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ABSTRACT 
Dimitrios Zevgolis 
Socialism. Nationalism and European Integration: The Development of Theory and 
Practice 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. University of Durham 1999 
The late twentieth century has seen a triple crisis on the left: a crisis of socialism in all 
its mainstream expressions, a crisis of the state, but also a reaffirmation of the appeals 
of nationalism. The thesis is an attempt to examine the relationship between these 
developments in the context of the process of European integration. It starts with the 
difficult relation between socialism and nationalism, from the founding fathers of 
scientific socialism, through to their followers in the so-called golden age of socialism, 
and the practice of the Internationals. It looks briefly at the way the German SPD and 
the French Socialists reacted to the process of European integration, showing the 
predominance of national interests, which combined with the internal party problems 
and socialist beliefs, resulted in a confusion manifested in their rhetoric and 
vocabulary. An account is offered of some socialist thinkers who paid attention to 
European integration in the 1970s. The French Rocardians, Ernest Mandel and Johan 
Galtung are shown to have failed to understand the importance of nationalism and 
remained preoccupied with statism. The exception is Altiero Spinelli, who, as both 
thinker and practitioner, developed a unique non-doctrinaire vision of socialism, 
coupled with an understanding of national differences. His federalism and his pro-
European stance incorporated notions and ideas that were to dominate the socialist 
discourse of today. Finally there is an examination of issues that currently dominate 
the discussion about the future of socialism. These can be divided into arguments 
about the state, the working class and the new radicalism, and democracy and the 
ideas of choice, rights, autonomy and the market. Spinelli had touched upon all these 
issues with a particular reference to European integration and opened up for socialists 
the European horizon. In conclusion, it is argued that while European integration is 
not a socialist enterprise, it might be used to further its aims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global political landscape has undergone massive changes since 1945, in 
particular with the phenomena of decolonisation and globalisation. The rate of 
change in many respects has intensified in the last ten years. On the European scene, 
the process of European integration gathered a new momentum in the eighties and 
the idea of a united western Europe seemed closer than ever. In addition, the year 
1989 signified, after seventy years, the end of what was known as existing socialism 
in the eastern half of the continent. As Nairn has remarked, there were three major 
strands in this upheaval against communism. There was a democratic rebellion 
against one-party autocracy, there was an economic revulsion against the command 
economy, and last but not least, there was the re-emergence of national identity.1 
The present thesis is an attempt to discuss the relation between nationalism and 
socialism, in the light of these developments, i.e. the end of communism, the process 
of integration in Western Europe and the process of disintegration in the East. The 
closing decade of the twentieth century has witnessed rapid transformations of the 
way we understand the operation of these two ideological traditions. Much 6f our 
traditional understanding of socialism revolved around two interrelated types of 
regime ~ the communist command economies of the USSR and Eastern Europe and 
the mixed economy welfare states of Western Europe. We have seen the end of the 
communist era in what used to be described as Eastern Europe, but also the rise of 
assertive forms of nationalism in that region At the same time, the existing practice 
of social democracy in Western Europe has come under a series of pressures. The 
1 Nairn, T. Faces of Nationalism: Janus revisited. (London, Verso, 1997), pp.57-8 
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popular socialist political movements have seen their working class base of support 
increasingly questioned, and the traditional statist welfare objectives reconsidered. 
And the developing process of European integration has undermined the very states 
which are required to deliver social democratic policies and legitimate them through 
membership of national political communities. The possible replacement of nation-
states by supranational political authorities, perhaps in the form of a federal United 
States of Europe, raises major issues which socialist theorists and politicians have to 
confront. 
So the major thrust of this thesis is to reconsider the relationship between nationalism 
and socialism, with particular reference to European integration and the changing 
political agenda of which this is a key part. This requires an examination of the way 
various socialist parties and thinkers have reacted specifically to this process of 
integration. But it also involves some assessment of the wider global setting to see 
how the socialist understanding fits with the reality of the modern world. 
The approach in this thesis has been to consider socialism as an ideology and as a 
practical application. The analysis follows the framework on ideology developed by 
Manning and Robinson. 
Political ideology is not the systematic investigation of our political life in a 
way which is rationally superior to, or supersedes, what in the past has been 
relied upon in determining the form ofpolitical life. It is the form of language 
which has always made the construction or reconstruction of political life 
possible or impossible.2 
2 Manning, D.J. & Robinson, T.J. The Place of Ideology in Political Life . (Kent. Croom Helm, 1985), p. 121 
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I see socialist ideology therefore as the language which can make possible the 
construction or reconstruction of political life. My aim is to provide a synthesis for 
understanding the new socialist language, a language that can facilitate the 
construction of a socialist polity in the contemporary world. One of the major points 
that has struck me throughout the preparation of this thesis has been certain broad 
similarities and parallels between socialism and nationalism. Their philosophical 
roots are the same, their practices are similar. Both, nationalism based on Kant and 
socialism based on Marx, regard human history as a long process of struggle. They 
both need an actor in history. For nationalism the actor is the nation, for socialism 
traditionally it has been the class. They both see mankind as divided, the first into 
nations, the second into classes. As far as their practice is concerned, violence, 
collectivism, and belief in, and glorification of, the state are fundamental to both. It 
should not be surprising then that the dividing line between them is blurred. And if 
one substitutes class for nation it becomes even more so. It follows therefore that the 
state figures prominently in my discussion. The development of socialist strategies 
about the state as a means and as an end has also been one of my guidelines. 
The main elements of the argument of the thesis may be summarised as follows. 
It is contended that from the founding era of socialism, both its theorists (especially 
Marx and his successors) and its political leaders have generally failed to understand 
the power of nationalism. Their preoccupation with economic factors and with the 
state and political structures led to failures both at the theoretical and practical level 
in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Since then European 
5 
integration has become an important new phenomenon affecting the power and role 
of nation-states, which has required analysis and action by socialists. In fact both the 
German SPD and the French SFIO/PS dealt with European integration in accordance 
with perceived interests emanating from the two nation-states, rather than for 
specifically socialist reasons. Socialist theoreticians were slow to recognize the new 
phenomenon, and three of the theoretical approaches (Rocardiens, Johan Galtung and 
Ernest Mandel) towards European integration each failed to provide a satisfactory 
analysis ~ through a combination of factors including the failure to appreciate 
nationalism or national questions, and partly because they too were preoccupied with 
"statism". On the other hand, one figure, Altiero Spinelli was successful, and that this 
was both because of his appreciation of nations and the importance of federalism, 
and because he was flexible and non-doctrinaire in his understanding of socialism. 
Since Spinelli's analysis, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and growing criticisms of 
the strategy and achievements of traditional Social-Democracy have given rise to 
various new approaches in left-wing theory. These include new discussions about 
agencies of transformation, and the relationship of traditional socialist values to 
democracy and the market. For European socialists it is increasingly evident that the 
existence and development of the European Union in a more interdependent world 
must be the terrain where debates about such values must be conducted i f they are to 
be realised. 
The organisation of the thesis follows a plan to allow this set of arguments to be 
described and developed in detail. The first chapter is an examination of the difficult 
relationship between socialism and nationalism. The theoretical foundations of 
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nationalism and socialism are examined, and the failure of socialism to appreciate the 
nationalist phenomenon in theory and in practice during the period of the Socialist 
and Communist Internationals is illustrated. Having established these themes, in the 
second chapter there is an examination of the way socialist parties have reacted to the 
process of European integration since 1945. Because the nation-state has been 
heavily relied upon by socialists as the unit of change, any attempts to unite the 
European continent have always been looked upon by the socialist parties through the 
looking glass of their respective national states. The parties chosen for consideration 
are the German SPD, and the French socialists (SFIO and later PS). There are good 
reasons for doing so. They are parties from the two most important original member 
states in European integration. France and Germany have been the major actors in the 
process of integration in western Europe after the second World War. Both parties 
have had a long intellectual tradition and have produced constructive debates 
regarding the theory of socialism from the period of the First International onwards. 
And both, although not at the same time, have been in office during important phases 
of the integration process, so they had the opportunity to have a substantial input in 
European policy formation in their respective countries, either while in office, or 
while in opposition. Moreover, the way both responded to European integration was 
in accordance with perceived interests emanating from their respective nation-states. 
Although it is not part of the purpose of the thesis to review the academic literature 
on theories and explanations of European integration, it is worth noting that these 
findings on the behaviour of political parties fit well with the 'domestic politics' 
model advanced by Bulmer and others.3 
3 Bulmer, S. "Domestic politics and European Community Policy-Making" , Journal of Common 
Market Studies , Vol.XXII, no.4 (June 1983), pp.349-63. In many respects this model is a subset of 
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In the third chapter the ideas of several individual socialist theorists on integration in 
Europe are investigated. They have been chosen because they represent different 
schools of socialist thought and some variety of practical experience. So by 
examining their work we get a fuller picture of the socialist response to the process of 
integration in Europe as it had developed by the 1970s. Galtung was chosen because 
he was an academic. We deal therefore with an intellectual who was not a 
practitioner of politics and who had the ability, free from the daily problems and 
responsibilities of actual politics, to follow his line of thought without any party 
obstacles. Mandel, an active Trotskyist internationalist and prolific theorist, had 
served as the leader of the Fourth International. We have here therefore a 
theoretically sophisticated active politician, but one who in effect worked within a 
revolutionary sect and thus was outside the conventional traditional party 
mechanisms. He represented a strand of socialist thought that had not been put into 
practice and was not associated with any of the governments or the regimes in either 
half of the continent. Finally, the French Rocardians were chosen because they are a 
classic example of the traditional socialist believers who had inherited the Jacobin 
assumptions about the power of the nation-state, but nevertheless later had to revise 
their ideas when Rocard himself served as Prime Minister. As we shall see, all three 
approaches failed to provide a satisfactory analysis because they were unable to 
appreciate nationalism and because they spent most of their time dealing with the 
"state". The fourth chapter deals with the exceptional case of Spinelli, whose 
achievement was significant because he appreciated the importance of both, nations 
the influential integovernmental school, represented by works such as the historical approach in 
Milward, A. The European Rescue of the Nation State (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1992), and from international political economy in Moravcsik, A. "Preferences and Power in the 
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach" Journal of Common Market Studies 
Vol. X X X I no. 4 (1993) pp.473-524. 
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and federalism, and combined this with a non-doctrinaire understanding of socialism. 
His was an independent mind, and his case is particularly interesting because he had 
the opportunity to try to put his ideas into practice when he served as a European 
Commissioner and as an MEP. He is the connecting link between old and new 
socialism. Socialism in a transformed world is the topic of the fifth chapter. It 
attempts to reflect the substantial and rapidly developing recent literature in this field. 
This long chapter is divided into three sections. They correspond to the three 
directions socialist thinking has been developing the last few years. These three 
directions are interrelated and form a network of ideas which had to be treated 
together. The three sections are as follows: new socialist ideas about the unit of 
change; reconsiderations of the agent of transformation; and the essential 
distinguishing qualities of socialist theory and practice. The issues of globalization, 
the search for a new social base, and the establishment of a new synthesis of values 
to include the ideas of participation and the market respectively, figure prominently 
in these discussions. 
The thesis examines the relationship between the idea of the nation-state and 
socialism, following it through a series of studies of the reactions of socialists to the 
process of European integration, and culminating in recent debates about the future 
of socialism. How can the dynamics demonstrated in the process of European 
integration contribute to this broader debate? This is a major question and in the 
conclusion some provisional answers will be offered. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Nationalism and Socialism: Dangerous Liaisons 
INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter examines the difficult relationship between Nationalism and 
Socialism. Firstly, it examines the history and the philosophical origins of 
nationalism from its early days to the end of the imperial era. Then it looks at the 
classical socialist thought which largely ignored nationalism. It discusses the post-
Marxian socialist thinkers and their inconclusive attempts to tackle nationalism. 




Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission 
as brothers into the fellowship of the Peoples. You are the bastards of 
humanity. Soldiers without a banner, Israelites among the nations, you will 
find neither faith nor protection; none will be sureties for you.4 
Nationalism is a doctrine about man, society and politics, which emerged in Europe 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although it seems to have been developing 
in the .west, and in France in particular, since the end of the Middle Ages. Originally, 
as Berlin observed, it took the form of the protection of customs and privileges of 
regions, corporations, states and ultimately nations, from the dangers posed by some 
foreign power, universal or supranational authority.5 
Nationalism is, first of all, a political doctrine which seeks the merging of the 
political and the national beings6. According to Kedourie7 the fully developed 
doctrine claims that mankind is naturally divided into nations identified by distinct 
detectable features and that national self-determination is the only legitimate type of 
government. It purports to offer a guide-line for measuring the unit of population 
4 Mazzini, J. "The Duties of Man" , in Mazzini, J. The Duties of Man and other essays , (London, J.M.Dent & 
Sons Ltd., 1907),p.53 
5 Berlin, I. "The Bent Twig: a Note on Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, no. 1 (October 1972), p. 15 
6 Gellner, E . Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983). Greek edition, translated by D.Lafazani, 
Ethni kai Ethnikismos , (Athens, Alexandria, 1992), p. 13 
7 On nationalism see Kedourie, E. Nationalism , (London, Hutchinson, 1966). There other authors who adopt 
different lines. See for example Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism , (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), and Minogue, 
K.R. Nationalism , (London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969) amongst others. 
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proper to have a government specifically of its own, for the legitimate exercise of 
power in the state and for the correct organization of international society.8 
Nationalism was neither left, nor right since these are concepts that appeared later in 
the course of European history. Its philosophical origins are to be found in the 
thought of Kant (1724-1804). For him, morality is an objective requirement 
independent from knowledge, and based on a universal moral law. This he called the 
categorical imperative, and it is only when our will is guided by it that we can be free 
in the strictest sense. Therefore, this Kantian formula of the free autonomous will, 
makes the individual the master of the universe. In his treatise on Perpetual Peace 
(1794) he listed the requirements for a stable international order. The first was that all 
states should be republican, i.e. that the laws should be the expression of the citizens' 
autonomous will. The second was that international law should be based on a federal 
system of free states. And third, that the common law will be limited to the principles 
of hospitality which allows foreigners the right to visit one country, but not to reside 
there permanently.9 Thus, Kant's ethical theory was translated into a political one. A 
few points should be noted here. From the first requirement it seems that Kant 
believed that the majority of citizens would never consent to a war, a claim that has 
yet to be verified. And from the third it seems that he advocates the culturally pure 
state. The great majority of the population should, for Kant, be made up of citizens, 
and not foreigners or slaves. For him nature has introduced various languages and 
religions to prevent the amalgamation of different nations.10 Three years later in The 
Metaphysic of Morals Kant transformed self-determination into a dynamic doctrine 
8 Kedourie, E. Nationalism .(London, Hutchinson, 1966), p.9 
9 Kant, I. "Zum ewigen Frieden", in Kants Werke (VIII), (Berlin, Ak.-Ausg, 1968) Greek edition Gia tin Aionia 
EiriniiAthens, Alexandria, 1992), pp.36-53 
1 0 Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden", pp.63-4 
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by suggesting that in both, the individual and society, virtue is achieved through 
struggle. For J.G.Fichte, Kant's account of the possibility and the limits of human 
knowledgewas not adequate, and he argued that the world can be nothing more than 
the product of a universal consciousness, transcending all individual human beings, 
and as such is more important than all its constituent parts. This, translated into a 
state theory, means that the state is more important than its parts, i.e. the individuals. 
It is clear therefore, that since pure freedom means complete absorption to the whole, 
for Fichte and the other post-Kantians, individual freedom can be secured only i f 
individual life is completely regulated by the state which is perceived as the 
embodiment of the collective. 
The state-compact is, therefore, a compact which each single citizen enters into 
with the actual Whole, which Whole results from the agreements of the single 
individuals with each other, and whereby he becomes One with this Whole in 
regard to a certain part of his rights, receiving in return the rights of 
sovereignty." 
In such a way the categorical imperative can be achieved only through society. This 
theory strongly resembles Rousseau's notion of the General Wil l . But whereas 
Rousseau never offered a systematic theory of the state, Kant's followers saw it as 
the fulfillment of human destiny. 
Observing the conditions of the various German states in the early 1800s, which 
denied opportunity to bright young people of lower social origin like themselves, the 
post-Kantians developed a detestation for the favoritism associated with the 
absolutism of the era. In his lectures on The Characteristics of the Present Age 
(1806) Fichte argued that, the state should capitalize on the abilities of all citizens by 
abolishing favoritism, in order to increase its own internal strength, and assigned to 
13 
the state the role of the promotion of culture, which he regarded as the process 
whereby man becomes really man. 
Schiller in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, written in 1795, advocated 
the harmonization of every man's existence with the archetypal man who is 
represented by the state. The latter, as representative of the whole must eradicate 
individualism.1 2 Commenting on the Europe of his day, he mourned the separation of 
enjoyment from labour and the fragmentation of the state, the church, the laws and 
customs, and above all of society into individuals.13 Later this theme was to be 
echoed in Marx's theory of alienation. The cure for that, according to Schiller, should 
be the state, which was called to create human freedom, but not from the outside and 
in the material sense, but in the spiritual sense and from inside. By merging their 
individual wills with that of the state the people find freedom, by complying with the 
actions and the laws of the state. Through it man realizes himself. What he calls "the 
aesthetic state' asserts the wil l of the whole through the nature of the individual. 1 4 As 
we shall see, this glorification of, and reliance on, the state has been the cornerstone 
of much socialist practice and policy, in both, its orthodox and revisionist varieties 
this century. And although the various advocates of decentralised socialism do not 
share this characteristic, they remained a minority voice with little influence on 
mainstream political parties and governments of the left. 1 5 This march to self-
" Fichte, J.G. The Science of Rights, trans, by A.E.Kroeger, pref. by W.T.Harris, intro. by C.Sherover, (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p.230 
1 2 See Schiller, F. Uber Die Aesthetische Erziehune Pes Menschen . I have used the Greek edition Gia tin 
Esthitiki Paideia tou Anthropou (Athens, Odysseas, 1990) pp.78-84 
1 3 Schiller. Gia tin Esthitiki Paideia. p.91 
1 4 Schiller. Gia tin Esthitiki Paideia. pp. 167-8 
1 5 As Nairn has noticed anarchism does not suffer from this effect. Since the principle of anarchism is that all 
state forms are an inhuman curse, nationalism becomes irrelevant. Marxists cannot take this course of sublime 
evasion because they "think politically" and admit that the Revolution will, temporarily at least, take the form of 
a state. T.Nairn, "Internationalism: a critique", p.37, in Nairn, T. Faces of Nationalism: Janus revisited , (London, 
Verso, 1997) 
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realization is not an easy one. As we have seen, for Kant, to reach autonomy man 
must strive against the heteronomous natural inclinations. 
The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the 
duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only 
does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of duty and to 
the morality of the will.16 
The Kantian notion of struggle reasserts its position. This struggle accounts for the 
passage from barbarity to civilization. For Kant, as later for Marx, human history is a 
long process of struggle, although for the first it is a struggle between good and evil 
as found in man himself, whereas for the latter it is a struggle between classes. And 
even though man might want peace, this is contrary to nature, since it is only through 
war that he can achieve the life of reason. Again, violence is the common 
denominator ~ as war for Kant, and class-war for Marx. Therefore, a universal 
community is undesirable, and unnatural, as it can only be a despotic one, 
contravening nature's wil l . In order to prevent the realization of this universal 
community, nature has introduced linguistic and religious differences among the 
nations of the earth. The conflict between these nations advances, though not 
directly, the self realization of humanity as a whole. 
In 1774 Herder17 wrote his Another Philosophy of History, introducing the idea of 
diversity. He expanded on that with the Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of 
Man, published between 1784 and 1791. For him diversity is a basic feature of the 
world and it is manifestly a divine creation. Connected with this is his theory of 
language, as expanded in his Treatise upon the Origin of Language, written in 1772. 
1 6 Kant, I. Critique of Practical Reason , trans., ed., and intro. by L.White Beck, (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1949), p,144 
1 7 See Ergang, R.R. Herder and German Nationalism , (New York, Columbia University Press, 1931) and Berlin, 
I. Vico and Herder: Two studies in the history of ideas, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1980) 
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Language was born with man's attempts to express his feelings towards the things 
and events he encounters in his life. As such language is perceived as distinct, as the 
product of a particular history and the legacy of a distinctive tradition. 1 8 This is taken 
to imply that every individual national culture has a value of its own, which has to be 
kept pure and undiluted. This view of language as being associated with distinct 
cultural communities indeed goes back to Herodotus, who held that the Greeks 
constituted one people because they were of common descent, and they had common 
religion, customs, ways of life, and finally, common language.19 The combination of 
these elements, of individual fulfillment through assimilation to the state, of struggle, 
of self-determination and of diversity, created the modern nationalist doctrine. In 
nationalism language, race, culture, and occasionally religion, form distinct 
components of the original national whole. Nationalism divides humanity into 
separate and distinct nations which should constitute sovereign states. The members 
of a nation reach freedom and fulfillment by emphasizing their own exclusive 
national identity and by sacrificing their individuality for the greater national 
totality. 2 0 Nations can be defined on the basis of the will of the group to form a unit, 
and on the basis of the common culture, at a time that these two come together and 
meet the political unit. 
Hobsbawm has observed that the nation was equated to the state, for the first time, in 
the French Declaration of Rights of 1795 which stated that, 
1 8 Kedourie, Nationalism , p.62 
1 9 Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780, ( Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.58' 
9 
2 0 Kedourie, Nationalism , p.73 
2 1 Gellner, EthnL, p. 106 
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Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who 
compose it and the extent of the territory it occupies. This sovereignty is 
inalienable22 
At that time the main national characteristic was the promotion of the common, as 
opposed to the particular, interest, and the common good against privilege. From this 
revolutionary-democratic point of view, as suggested by the 18 t h century American 
use of the term, ethnic differences were, in common with later socialism, seen as 
marginal.23 At the time when the doctrine of nationalism was developed the continent 
was in turmoil. The French revolution of 1789 killed the monarchy and the old social 
order, and introduced the principle of right of secession for communities and 
individuals, as well as the principle that state and linguistic boundaries should 
coincide. These had revolutionary consequences. Language came to be seen as a 
basic national characteristic. For Fichte language constitutes an internal national 
boundary, and any attempt to mix different linguistic groups wil l result in national 
confusion and disturbance. 
In 1796-97 General Bonaparte invaded Italy and occupied Venice. From there he sent 
agents to the Ionian islands to raise up the islanders against their Venetian rulers, by 
reminding them of the glory of ancient Greece and urging them to revive it. When he 
became emperor he continued this tactic. Nationalism had entered the vocabulary of 
European politics for good, and later Mazzini became its best known advocate.24 He 
founded Young Italy, a secret society to promote Italian unification by means of 
guerrilla warfare which he regarded as the best method to achieve national liberation 
from foreign rulers. In the organization's Manifesto he offered his credo: 
quoted in Hobsbawm, Nations, p. 19 
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Love of country, abhorrence of Austria, and a burning desire to throw off her yoke, 
are passions now universally diffused, and the compromises inculcated by fear, or a 
mistaken notion of tactics and diplomacy, will be abandoned, and vanish before the 
majesty of the national will. In this respect, therefore, the question may be regarded 
as lying between tyranny driven to its last and most desparate struggle, and those 
resolved to bravely dare its overthrow.25 
In 1857 he drew up a map of the future Europe of nations that comprised only twelve 
states and federations, applying the nationality principle to nations of a certain size 
only, in order for them to be economically viable.2 6 Hobsbawm calls this the 
threshold principle. 
As Hobsbawm has pointed out, the nation in popular proto-nationalism is closely 
associated with a set of characteristics. These include language, ethnicity (usually 
connected with common origin and descent, seen as the source of the common 
characteristics of the members of an ethnic group), religion (with Poland and Ireland 
providing examples of the link between the latter and national consciousness), and 
the awareness of being part of a lasting political entity.2 8 
As we have seen nationalism as a product of the French revolution spread to the rest 
of the continent, in Germany, Italy, Greece and other parts of the Ottoman empire. At 
roughly the same time, the new world witnessed the emergence of what Anderson 
calls Creole nationalism. Influenced by the European enlightenment and squeezed by 
the tightening of Madrid's control, South and Central American landowners fought 
for national independence and re-defined the large, non-Spanish speaking 
2 3 Hobsbawm, Nations , p.20 
2 4 For more about Mazzini see Mack Smith, D. Mazzini, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994) 
2 5 Mazzini, G. "Manifesto of Young Italy" , in Mazzini, G. Selected Writings ed. by N.Gangulee, (London, 
Lindsay Drummond Limited, 1945), p. 128 
2 6 Mazzini, J. The Duties of Man and other essays, (London, J.M.Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1907) 
2 7 Hobsbawm, Nations, p.31 
2 8 Hobsbawm, Nations, p.63 
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populations of the colonies, as fellow-nationals.29 And in Africa, according to Oliver, 
nationalism was introduced by the colonial masters who looked for something 
equivalent, in broad terms, to what they understood in the nineteenth century by the 
term nation. 3 0 Between 1880 and 1914 nationalism underwent a triple transformation 
as it abandoned the threshold principle of the liberal era, ethnicity and language came 
to be recognized as the main criteria of potential nationhood, and nationalism was 
increasingly associated with the political right 3 1. Nationalism reached its peak with 
the application of the Wilsonian principle of nationality at the Versailles settlement, 
following the Great European War of 1914-18. For Anderson this brought the age of 
high dynasticism to an end as by 1922, Habsbourgs, Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and 
Ottomans were gone, and the League of Nations, which included non-Europeans, 
replaced the Congress of Berlin. Thereafter the nation-state became the legitimate 
international standard, so that in the new organization even the surviving imperial 
powers were emphasizing their national, rather than imperial, identity. The Second 
World War signified the peak of the nation-state and by the mid-1970s even the 
Portuguese, the last remaining Empire was confined to history.3 2 
2 9 Anderson, B. Imagined Communities , (London, Verso, 1991) p.50 
3 0 Ascherson, N. "Africa's Lost History", The New York Review of Books , Vol.39, no. 11 (11 Nov. 1992), p.28 
3 1 Hobsbawm, Nations , p. 102 
3 2 Anderson, B. Imagined , p. 113 
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2. MARXISM AND NATIONALISM 
Marxism and nationalism coincided in chronological terms. Marx was born near the 
beginning of the nationalist era and the Communist Manifesto was published in the 
nationalist year 1848. It offered the credo of Marxist proletarian internationalism. 
Since society, in the capitalist world, is divided into the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, which are hostile to each other, there are no boundaries of nationalist 
nature between workers of different nationalities. A l l workers are united in their 
struggle against their common enemy. This universal proletarian solidarity renders all 
wars anti-proletarian in the sense that where all profits go to the capitalists, it is the 
workers that must bear the human and material cost. Therefore it is in the interest of 
the working class to prevent war from taking place. 
According to Connor, whereas for nationalism the most fundamental cleavages of 
mankind are the many vertical ones separating people into ethnonational groups, for 
Marxism, in contrast, they are the horizontal class distinctions that cut across these 
very groups. Consequently for a nationalist, in contrast to a Marxist, in conditions of 
social tension the national consciousness would prove more powerful than class 
awareness.33 
Marx did not offer a systematic theory of the national question and he did not 
develop a proletarian strategy in this domain, since for him, as well as for Engels, 
both nations and nationalism were relegated to the superstructure. The nation was for 
the founders of Marxism, a vehicle, an economic unit, and national differences were 
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going to vanish as the bourgeoisie was developing a world uniformity in the mode of 
production. It has been estimated that by Roux that only 2 to 3 per cent of their 
writings deal with nationalism, and this is even more marginal from the qualitative 
viewpoint.3 4 
Avineri has distinguished two different paradigms in the Marxist treatment of the 
subject. One, the pre-1848 or pre-modern paradigm, to be found in the Manifesto, 
and which characterizes the cosmopolitan and internationalist heritage of the socialist 
movement. 
National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and 
more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of 
commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in 
the conditions of life corresponding thereto. 
The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United 
action, of the leading civilized countries at last, is one of the first conditions for 
the emancipation of the proletariat. 
In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put to an end, 
the exploitation of one nation by another will so be put to an end. In 
proportion as the antagonisms between classes within the nation vanishes, the 
hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.36 
The second is the post-1848 or bourgeois paradigm, which sees nationalism as a 
superstructural expression, as a building block of capitalism. 
In his early period writings on Ireland Marx elaborated three themes that became very 
important for the Marxist theory of national self-determination and which refer to 
3 3 Connor, W. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, (Princeton N.J., Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p. 5 
3 4 quoted in Fisera, V . C . & Minnerup, G. "Marx, Engels and the National Question" in Cahm, E . & Fisera, V .C. 
(ed.) Socialism and Nationalism Vol.1 , (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978), p.5 
3 5 Avineri, S. "Marxism and Nationalism" , Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.26 (1991), pp.639-40 
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proletarian internationalism. One, only the national liberation of the oppressed 
nations will erase national divisions and antagonisms and wi l l unite the workers of 
both nations against the capitalists. Two, by oppressing another nation the 
bourgeoisie reinforces its ideological hegemony over the oppressing nation's 
proletariat. Three, bourgeois ideological, economic, political and military domination 
is undermined in the oppressor nation, by the emancipation of the oppressed one.37 
Connor has summarized the implications of the classic position of Marx and Engels 
on nationalism. Nations and nationalism are products of the capitalist era, and 
therefore part of the superstructure based upon this particular economic system. 
Nationalism is a temporary political phenomenon that wi l l disappear along with 
capitalism. It can be a progressive force, before a society's development, but it is a 
reactionary one afterward. In both its forms nationalism is in essence an ideology in 
the bourgeoisie's service, first helping to destroy feudalism and then obstructing the 
workers from realizing their own interest. This device, nevertheless, can not work in 
the long term since loyalties are determined by economic realities rather than by 
ethnonational sentiments. Any movement, nationalist or not, must be supported i f it 
represents the most progressive alternative. Communists themselves must remain 
above nationalism. Endorsement of national self-determination may be a good 
strategy but the decision about it must be made on an individual basis. The ultimate 
criterion on whether or not to support a national movement is its relationship to the 
•50 
broader demand of the whole international movement-
3 6 Marx, K. & Engels, F. "The Communist Manifesto", in Feuer, L.S. (ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on 
Politics and Philosophy, (Glasgow, Fontana, 1984), pp. 67-8 
3 7 Lowy, M. "Marxists and the National Question", New Left Review , no.96 (March/April 1976), p.83 
3 8 Connor, National Question , pp. 11 -4 
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An issue that should be stressed here is the significance of the abortive 1848-9 
revolutions. The defeat of the German national democratic movement was a 
disappointment for Marx and Engels who had counted upon it. In France the armed 
confrontation between the bourgeois state and the proletariat made clear the 
distinction between democracy and socialism and exposed the weakness of the notion 
of class partnership.39 Marx condemned all liberals as cowards and saboteurs. And in 
the light of the 1848 events he progressively renounced the entire previous notion of 
the seizure of power by an elite, and dismissed the idea of collaboration with the 
bourgeoisie. It can be said that this distinguishes the earlier from the later phases of 
his thought and, to a degree, provides some of the grounds which were to be 
exploited in the subsequent division between communism and social democracy. The 
founders of scientific socialism were not consistent in their terminology. Changes 
and ambiguities within the work of Marx have been exploited in different ways. On 
the one hand the communists based their strategy on the idea of the party as a small 
group of committed individuals holding absolute power and educating the proletariat. 
On the other hand, the social democratic strategy of moving slowly and cautiously 
through recognized parliamentary institutions and trade unionism could be presented 
as the legitimate child of the master's post 1848 analysis.40 Finally, the revolutionary 
failures led Marx and Engels to advance the theory of the non-historic nations41 (a 
Hegelian notion), i.e. those which have not been able to form national states and are 
therefore underdeveloped in capitalist terms. Such underdeveloped nations like the 
Southern Slavs, the Scots, the Basques etc. are intrinsically counter-revolutionary. 
3 9 Lichtheim, G. A Short History of Socialism , (London, Flamingo, 1983), pp.59-65 
4 0 Berlin, I. Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 3rd edition , (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), 
pp. 174-188 
4 1 For a discussion see Rosdolsky, R. Eneels and the "Nonhistone" Peoples: the National Question in the 
Revolution of 1848 , trans, and ed. by J.P.Himka, (Glasgow, Critique Books, 1987) 
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Consequently, their pro-independence movements should be discouraged because 
they would delay the forthcoming proletarian revolution as their national survival 
could occur only by moving backwards to the pre-capitalist period of national 
formation.4 2 
As Lowy observed, while the Manifesto of the Communist Party offered the 
foundation for proletarian internationalism, it failed to provided a concrete political 
strategy for the nation state and the national question.43 According to Nairn, ...the 
theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historic failure.44 
This failure has influenced the whole socialist movement, as dominated by Marxism, 
ever since. But on this issue Marx did not differ significantly from most of his 
socialist precursors and contemporaries. The early socialists shared his dislike of, and 
relative lack of interest, in nationalism. Saint-Simon described the nation as follows: 
The nation holds as a fundamental principle that the poor should be generous 
to the rich, and that therefore the poorer classes should daily deprive 
themselves of necessities in order to increase the superfluous luxury of the 
rich45 
He believed that the spread of industry was making the nations increasingly 
interdependent, and classes rather than nations, were coming to have more in 
common. His industrial class, composed by both proletarians and capitalists, was 
destined to create a new peaceful international order since its class interests could not 
be served by war. Therefore war was destined to disappear together with feudalism. 
4 2 Nimni, E. Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis, (London, Pluto Press, 1991), 
pp.30-1 
4 3 Lowy, Marxists , p.83 
4 4 Nairn, T. "The Modern Janus" , New Left Review, no.94 (Nov/Dec. 1975), p.3 
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For Proudhon war was the result of the class dominated political order, as social 
classes are equally warlike. 
Our fundamental proposition is that the primary cause of all disruption and 
war is endemic to society, and that this cause is poverty. Nations and 
corporations, individuals and governments, commoners and nobles, 
proletarians and princes-all suffer hardship.46 
Peace wil l come with the erosion of class domination and the abolition of its 
expression, i.e. the state. Although he did not belittle patriotism, he was afraid of 
strident nationalism that destroys narrower loyalties and strengthens the state at the 
expense of other social associations.47 
There have been offered two explanations for this lack of treatment of nationalism by 
Marx. Although they might at first sight seem contradictory, I believe they are in 
essence complementary. Enlightenment rationalism and Hegelianism are the two 
dominant themes in classic Marxist thought. For Berlin, on the one hand, the heritage 
of the Enlightenment is to be blamed for the absence of a serious and coherent 
Marxist theory of nationalism. Together with the French Revolution of 1789 it made 
men very conscious of change and provoked interest in the laws that governed i t . 4 8 
Condorcet went as far as to attempt the application of mathematical methods to 
social policy that would usher in that a reign of virtue, knowledge and happiness in 
order to end cruelty, misery and oppression.49 At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century Saint-Simon, a follower of Condorcet, foresaw the revolutionary role of 
4 5 Saint Simon, H. Comte de "First extract from the Organizer", in Saint Simon, H. Comte de Selected Writings , 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1952), p.72 
4 6 Proudhon, P.J. "The Economic Resolution of Conflict", in Proudhon, P.J. Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon (London. MacMillan, 1969), p.209 
4 7 Plamenatz, J. Man and Society , Vol.2 (Essex, Longman, 1963), pp. 120-5 
4 8 Berlin, "The Bent Twig", p.l I 
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applied science and industrial organization and the human domination over nature. 
For Marx, the Saint-Simonian administration of things would be then achieved by the 
productive forces of society, the relationships of which were the main factors that 
determined the social relationships which constituted the so-called superstructure.50 
Under these circumstances Marx-Engels, and most nineteenth century socialist 
thinkers, although aware of the existence of nationalism ignored it as something in 
the verge of extinction. 
For Pelczynski, on the other, this so-called blind spot is the product of the Hegelian 
heritage in Marxism. 5 1 The origins of Marxism are to be found in Hegel's 
philosophy, which, in turn, is partly a reaction to Kant's philosophy. For Hegel most 
of the individual's right and duties, as well as interests and claims, are connected 
with the his participation in lesser associations which constitute the Civil Society. 
This is the link between the individual and the state, the latter being the object of a 
person's supreme duty. Since the state provides the only standard of right there is no 
morality between states.52 He regarded the state as the means by which the nation 
emerges, which is the synthesis of the different artistic, religious and cultural 
traditions in which mind exhibited itself. For Hegel, 
A Nation that has not formed itself into a state-a mere Nation-has strictly 
speaking no history, like the Nations which existed in a condition of savagery.53 
4 9 Berlin, "The Bent Twig" , p. 12 
5 0 Berlin, "The Bent Twig", p. 13 
5 1 Pelczynski, Z.A. "Nation, civil society, state: Hegelian sources of the Marxist non-theory of nationality", in 
Pelczynski, Z.A. (ed.) The State and Civil Society, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.262 
5 2 Peters, R.S. "Hegel and the Nation-State" in Thomson, D. (ed.) Political Ideas , (Middlesex, Penguin, 1969), 
p.133 
5 3 quoted in Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State" , p. 138 
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According to Peters, Marx borrowed the Hegelian assumption that there is a dialectic 
development in historic change which has an essence.54 But he substituted the 
Hegelian view that history exhibits "mind clothing itself with the form of event" and 
developing towards the absolute, with the view that it presented the human effort to 
manipulate nature by productive techniques and the different types of social 
organization which for him, kept pace with these developments by some kind of pre-
fixed agreement.55 He transformed the Hegelian notion of nations as fundamental 
expressions of "the self-developing self-consciousness of the world mind" into the 
notion of social classes accomplishing a historic target. Marx moreover, in 
correspondence to the Hegelian idea that the individual's and the state's interests and 
ideals were identical, perceived the individual's interests and ideals as identical to 
those of his social class. Accordingly, for Hegel's perception of permanent war 
among states and of the non-existence of inter-state morality, he substituted his 
perception of the inevitable class-war, seen as the motor of social change, and of the 
non-existence of inter-class morality. Finally, whereas for Hegel history presented a 
dialectical progression of ideas towards the absolute, for Marx it presented a 
progression towards a classless society.56 
Pelczynski observes that Marx and Engels embraced only one, the conception of civil 
society, out of the four main elements that constitute the nationalist part of the 
Hegelian social and political philosophy. The other three were the conception of the 
state as a politically organized nation, of world history as the formation, 
development, decline and dissolution of political communities which are in some 
sense nations, and of the self-realizing spirit which, through the activities of 
5 4 Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State" , p. 140 
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individuals and the spatial and temporal interactions of national communities, 
develop to ful l consciousness.57 
For Hegel civil society has a universalistic and homogenizing tendency, which is 
reinforced by the conception of universal human rights, and which leads to an 
antagonistic relationship between civil society and the nation. Even though civil 
society helps man to become an individual by promoting his personal happiness, it is 
not adequate since it disregards his capacity for public action on behalf of common 
ideals and interests. The latter is satisfied by the individual's membership of a 
national, community which itself must form a constitutional state, where the 
constitution ensures the identification of the individual with the national spirit. 5 8 The 
Hegelian notion of nationhood, in contrast to the above mentioned German Romantic 
one, is thus seen as essentially political. 
In the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx made three 
significant points. Firstly, he asserted the predominance of the civil society over the 
state, which are both seen as different forms of social life. For him a democratic state 
is essentially a non-constitutional one, since a state is impossible without the people 
who as a whole determine the common good and the general interest. Secondly, he 
dismissed the Hegelian idea of bureaucracy as a universal class, since he regarded 
direct democracy as a more adequate form of political life. Thirdly, the young Marx 
preferred a direct participatory, rather than a highly institutionalized, form of political 
life. As he put it, 
Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State", p. 140 
Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State", pp. 140-1 
Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.263 
Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", pp.265-6 
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The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social 
process of production - antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism 
but of an antagonism that emanates from the individual's social conditions of 
existence - but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society 
create also the material conditions for a solution to this antagonism. The 
prehistory of human society closes with this social formation.59 
Marx sees civil society as the main source of egoism and conflict. For him, therefore, 
real community life, which cannot be found in a democratic republic, wi l l be brought 
about with civil society's abolition, and this is the task of the proletariat. For Hegel 
economic life exists in a broader ethical, religious, legal and political context, and 
economic relations are subordinate to, and determined by, social reality as a whole. 6 0 
In The German Ideology, which was completed in the summer of 1846, Marx and 
Engels, in Hegelian terminology, made clear their differences with Hegel by stressing 
the centrality of the economic aspect of society, which was to become the central 
focus of their theory. For them History can be divided into periods corresponding to 
the different methods of production and forms of division of labour predominant in 
each of them. Consequently they came to the conclusion that all true history is that of 
the civil society, 
Our conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of 
production, starting out from the simple material production of life, and to 
comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this 
(i.e., civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history.61 
In this narrowed sense then, as Pelczynski has stressed, Marx saw civil society, as the 
aggregate of productive relations, which, in historical terms, was preceding the state 
and became the basis of all political and governmental institutions. He made 
5 9 Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy , (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), 
Preface, pp.21 -2 
6 0 Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.273 
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therefore a treble modification of Hegel's notion as he dehistoricized the concept, 
narrowed down the meaning of civil society, and reversed its relation to the state. In 
the course of history men manifest their basic character as members of society, i.e. as 
producers and exchangers, whereas their political awareness and national qualities do 
not constitute critical features of this character. In all historical stages the idea of 
political community and national identity has been an "illusion and false 
consciousness."62 
By founding their theory on Hegel's notion of civil society the founders of scientific 
socialism failed, by leaving it outside the framework, to pay sufficient attention to the 
national factor in history. By rejecting the conception of the state as a sovereign 
national community, they deprived their theory of a sound theoretical basis since they 
did not take into account the idea that state power might be, in the modern age after 
the French Revolution, increasingly a product of historically formed nations, or of 
groups who think of themselves as such. This state power protects national self-
assertion and values. It is worth noting here Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as 
recent examples of the vulnerability of states that are not perceived by their subjects 
to be the products of historically formed nations. And though they emphasize'd the 
advantages of a global community, they ignored the question whether such a society 
could ever be perceived by its citizens as a community and whether it could ever 
become a meaningful focus of loyalty and unity as nation states have managed to 
6 1 Marx, K. & Engels, F. "German Ideology", in Feuer, Marx and Engels , p.298 
6 2 Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.275 
6 3 Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", pp.275-6 
6 4 Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.277 
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Debray has offered a novel explanation for this lack of a Marxist theory of the nation. 
For him the nation has been Marxism's guilty conscience, and the absence of a theory 
of the nation is to be explained by the fact that Marx himself never offered a concept 
of nature. Since he only had concepts of what people produce he could not conceive 
of a concept of what humans do not determine, of what produces humans itself^ and 
this in turn explains the nonexistence of a Marxist theory of politics and culture, as 
both happen inside the nation state. 6 5 It must be noted here that this comment is 
contentious. For Schmidt, this is only the case at first sight, and the fact that Marx 
rarely referred to nature as such in his work does not mean that it plays an 
insignificant role in his theory for society. He saw nature from the beginning in 
relation to human activity.6 6 It plays an important role in his philosophical 
materialism, and 
since this relationship between man and nature is the precondition for the 
relationship between man and man , the dialectic of the labour-process as a 
natural process broadens out to become the dialectic of human history in 
general.61 
It can be said therefore, that for a variety of reasons which are intrinsic to his method 
of analysis, Marx failed to understand the power of popular nationalist feelings and 
the importance of such a political identity. The location of the fundamental 
explanatory factors in the economic sphere of society, and the understanding of the 
state as an expression of class power, did not provide room for the recognition of a 
possibly autonomous role for the phenomenon of nationalism. As a result, his 
followers faced a serious problem in developing a satisfactory theory of nationalism. 
6 5 Debray, R. "Marxism and the National Question", New Left Review, no. 105 (Sept./Oct. 1977), pp.30-1 
6 6 Schmidt, A. The concept of nature in Marx , (London, NLB, 1971), p. 15 
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Moreover, since in subsequent practice the capture of state power has been the only 
route to the implementation of socialist objectives, socialists have found it difficult to 
justify the national underpinning of the very instrument that could help them realize 
their "utopia". Marx's successors did not manage to solve the problem as we shall 
see in the next section. 
Schmidt, The concept of nature in Marx , p.61 
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3. POST-MARXIAN THINKERS AND NATIONALISM 
Nimni has argued that the main European Marxist discussions of the national 
question are characterized by three parameters, which explain the absence of a 
concrete socialist treatment of the nationalist phenomenon and are apparent in all 
Marxist studies of the subject.68 One is the theory of the universal evolution of the 
productive forces. This refers to an understanding of social transformation as a 
process that can be explained with universal laws of historical development. The 
second is the theory of the economic determination of the forces of production, which 
is a kind of economic reductionism. This appears in two forms. In the work of Marx-
Engels and of leading figures in the Second International, on the one hand, as 
epiphenomenality, i.e. an attempt to explain all aspects of the superstructure as 
reflections of the economic base. And in the policies of the Third International, on 
the other, as class reductionism, i.e. a belief in the social classes as the only historical 
subjects.69 Finally, following from the previous two, a eurocentric bias in the 
construction of a universal model of development based on the European 
7ft 
experience. The only attempts to break with them are the works of the Italian 
Antonio Gramsci and the Austrian Otto Bauer. 
As Absalom has noted, Gramsci nowhere confronted the nationalist problem as 
such.71 For Gramsci the proletariat can achieve predominance and become 
6 8 Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, p.6 
6 9 The political problems of the Second and the Third Internationals are discussed below in section 4. 
7 0 Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism , pp.6-11 
7 1 Absalom, R. "Gramsci's Contribution to the Debate" in Cahm, E. & Fisera, V.C. (ed.) Socialism and 
Natonalism Vol.1 , (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978), p.27 
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hegemonic only by forming alliances with the other sections of the working 
population. The term hegemony signifies the dominance of a class through all social, 
political and ideological spheres, and not only in the economic one, and its ability, 
because of that, to encourage other classes to see the world in terms favorable to this 
dominance. This implies a dissolution of class identities, thus escaping to a degree, 
class reductionism, since his conceptualization of main features of the political 
sphere from without this model constitutes an attempt to transform the Marxist 
understanding of the national problem. Discussing the Italian Southern Question 
Gramsci perceived the disparity between the country's north and south as a failure of 
the bourgeoisie to become a national class. Consequently, the working class is invited 
to become, through the endeavors of the Communists, the leading class which in 
cooperation with the peasants and other subordinated classes wil l build a national 
popular bloc and define a national collective will. 
The proletariat will destroy the southern agrarian bloc to the extent to which, 
through its Party, it succeeds in organising even larger masses of peasants in 
autonomous and independent formations.73 
The formation of a national consciousness is fundamental to the creation of a truly 
modern national state, a revolutionary act itself.7 4 
The problem with this analysis though is that always the leading element in the 
hegemonic relation must be either of the main classes, thus the freedom from the 
class-reductionist model becomes more limited. Moreover, Gramsci remained 
7 2 Scruton\ R. A Dictionary of Political Thought, (London, Pan Books, 1983), p.2GG 
7 3 Gramscii A. "The Southern Question" , in Gramsci, A. The Modern Prince and other writings , (New York, 
International Publishers, 1957), p.51 
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insensitive to the plurality of the national phenomenon, and the existence of various 
ethno-national groupings within the same state, since he took as given that nations 
and states always coincide.75 
In Habsburg Austria the nature of the multinational state forced the socialists to move 
forward from the class reductionist model in order to address the burning issues 
confronting them. The acute national animosities of the dual monarchy and their 
disastrous effects on the empire's political life, combined with the growing 
nationalist feelings among members of the socialist party forced the latter, with some 
reluctance though, to engage in experimental attempts in dealing with the nationalist 
puzzle, since they realized that without understanding it their political prospects were 
gloomy.7 6 As a result the Austrian party was organized along language divisions, 
which in turn gave it a federalist structure dominated by cultural pluralism. Their 
proposal was to preserve the empire by transforming its hegemonic nature into an 
internationalist national-cultural federation. This could be done by a two tier 
representation system, a territorial and a national-cultural one, to prevent the 
economically more powerful German-Austrians from dominating the other 
77 
nationalities. 
Well known members of the Austro-Marxist school included Julius Deutsch, Karl 
Renner, Max Adler, Rudolf Hilferding, and the most important of all, as far as the 
7R 
national problem is concerned, Otto Bauer. The school's most important 
7 4 For a detailed account of Gramsci's thought see Femia, J.V. Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony. 
Consciousness, and the Revolutionary process , (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981). For a brief introduction see 
Jolt, J. Gramsci, (Glasgow, Fontana, 1977) 
7 5 Nimni. Marxism and Nationalism, p. 15 
7 6 Nimni. Marxism and Nationalism . p. 129 
7 7 Avineri, "Marxism" , p.652 
7 8 See Bottomore, T. & Goode, P. (ed.) Austro-Marxism , (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978) 
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characteristics were, a combined attempt to deal with complex theoretical and 
political issues that defied simple explanations, an engagement in a serious argument 
with non-Marxists, and finally the rejection at the political domain of the reform-
revolution dichotomy as exhausting all categories of political activity.7 9 
The work of Otto Bauer on the national question is one of the lost gems of European 
Marxist thought, despite the fact that in his Die Nationalitatenfrage und die 
Sozialdemokratie (1907) two conflicting lines, one of a dogmatic Marxist and one of 
an independent and innovative thinker, can be detected.80 In his work Bauer 
attempted to comprehend the concept of the nation as the result of a combination of 
social forces. For him the concrete expression of a national community is the 
national character, i.e. the set of physical and spiritual features and the similarity in 
the orientation of wil l , as found in every member of a particular national group which 
is not the causal factor, but the concrete manifestation of the national existence.81 
What makes a national community distinct, and binds its members together, is the 
result of the same historical forces and common and communitarian experience ~ 
what he calls community of fate. 
The nation can thus be defined as a community of character that grows out of a 
community of destiny rather than from a mere similarity of destiny. This is also 
the significance of language for a nation. It is with the people I stand in closest 
communication with that I create a common language; and it is with the people 
with whom I share a common language that I stand in closest 
communication, (sic) 
Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism , p. 133 
8 0 Bauer's "Die Nationalitatenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie" has never been fully translated into English ninety 
years after its original publication. Only extracts of it have been included in Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) Mapping the 
Nation , (London, Verso, 1996), pp..39-77. Extracts form the same work have also been included in Woolf, S. 
(ed.) Nationalism in Europe. 1815 to the present, (London, Routledge, 1996), pp.61-84 
8 1 Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, pp. 146-9 
8 2 Bauer, O. "The Nation" in Balakrishnan, Mapping the Nation , p..52 
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In his terminology the proletariat is not a community of fate as the latter signifies not 
only the experience of the same historical circumstances, but this experience in a 
situation of common reciprocal interaction. Living in a permanent reciprocal relation 
generates the national community and expresses itself in an inter-subjective bond 
which forms every individual national identity.83 This interaction is only achieved 
through the common language, which is a precondition of such relationships. The 
disintegration of the shared language will result into a similar fate for the national 
community. This stress upon cultural phenomena is what sets him apart from Lenin 
and Kautsky. 
The community of communication is a close one only as far as the community 
of language extends. Communication community and language reciprocally 
determine each other: language is the condition for all close communication, 
and for this very reason the necessity of communication generates common 
languages, while the break-up of the communication community language too 
gradually differentiates.84 (sic) 
For Bauer there are three kinds of national cultural community. The first, as 
represented by the Teutons in the period of clan communism shows a nation all 
members of which share the same blood origins and culture. The second is 
represented by a society based on social class differentiation. And finally there is the 
socialist society of the future where the nation is composed by common education, 
or 
work, and cultural enjoyment. 
It is clear then, that Bauer's theory represents a serious attempt to break free from the 
Marxist economist strait-jacket since his theory appears to provide a plausible 
8 3 Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism , pp. 156-7 
8 4 Bauer, "Nation", p.53 
8 5 Bauer, "Nation", pp.55-6 
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explanation for the existence of nations and asserts that with the creation of the 
classless society the expansion and differentiation of national communities will be an 
indispensable tool for the realization of the socialist dream. This was Bauer's 
independent and innovative face. Unfortunately the attempt was inconclusive since 
he also attempted to marry it with other more traditional Marxist tools of analysis. 
His historical analysis of the national phenomenon is characterized by the assertion 
that in every historical nation, with the exceptions of the German primitive 
community and the future socialist society, there are two classes. Those who hold 
political power and control the means of production, and those who despite the fact 
that their toil sustains the culture and lifestyle of national classes, are excluded from 
national life. Since for Bauer the cultural unity of the ascendant classes institutes the 
nation, then the history of the national community is the history of the rotation of the 
various ascendant classes. Consequently, the developmental logic of the forces of 
production explains the process of national integration. Moreover, since through the 
process of historical development different dominant classes incorporate groups that 
previously were secondary to the national community, then it follows that the 
working class wil l gradually be incorporated into the national community during the 
capitalist period. 8 6 The establishment of socialism wil l , with the abolition of the class 
system, result in the integration of the whole population into the national cultural 
community. 
Drawing the entire people into a national cultural community, the attainment 
of full self-determination by the nation, growing mental differentiation of the 
nations - this is what socialism means.87 
Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism , pp. 167-8 
8 7 Bauer, "Nation", p.50 
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Bauer argued that against Engels' forecast, the non-historical nations had become 
more revolutionary than the historical ones. For him there are non historic nations of 
two kinds, the ones which do not have what he calls high culture, and the ones which 
although they have been advanced in the past are at present stagnating.88 Non-historic 
nations have been brought to historic life by industrial capitalism and as a result 
national rivalries become more acute since national hatred is a form of class 
on 
hatred. This is the dogmatic face of Bauer, since this part of his analysis introduces 
a hierarchy of nations explained in terms of a Marxist class reductionist model. And 
whereas in the previous part he was very close to breaking with i% in his attempt to 
construct universal laws of national development corresponding to stages of capitalist 
development, he lapses back to mainstream Marxism. 
It appears then that even such relatively creative members of the Marxist theoretical 
tradition as Bauer and Gramsci, who had an unusually high level of interest in the 
contribution of cultural factors, found it difficult to escape from the intellectual 
tradition they had inherited. Despite a few notable attempts, they never managed to 
understand and come to terms with nationalism and popular adherence to the nation-
state. Yet this was a problem area for the growing socialist movements in the period 
of the Socialist Internationals. As we shall see in the following section, the leaders of 
socialist parties, who claimed to possess a sophisticated theoretical armoury for 
economic, social, and political analysis, were faced with urgent political decisions 
which revolved around issues of nationality and state. What decisions should be 
taken, and how could they be justified within the ideological framework where 
socialist politicians were operating? 
Ninmi, Marxism and Nationalism , p. 169 
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4. NATIONALISM AND SOCIALIST PRACTICE 
The difficulties with the Marxist non-theory of nationalism can be underlined by the 
problematic relation between socialism and nationalism. An examination of 
particular events in socialist history wil l illustrate this point. 
On September 28, 1864 the International Workingmen's Association, known as the 
First International, was founded in London. Its founders, as Lichtheim commented, 
were groping towards an original international working class organization. It was 
mainly an Anglo-French affair with a social-democratic type program drafted by 
Marx himself, the Inaugural Address, in an attempt to accommodate the five national 
sections (English, French, Italian, German and Polish), which had very little in 
common. 
To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working 
classes. They seem to have comprehended this, for in England, Germany, Italy, 
and France there have taken place simultaneous revivals, and simultaneous 
efforts are being made at the political reorganisation of the working men's 
party. 
One element of success they possess-numbers; but numbers weigh only in the 
balance, if united by combination and led by knowledge. Past experience has 
shown how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between 
the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each 
other in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common 
discomfiture of their incoherent efforts.90 
8 9 Nimni. Marxism and Nationalism, p. 171 
9 0 Marx, K. "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association", in Marx, K. & Engels, F. 
Collected Works , Vol.20 , (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1985), p. 12 
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It was the beginning of a difficult relation.91 
Mazzini was represented at the founding meeting, but this was not the only paradox 
in the history of an organization striving to eradicate nationalism. Apart from their 
industrial concerns, one of the main interests of the British and French trade unionists 
that were prominent in the association's creation, was the support of the Polish, 
Hungarian and Italian nationalist causes.92 At the meeting Professor Beesly, a 
Comtean Positivist, called for an Anglo-French alliance to secure and maintain 
liberty at a global level, and with Marx's agreement, condemned British policy on 
India, China, Japan and Ireland. Nevertheless, in the report in the Beehive, the 
official organ of the London Trade Council, the reference to Ireland was omitted, as 
it came up against the traditional dislike of British workers for the Irish. In 1870 the 
International broke with the Beehive, partly because the newspaper systematically 
suppressed or ignored the General Council's resolution on Ireland.93 
From 1865 to 1870 the International was ravaged by the disputes between mutualists, 
collectivists and communists and the rivalry between Proudhonists and Blanquists in 
France. In 1870 Marx welcomed the Franco-Prussian War because he thought that a 
Prussian victory would result in a set-back for the French Proudhonists, on one hand, 
and the German domination of the international socialist movement, on the other.94 
In July 1870 the SPD abstained from voting the war credits against France. The 1871 
Paris Commune had a devastating effect and in the 1872 Hague Congress socialists 
split from anarchists when a narrow majority of the association's General Council 
accepted Marx's proposal to transfer its seat to New York. At around the same time 
9 1 Lichtheim, Short History , p. 172 
9 2 Lichtheim, Short History , pp. 173-4 
9 3 Lichtheim, Short History , p. 179 
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Marx broke with the British Trade Unionists, most of whom had joined the Liberals 
of Gladstone. The International passed away in Philadelphia* in 1876.95 
As the various working class movements began to gather strength they started 
thinking of creating an International organization. Following the demands of the 
older Liebknecht, at that time in charge of the International relations of the German 
Social Democratic Party, the party congress at St.Gallen in October 1887 decided to 
work towards a new International congress. The Second International was created at 
the Marxists' meeting in the Salle Petrelle, in Paris on July 14, 1889. From the very 
beginning the Germans, the most solidly based and united delegation dominated the 
organization. Liebknecht was the moving spirit of the Congress and he and the 
French socialist Edouard Vaillant were elected joint presidents. This was seen as 
underlining Franco-German socialist solidarity and proletarian unity. 9 6 
The congress helped to break the isolation in which socialist leaders had lived after 
the Paris Commune and provided an opportunity for the exchange of information of 
mutual concern. But although the representatives of the suppressed nationalities, like 
the Polish, proclaimed their international faith, the Germans found it difficult to treat 
more backward people as equals. As the international situation was not yet alarming, 
the Congress managed to pass unanimously a resolution about war and peace which 
condemned standing armies and called for national defense by means of the people in 
arms. The first cracks appeared when the French socialist Raymond Lavigne 
proposed that the Congress should declare that workers in every country should 
celebrate the May 1 of next year as a holiday, so that an international demonstration 
9 4 Feuer, p.27 
9 5 Lichtheim, Short History, p. 183 
9 6 Joll, J. The Second International: 1889-1914 , (London, RKP, 1974), pp.36-7 
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in favour of the eight-hour day, among other demands, could take place. The 
Belgians and the Russians abstained from the voting and Bebel and Liebknecht added 
an amendment that the demonstration's extent should be decided individually in each 
country. But even this unclear statement was a real test of the International's 
effectiveness, one that disclosed the perplexities of coordinated international 
operations, as arguments about its interpretation at the 1891 and 1893 Congresses 
watered down the character of the original resolution.97 It must be noted as well 
though, that fear of repression by the authorities in some countries was a major 
obstacle to organizing such an event. In any case, at the end the Germans had their 
way and the celebrations were relegated to the evening of the day, thus losing their 
effectiveness as at least a symbolic demonstration of international solidarity. 
Gradually, due to their organization, the Germans achieved a leading position in the 
International, so that the association's Congresses became more like the Congresses 
of the German SPD. 
At the Brussels 1891 Congress, at the same time that anti-Semitism was emerging in 
both Germany and Austria, an American group raised the question of the position of 
the Jews. The Congress decided not to discuss this question because this Would 
constitute a deviation and would divide the proletariat which should only be 
concerned with the class problem. This attitude was to be maintained about all 
national problems. This refusal to discuss the Jewish question and the continuous 
rejection of nationalist struggles deprived the socialist movement of the support of 
many Polish and Czech workers. It is worth noting here that at the Erfurt Congress of 
the German SPD, in the same year, Bebel had declared that in the case of a Russian 
9 7 Joll, Second International, pp.36-49 
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attack on Germany the Social Democrats would support their country. Moreover, 
when the Congress came to the discussion of organizing international trade union 
activity it met the indifference of the average trade union member who was not 
interested in international action. Even though an International Trade Union 
Secretariat was established in Germany in 1901, it never acquired much influence. 
And for Joll this dependence on the unions made the international May Day 
demonstrations less impressive than expected and prevented the formation of an 
no 
effective anti-war policy/ 0 It was clear that socialist movements which were 
organised within a framework of nation-states believed that their international 
commitments must be reconciled with their domestic national interests. 
Opening the Second Congress of the International in Zurich, in August 1893, the 
Swiss chairman declared that it was 
a little blueprint of the United states of Europe and the future world republic" 
Nevertheless when Domela Nieuwenhuis introduced a motion calling for a general 
strike and refusal of service by conscripts on the outbreak of war, it failed to gain 
considerable support and was rejected. And three years later celebrating the 
socialists' success at the French municipal elections of 1896 Millerand, an 
independent socialist, stated: 
We shall at no moment forget that at the same time as being internationalists we are 
Frenchmen and patriots. Patriots and Internationalists, these are the two titles which 
our ancestors of the French Revolution knew how to link nobly.100 
Joll, Second International, pp.68-70 
Joll. Second International. p.71 
5 quoted in Joll, Second international, p.82 
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How this was to be achieved never became clear. The left in France had established a 
republican tradition which combined patriotism and internationalism by assuming the 
role of standard-bearer for the doctrines of 'liberty equality and fraternity.' But as we 
have seen, for Marx such slogans had become the increasingly empty rhetoric of 
bourgeois ideology. Socialists had to recognize the economic interests of the 
proletariat, and their political movements had to be based upon these real interests 
rather than such appeals. And since the existing system of states was a target for 
revolutionary action it was difficult to find arguments for the proletariat to act in their 
defence. The same set of dilemmas seemed to apply to the vexed question of 
socialist participation and co-operation with the state. 
The success of mass social democracy in Europe gave birth to reformist political 
practice, and to revisionism which was the parallel theoretical development in 
reaction to this growth. Its chief exponent was Eduard Bernstein who attacked the 
Marxist economic theory and attempted to modify Marxism's materialism. For him 
evolution, instead of revolution, was the key to socialist success, working within, 
exploiting and adapting the existing structures of the state by concerted and persistent 
action. 1 0 1 
The connection between reformism and internationalism was made by Guesde who 
claimed that the International's raison d'etre would disappear with the participation 
of socialists in national governments, as all ministers, even the socialist ones, would 
have to vote for the military budgets. Hence socialists should not participate in 
bourgeois governments. At the Amsterdam Congress of the International, in August 
1 0 1 see Bernstein, E , The Preconditions of Socialism , ed, and trans, by H.Tudor, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), and Tudor, H. Bernstein's preconditions of Socialism; the first crisis of Marxism , 
Durham Research Papers in Politics No. 1, (Durham , 1993) 
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1904, the Germans attempted to solve the revisionist debate on the international level 
in the same way they had solved it at the national German level. This met the 
resistance of Jaures who accused the German party of imposing its wil l on other 
countries. An amendment to allow for local variations in different countries was 
rejected. This Congress marked the highest point in the International's influence as it 
managed to lay down rules of political behavior and persuade one of its most 
important members to accept them. But this success, although impressive, included 
some apparent dangers as the Germans managed to impose their policy on the other 
European Socialists, a policy they themselves were the first to abandon in 1914 and 
1918. 1 0 2 
The Socialist attempt to prevent the war was made even more difficult by the 
existence of universal compulsory military service. The aim of socialists in Europe 
therefore was to abolish the standing armies and replace them with people's militias. 
In all discussions of the problem though, what became clear was the necessity of 
national defense. Under these circumstances therefore, traditional national 
animosities were allowed to resurface, with Jaures abandoning his internationalism 
and justifying French socialist resistance to a German attack, whereas for Bebel in 
1891: 
The soil of Germany, the German fatherland belongs to us the masses as much 
and more than to the others. If Russia, the champion of terror and barbarism 
went to attack Germany to break and destroy it...we are as much concerned as 
those who stand at the head of Germany.103 
Joll, Second International, pp.97-107 
quoted in Joll, Second International, p. 114 
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The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was the first important war between countries 
represented in the International, and according to Kublin, the stand taken by the 
Japanese and Russian socialists at this occasion is perhaps the crowning success of 
socialist internationalism104, as members of the International from both countries 
concerned proclaimed the united opposition of the working class of their respective 
countries to the war. On March 13, 1904, the Japanese socialists issued a 
proclamation of sympathy with their oppressed Russian comrades, who in turn, 
answered in a similar tone.1 0 5 At the Amsterdam Congress of the International 
Katayama and Plekhanov, the Japanese and Russian representatives respectively, 
shook their hands in a symbolic gesture of proletarian internationalism. Nevertheless 
the significance of this gesture was very limited. Although Katayama had claimed 
that he was not interested in the war's outcome at all, he was actually looking 
forward to a Japanese victory regarding Czarist Russia as a despotism.106 
At the same time nationalist sentiments surfaced in every part of Europe, thus 
highlighting the tension between socialist theory and practice. As Poland provided a 
cheap labour army for German industry the anti-Polish feelings of the German 
workers were intensified. In Austria the failure of the Social-Democrats to abandon 
their German character and to become an international party dealt another blow to 
socialist internationalism. Finally colonialism presented a major obstacle to the 
realization of the International's scope. On the one hand the socialists from the 
imperial powers, Britain and Holland, were put into a difficult position, and on the 
1 0 4 Kublin, H. "The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War", Journal of Modern History, Vol.22 , no.4 
(December 1950), p.322 
1 0 5 Kublin, "Japanese Socialists" , p.330 
1 0 6 Kublin, "Japanese Socialists" , p.335 
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other, the right of the SPD was calling for a German entry into the colonial league, in 
order to sustain the living standard of the German workers. 
From 1904 onwards the European socialists were very much concerned with the 
prevention of war. The use of the mass strike as an anti-war weapon was discussed at 
the German party's 1905 congress in Jena. Following the growing disagreement 
between the party fractions, the resolution was a compromise that left the question 
vague and satisfied nobody. The 1906 resolution did not make the situation any 
better. At the 1907 Stuttgart Congress of the International the divisions over the 
question of the mass strike became apparent. The French were pressing for the 
adoption of an active anti-war policy and the Germans were maintaining that the 
question should not be discussed any more, as already the mass strike had been 
rejected twice at the Zurich (1893) and the Paris (1900) congresses and, as we have 
seen above, it was watered down at the Amsterdam congress. For Joll the German 
position on the matter can be explained by what he saw as the strong links between 
the German society and the SPD. This made any attempt against the first dangerous 
for the latter as well. At the end the Stuttgart resolution was the result of a 
compromise between the opposing fractions. It contained something to pTease 
everybody and committed nobody to anything, by avoiding any specific commitments 
to a general strike, or any other action, while not specifically ruling it out. This 
resolution was to be the guide-line of socialist anti-war action. The national tensions 
were to emerge again at the next congress of the International, at Copenhagen in 
1910. The Serbs accused the Austrians of inaction against the annexation of Bosnia, 
and the Germans were openly suspicious of the British as the Labour Party in Britain 
had, by supporting the Liberal government of the day, indirectly voted for 
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rearmament. The 1912 German elections produced a Reichstag with 110 socialist 
deputies after the party received one third of the votes with a program based mainly 
on domestic matters and omitting any important foreign policy issues. This 
highlighted the fact mat while the SPD was the International's great hope and power, 
the opposite was not true. 1 0 7 
In the meantime the younger Social-democrat leaders, Eduard David and Gustav 
Noske, had become more positive about the government's naval policy and from 
1907 onwards Noske was, although still in a minority, advocating support for the 
military budget in the interests of national defense. Meanwhile, as the Germans were 
rejecting mass strike, the Belgian social-democrats disregarded the International's 
rules and, by means of the general strike of 1913 and the alliance with the Liberals, 
won universal suffrage. As Germany and France were the only major states with an 
important socialist party, and the relations between the two countries had been hostile 
for a long time, the fraternity and solidarity between the two parties became very 
important. Yet in 1913 both failed to prevent the escalation of the animosity that led 
to the war, especially at a time when the socialist parties of the small countries were 
turning to them for direction. When the first Balkan war broke out in 1912 it caused 
great alarm and preparations were made for an extraordinary congress of the 
International which took place in Basle, Switzerland, k November of the same year. 
For Joll this marked the zenith of the International's optimistic self-confidence and 
manifested the unfounded trust in the organization's actual existence, as war over the 
Joll, Second International, pp. 139-146 
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Balkans seemed to have been prevented following anti-war action throughout the 
1 A O 
continent. In July 1914 these fantasies turned to dust. 
On August 4, Haase sacrificed his own beliefs to the solidarity of the party and 
followed the majority in declaring in the Reichstag the party's support for the war 
effort. In Austria the situation was not very different as the Social-Democrats also 
voted for the war credits after declaring their solidarity with the Serbian working 
class. And in France the socialist deputies unquestioningly voted the credits on the 
afternoon of Jaures' funeral. In Italy the party was divided over the issue but the 
majority opposed the war, thus abiding by their obligations as members of the 
International. In Belgium Emile Vandervelde, the International's president joined the 
national government. It was only in two of the countries involved in the war, Russia 
and Italy, that the socialist representatives remained faithful to their commitments as 
internationalists and voted against the war credits. Perhaps, as Debray has 
subsequently argued, the Italian and Russian responses are to be explained by the fact 
that Italy at that time was a young state, the product of a fusion of several entities and 
without a single and strong national feeling, and Russia was simply not a nation-state 
at a l l . 1 0 9 But the predominantly Marxist based socialist theories which were utilised 
in 1914 had no adequately accepted conceptual apparatus to explain the crisis and 
suggest clear lines of common action. Thus the Second International came to a sad 
end. The 1917 unsuccessful attempt for another International Socialist Congress 
marked the official burial of the Second International. According to Joll, the 
Germans' attempts to impose their theories and rules of action, or inaction, on the 
other member parties, however well intentioned, destroyed the Second International, 
1 0 8 Joll, Second International, pp. 147-159 
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just as Marx and the Bolsheviks did to the First and Third Internationals 
respectively.110 But to argue that the Germans were responsible for the 
International's collapse is misleading. August 1914 signified the end of the 
Internationalist illusion and proved the tenacity of the nationalist feelings. What is of 
significance is to identify the shortcomings of the Marxist analysis of nationalism and 
the proposed responses to such crises. 
For the International class consciousness and proletarian internationalism were the 
safeguards against nationalism, and in order to counteract capitalism's inherent 
militarism the International worked out a number of proposals: the abolition of secret 
diplomacy, the replacement of the permanent armies by militias, the promotion of 
general disarmament and, after a French proposal at the London 1896 Congress, the 
establishment of an international tribunal. But when it came to putting the above 
mentioned resolutions into practice, there was no organization to co-ordinate the 
various national parties' activities and to ensure continued international action. This 
was the first major obstacle to the application of a joint socialist internationalist 
policy. The second was, as we have already seen, the disagreement between the SPD 
and the main French Socialist group.1 1 1 
For Haupt, the inability of the International to oppose the war was the result of the 
contradictions, and the theoretical inadequacies, which prevented the organization 
from adopting a concrete pacifist strategy which was free from ambiguities. When in 
the summer of 1914 the pressure of events forced the socialists to choose between 
internationalism and patriotism, these very contradictions and vagueness led them to 
1 0 9 Debray, "Marxism" , p.35 
1 1 0 Joll, Second International, p.3 
"" Haupt, G. Socialism and the Great War, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 12-7 
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betray their internationalist credo and ally themselves, with a very few notable 
exceptions, with their respective national governments. Even as late as July 1914 the 
International Socialist Bureau meeting failed to address the issue as war seemed to 
the socialist leaders an impossibility. And the German social democrats who had 
spent so much time on the anti-war propaganda and the theory of imperialism never 
seriously considered socialist action in the event of war. Moreover, despite the fact 
that socialists kept on mentioning the revolution that would follow the war as a 
propaganda tool, they never elaborated on i t . 1 1 2 Hence, with the war looming, they 
were reduced to passive followers of events. 
The interpretations of this failure can broadly be divided into two categories. One is 
the Leninist theory which condemns the leadership for betraying the workers, who 
consequently failed to demonstrate their internationalism. The second, in 
contradiction to this, regards the social democratic position not as a betrayal of the 
popular feelings, but as a true expression of the nationalist sentiment that was 
prevailing among the working classes of the different European nations at the time. 
The Leninist interpretation has missed the point, because by finding a scapegoat, it 
avoids dealing with the problem of nationalism itself. As Haupt has observed, the 
workers' movement's superfluous internationalism, blinded by its own ritual* 
language, and imagery, failed to address the gut feelings of Jacobin patriotism or 
innate Russophobia.113 
The Zionist socialist thinker Chaim Arlosoroff blamed the vague internationalism of 
the Marxist tradition which, although it continually emphasized international 
solidarity, never produced a concrete study of institutions and behaviour patterns. 
' 1 2 Haupt, Socialism , pp.219-21 
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Thus, the political movement was left with no understanding of the workers' very 
real attachment to their national culture and heritage. Despite some working class 
alienation from society, its elites and its high culture, they were still bound to the 
language and culture of their national environment.114 
Among the thinkers who devoted much thinking and energy to the national question 
Rosa Luxemburg figures prominently and demonstrates precisely this weakness and 
confusion. For her a partnership on equal terms between socialism and nationalism 
was out of the question. She argued that i f the workers were to defeat the middle 
classes and its ideology, national boundaries and identity could not be acknowledged 
to be durable political and cultural divisions within the working class. Reformism is 
intrinsically bound with nationalism. Nationalism advocates the unification of 
conflicting interests, and when pursued by the socialist movement, generates a basic 
interest in status quo preservation.115 She denied that there was any right to freedom 
from national oppression, and was against the right of nations to self determination. 
As she stated: 
When we speak of the "right of nations to self-determination", we are using the 
concept of the "nation" as a homogeneous social and political entity. But 
actually such a concept of the "nation " is one of those categories of bourgeois 
ideology which Marxist theory submitted to a radical revision, showing how 
that misty veil, like the concepts of the "freedom of citizens ", "equality before 
the law", etc. conceals in every case a definite historical content.116 
Not nations but only the workers have rights. As a result then, 
" l 3 Haupt, Socialism , p.230 
I M Avineri, "Marxism" , pp.653-4 
1 1 5 Bronner, S.E. Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times, (New York, Columbia University Press), 
pp. 17-21 
1 1 6 Luxemburg, R. "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" in Luxemburg, R. The National Question , ed. 
and intro. by H.B.Davies, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 135 
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Social Democracy is called upon to realize not the right of nations to self-
determination but only the right of the working class, which is exploited and 
oppressed, of the proletariat, to self-determination."7 
She even went as far as to criticize Marx for having endorsed Polish independence 
since it would in essence result in consolidating the grip of the nobility and later the 
bourgeoisie. She opposed the creation of new small states, even in the case that the 
working class would support such a move. Yet in her Junius pamphlet, which she 
wrote anonymously while in prison in 1916, she adopted a more moderate line and 
while recognizing the right of independence for every people, she also held that 
national wars were impossible and that self-determination was unattainable in 
capitalist conditions. Such a position revealed the lack of a theory which could have 
any practical application in the forseeable future. Luxemburg grossly miscalculated 
the power of nationalism and her theory was incapable of dealing with the centrifugal 
tendencies of the contemporary multinational state.118 
Lenin's ideas on nationalism were exposed in the pamphlet on The right of nations to 
self-determination, written in 1914, and originally intended as a reply to Luxemburg. 
Their differences can be summed up in the following way. Whereas Lenin 
emphasized the right to national self-determination, Luxemburg at mat point denied 
it altogether. The role of the bourgeoisie in modern nation building was seen as vital 
for Lenin, but as minimal for Luxemburg. In her thought there was some place for 
federation and autonomy, something on which Lenin was ambiguous. Against Lenin, 
Luxemburg took self-determination to mean the self-determination of the proletariat 
1 1 7 Luxemburg, "Right of Nations", p. 140 
' 1 8 Davies, M B. "Introduction: The Right of Natonal Self-Determination in Marxist Theory - Luxemburg vs. 
Lenin", in Luxemburg, The National Question , p. 10 
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only. And finally, unlike Luxemburg, Lenin appreciated the power of national 
fragmentation.119 He defined national self-determination as follows: 
Consequently, if we want to learn the meaning of self-determination of nations 
not by juggling with legal definitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but 
by examining the historical and economic conditions of the national 
movements, we shall inevitably reach the conclusion that self-determination of 
nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national 
bodies, the formation of an independent national state.120 
For him the national question is confined to the domain of political democracy. His 
concept of democracy though was never separated from the class struggle. He never 
attempted to define the nation since his most urgent task was to liberate the working 
class from the grasp of the bourgeoisie. Being a practitioner himself, Lenin did not 
want to grant to his enemies the opportunity to capitalise on the workers' desire for 
national self-determination. He allowed therefore, and sometimes supported the right 
of the oppressed nations to self determination in order to prevent national oppression. 
If we do not raise and advocate the slogan of the right to secession we shall 
play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal 
landlords and the despotism of the oppressing nation.121 
He had though reservations on whether the actual secession, as well as the right to 
secede, should be supported.122 Lenin, with regard to the right to self determination, 
divided the nations into three categories. These were the capitalist western countries, 
Eastern Europe (including Russia, Austria, and the Balkans), and semi-colonial 
1 1 9 Davies, "Introduction" , pp.1 1-2 
1 2 0 Lenin, V.I . "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" , in Lenin^ V.I. The Essentials of Lenin in Two 
Volumes , Vol. 1 , (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1947), p.565 
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countries(like China and Turkey) and colonies proper. He supported the right of the 
nations falling in the last two categories to self determination. Lenin's fundamental 
approach follows the Marxist line. Its priority is international socialism and self 
determination movements were to be supported i f they furthered the socialist cause. 
Moreover, the guideline of his thought is that large economic units are preferable to 
small ones as far as economic development is concerned. It follows men that the 
claims of subordinate nations against large nation-states should not be supported.123 
A few more points about the Leninist treatment of nationalism should be stressed. 
Unlike Bauer, Lenin paid no attention to national culture. He divided capitalism into 
two periods, that of the formation of the bourgeois democratic state, and that of 
internationalisation during which the confrontation between the international capital 
and the international working class intensifies. In countries that are still in the first 
phase, i.e. that of the formation of the bourgeois democratic state, nationalism could 
be seen as a progressive force. This corresponds to his second and third categories of 
country described above. But for countries that are in the second internationalisation 
phase, that is western capitalist countries, nationalism is a reactionary force that 
hinders the building of a strong international working class movement. While it 
appears that the Leninist treatment of nationalism provides clear criteria in principle, 
it shows the same essential features as previous Marxist analysis. The evaluation of 
any particular nationalist issue is subject to a test based upon a combination of 
economic development and contribution to a progressive revolutionary potential. 
Nationalism is still seen as a secondary derived phenomenon, and Lenin appears to 
have no appreciation of or explanation for the popular devotion to the nation and 
1 2 2 Minnerup, G "The Right of Nations to Self Determnation: Bauer, Stalin, Lenin" in Cahm & Fisera, Socialism 
and Nationalism, pp.24-5 
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democracy, which had been embraced by the working class. As Schwarzmantel has 
pointed out, it is not clear in practice who is going to decide on the application of the 
theory of self-determination at any particular time. 1 2 4 In fact, the practice in this area 
of Leninists (which is discussed briefly below) appears to have been dictated by the 
same imperatives which struck leaders of the Second International. Practical tactical 
decisions became simply clothed in theoretical language. 
I f Marx-Engels devoted only 2 to 3 per cent of their work to nationalism and Lenin 
about ten times that, the National question covers more than half of Stalin's total 
work. 1 2 5 His Marxism and the National Question, written in 1913, has been seen as 
the most methodical demonstration of the Leninist thesis on nationalism. He offered 
a definition of nationalism, similar to that of Bauer's. 
A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on 
the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological 
make-up manifested in a common culture.126 
As Minnerup has noted, there are two problem with such a definition. Being based on 
language, economy etc. it allows the nationalist to conduct the debate on familiar 
territory, thus disarming Marxism in contrast with the bourgeois nationalist. 
Furthermore, the theoretical yardsticks used to define the fairness of national 
liberation fights can sometimes create a loophole out of the pledge to the right of 
1 2 3 Schwarzmantel, J. Socialism and the Idea of Nation , (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 174 
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self-determination.127 Stalin allowed for the right of nations to secede. In his own 
words: 
The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the 
way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It 
has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right 
to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal 
rights.128 
It is not clear how this view can be reconciled with the prevailing Marxist theoretical 
approaches. Stalin's subsequent performance when in power suggest that his 
theoretical formulation had little connection with political practice. 
Lenin and Stalin were both more important as practitioners rather than as political 
theorists, and in the history of the Third International we can see the continuing 
problems of maintaining any consistent approach to internationalism. Founded by the 
Bolsheviks in 1919, with other groups and parties playing a secondary role, it 
remained until its dissolution by Stalin in 1943 essentially a tool in the hands of the 
Soviet leadership, lacking any truly international character.129 There have been 
identified three periods of Comintern history. In the first the Comintern was a 
revolutionary tool, in the second it was a tool in the domestic factional struggles, and 
in the third it was a tool of Soviet foreign policy. 1 3 0 Throughout its life the 
organization's policies were a reflection of the apparent duality of the Russian reality 
of the period which, on the one hand saw Russia as the heart of the world 
1 2 7 Minnerup, "The Right of Nations", pp.23-4 
1 2 8 Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question" , p.321 
58 
revolutionary movement, and on the other, saw it as a state in a hostile global 
environment.131 
Soviet foreign policy between 1921 and 1939 was defensive in essence, although the 
country's self-defense demanded the encouragement of foreign communist 
movements which had demonstrated some potential. At the same time the perceived 
danger from France and Britain led the International to the promotion of the class war 
dogma, directed as much against non-communist parties of the left as the political 
right. But a number of developments from 1931 onwards, such as the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the departure of Japan and Germany from the 
League of Nations in 1933, and the conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact between 
Japan, Germany in 1936, and Italy's adherence to it in 1937, led to the abandonment 
of this line. In 1933 the USSR established relations with the USA, next year joined 
the League of Nations and concluded "mutual aid" pacts with France and 
Czechoslovakia in 1935. Later the same year and in support of the Soviet drive for 
collective security, the Comintern called on member parties to establish "Popular 
Fronts" to resist Japanese militarism and Nazism. The change of direction in the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939, creating an alliance with a "bitter 
ideological enemy, was only explicable in terms of a calculation which gave absolute 
priority to the security interests of the USSR. Carr saw Soviet foreign policy, after 
the Brest-Litovsk treaty, as being based on two opposite motives, the promotion of 
proletarian revolution in the capitalist world and the economic and political need to 
1 2 9 In the early 1920s Friedrich Adler attempted, without success, to re-unite the Socialist and Communist 
Internationals in what came to be known as the "Two-and-a-Half International". 
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maintain regular relations with these very states.133 The doctrine of socialism in one 
country meant that the Soviet regime did not regard the world revolution as the 
primary condition of its existence any more. The twenty-one conditions of 1920 
initiated the so-called bolshevization of the foreign communist parties and the 
process was concluded with the consolidation of Stalinism in Russia, to the point that 
Moscow was able to impose the leaders of its choice on the member parties. The 
extent to which foreign communist parties had become blind instruments of the 
Soviet foreign policy is best highlighted by the case of the German Communist Party 
(KPD) and its changing attitudes towards the SPD during the years before Hitler's 
accession to power. 1 3 4 The dissolution of the Communist International by Stalin in 
1943 as a gesture of reassurance to his western allies was merely the final symbolic 
act in this policy. 
One point to be stressed once more, is that to hold the Russians solely responsible for 
the failure of internationalism during these years is to miss the real issue. Although it 
is true, as became clear above, that the member parties of the third international were 
very much controlled by Moscow, and consequently by Russian national foreign 
policy, they were not immune to nationalism themselves. As Slavin' has 
demonstrated, the French communists during the Rif war of 1924-5 abandoned any 
internationalist ideals, and shared the common French dislike for Muslim North 
Africans. 1 3 5 
The gap between socialist theory and nationalist practice became increasingly 
evident. In practice socialist political leaders did grasp the importance of nationalism 
1 3 3 Carr, E.H. The Twilight of Commintern: 1930-1935 , (Basingstoke, Macmilian, 1982), p.3 
1 3 4 see Carr, Twilight 
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and exploited it. Al l the 'socialist' regimes that were established in the course of the 
twentieth century in the Third World, from Cuba to Vietnam, were in various ways 
the result of the association of nationalists and Socialists, in the revolutionary anti-
colonial movements. According to Debray, the only socialist revolution not 
apparently connected with a nationalist struggle was October 1917 in Russia. 
Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks were able to gain significant mass support only after the 
national defensive struggles of 1919 and 1941. Moreover, the triumph of Stalin over 
Trotsky can be seen as the triumph of Great-Russian nationalism over 
internationalism. Thus nationalism seemed to make realizable the hitherto Utopian 
revolutionary dream. And although in theory and rhetoric socialists might have 
remained internationalists, it was the nationalist popular feeling that mobilized mass 
support for the revolutionary cause. The dividing line between the two opposing 
doctrines was not clear. The socialist vehicle was powered by the nationalist engine. 
And the colonial nationalism appeared to be compatible with the creation of state 
socialist regimes. Most strikingly, in the real world socialists might even have to 
envisage the outbreak of armed conflicts between socialist states, as between 
Cambodia and Vietnam in 1978-79. 
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CONCLUSION 
Nationalism represents socialism's greatest failure. The lack of treatment of the 
national problem by the founders of scientific socialism has been attributed to the 
combination of Hegelianism and rationalism that ran through Marx's thought. For 
Marx-Engels nations and nationalism were relegated to the superstructure. So, 
without a coherent legacy handed down from them, their successors were left with no 
solid base on which to build a proper treatment of the issue. This failure to 
understand the power of nationalism is obvious in the theoretical work of many 
influential Marxists like Luxembourg, Lenin and Stalin. Although the nation and 
democracy were considered to be capitalist products, they were in fact valued and 
partly conquered by the working class. The attempt by Gramsci to deal with 
nationalism remained inconclusive. The only socialist who came very close to 
producing a coherent theory for the national problem was Bauer but he never 
managed to break completely free from the Marxist dogma. The failures of the 
Internationals to become real vehicles of socialist internationalism highlights this 
great lack of understanding. As towards the end of the nineteenth century the nation-
state became the agent of social policy and the provider of welfare rights, the 
European working class felt that there was something worth defending in the nation. 
The events of 1914 showed that in times of conflict national affiliations are stronger 
than class ones. The Third International became the instrument of Soviet foreign 
policy, thus dealing a further blow to socialist internationalism. 
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The first half of the twentieth century saw an enormous multiplication in the number 
of nation-states in the global system. Socialism had yet to produce a convincing 
theoretical understanding of the national question. But in practice socialists had 
learned to coexist with, work within, and exploit the opportunities offered by the 
forces of nationalism and the political and administrative structures of the state. 
However the second half of the century has seen a new dynamic, the development of 
European integration, which faced socialists with a further set of theoretical puzzles 
and practical dilemmas. Just when they had adjusted to the practice of nation-state 
politics, the state functions and powers were to be increasingly absorbed in a 
complex new supranational system of governance. The range of responses is 
explored in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
European Integration and Western Social-Democracy 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I examine the way the German SPD and the French Socialists reacted 
to the process of European integration from 1945 to the Single European Act. The 
chapter is divided in two sections The first section examines the attitudes of the SPD 
towards European integration. In the second section the French Socialist Parties are 
reviewed. I am trying to identify any similarities in the way the two parties under 
consideration followed the developments of integration in Western Europe, given the 
fact that they were two of the most important socialist parties in Europe, with strong 
theoretical armoury, operating within the context of the two countries that have 
shaped the process of post -war integration. 
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1. THE GERMAN SOCIALDEMOCRATS-SPD. 
The Socialdemoeratic Party of Germany (SPD) is the longest surviving Western 
European socialist party and one of the most influential. This, combined with the 
weight Germany carries in European, and indeed global affairs, make the party a vital 
component of any discussion of European integration from a socialist point of view. 
The SPD traditionally complied with the West European Socialist norm of 
emphasising the domestic rather than the foreign aspect of policy. When it did 
expound foreign policy views they were governed by the idea of class consciousness 
in foreign affairs, supranationalism, belief in international co-operation, and anti-
militarism, although the first had been frequently modified by Marxist Russophobia, 
and the last two by Lasallean etatism. Before 1914 some enthusiasm for European 
unity, perceived mainly as a Franco-German affair, was confined primarily to the 
right-wing revisionist intellectuals associated with the journal Sozialistische 
Monatshefte. The first World War acted as a catalyst bringing the idea of European 
integration to the forefront of German socialist thinking. The notion of European 
integration was mentioned in the party's Heidelberg Basic Programme of 1925, 
which was drafted by Hilferding. Towards the end of the decade though, it was 
fading. After 1933 the party struggled to accommodate internationalism and 
patriotism, and Europeanism was relegated to lesser importance as the prime target 
was Hitler's dictatorship. The fall of France reinforced the belief that the nation-state 
had outlived its usefulness and that a federation would be a viable solution to 
Europe's political and economic problems. The meeting of a Socialist Vanguard 
Group, comprising representatives of the SPD and various socialist splinter groups, 
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in London during Easter 1942 agreed that Europe should no longer be organised on a 
nation-state basis nor should be it divided into spheres of influence. A federal union 
should be the economic and political task. A socialist economic and social 
programme should be produced. Europe should be dominated neither by an Anglo-
American axis, nor by the Soviet Union. A socialist Europe would contribute towards 
Soviet security. Indeed British socialists should support European integration, and all 
politicians, but socialists in particular, must work for a European future. 
In the war years all prominent German socialists in exile envisaged a democratic, 
demilitarised, socialist Germany in a democratic socialist European federation. This 
was an idea similar to those expressed at the Draft Declaration of the Resistance 
Movement, as we saw in the previous section. Hilferding for example, anticipated a 
central authority responsible for defence, foreign, and economic policies. He called 
for a revitalised League of Nations responsible for the 
co-ordination of foreign policy. This implies at the same time a certain 
limitation of the sovereignty of the member states. It is conceivable that this 
goal may be reached if the Allies' victory is on a big enough scale.139 
In Spring 1940, the young WiMy Brandt envisaged the future united Europe. 
Bringing about a united states of Europe raises the question what kind of 
society there will be in the various countries when the war is over. A 
democratic and federal solution of the European crisis depends primarily on 
whether the essential revolutionary changes involved in the destruction of 
capitalism and imperialism are in fact carried out.140 
1 3 8 Paterson, W.E. The SPD and European Intgration , (Farnborough, Saxon House Studies, 1974), 
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In the summer of 1945, before political parties were officially permitted, Schumacher 
attempted to revive the SPD, which 
cannot imagine a new Germany as an isolated and nationalist Germany, or 
as anything but a part of Europe. But Germany must hot be a pariah in 
Europe; it must enjoy equal rights. A party like the SPD, which has been 
denounced by the senseless nationalist-infiltrated section of its own people 
because of its internationalism, can make this demand openly and with clear 
serenity... 
Europe is not only a system of political balance: all its parts are 
economically dependent on one another, and in the last resort it is a social 
unity too. As time goes on, European forces will be more and more devoted to 
these aims. In so far as a German contribution is possible, the SPD will strive 
to provide it.141 
Such an idea justified their objection to the annexation of parts of their country by 
the allies and their opposition to the idea of the collective guilt of their compatriots, 
while at the same time dressing their argument in internationalist clothes. At the 
same time the German Social Democrats in the UK issued a report which proposed a 
mixed economy directed by a Central European Economic Committee and 
administered on a daily basis by a European Economic Commission. Such an 
arrangement allowed for a coal and steel community, an agricultural authority, 
central banking and credit institutes and a monopoly commission thus anticipating 
the Schuman Plan. 1 4 2 
According to Lodge the European policy of the SPD since 1945 had been governed 
by six main themes; the peaceful reunification of the German nation; the nation's 
right to freedom, democracy, and self-determination; co-operation between the 
European states in order to lessen the East-West tension; equality of status for the 
Federal Republic in its relations with its Western European Partners; the foundation 
1 4 1 Schumacher, K. "Consequences of German policy" in Lipgens, W. & Loth, W. (ed.) Documents on 
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of Western security on a strong Atlantic relationship; collective security 
arrangements for central Europe as part of a Europe-wide co-operation and as a way 
of eliminating intra-German and East-West divisions. Moreover, the party's attitudes 
towards the Federal Republic's participation in West European integration can be 
explained by, the emphasis on the doctrine of status equality for all partners in the 
process, the wish that socialism be the main centre of activity in a united Europe, and 
finally the party's belief that it had a legitimate right to govern.1 4 3 
Writing in April 1946, Schumacher defined Germany's relations with Europe. 
The whole of Europe must be internationalised, not just parts of Germany; 
and Europe must become socialist as well; Our continent has long been a 
single unit from the political, economic and social points of view. Today 
Germans have to contend not only with the inheritance of the Third Reich but 
also with the fact that there is no common United Nations policy towards 
Germany. The political, social and psychological consequences of this fact 
are disastrous. German social democrats want to see Germany as a single 
state, a national and political whole, but not in the form of a new 
nationalism. Our aim is that Germany should in due course become a 
member, on a footing of equality, of the United States of Europe.144 
The same motive can be detected in the Programme adopted by the party at its first 
post-war congress in Hanover, in May 1946. 
Just as socialists in all countries stand for the independence of their 'native 
land, so do German social democrats. But they know that the unrestricted 
sovereignty of national states is a thing of the past. The whole Europe, not 
only parts of Germany, must be internationalised. 
German social democrats want a United States of Europe, a democratic and 
socialist federation of European states. We want a socialist Germany in a 
socialist Europe.145 
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The dominant theme of German post-1945 politics had been the four-power 
occupation and subsequent division of the country. It follows therefore that 
politicians were looking at European integration through the lens of division. This 
was even more acute in the case of the Social Democrats since 50 out of the party's 
131 deputies in the first Bundestag were refugees from the East. Moreover many 
party leaders had been exiles during the Hitler years. Under these circumstances, they 
were striving to confirm their national identity with their compatriots. And this was 
obvious in their attitudes towards German unification and European integration. 
Another major determinant of party position was the election of Kurt Schumacher at 
the party's leadership. He came from Kulm near Danzig, an area traditionally 
associated with German national consciousness and anti-clericalism, which made 
him suspicious of the motives of the three allied commissioners and Adenauer, all of 
whom were catholics. Furthermore, he placed himself in the Lassalean and Jauresean, 
rather than the Marxist-internationalist, tradition of socialist thought and frequently 
distinguished between patriotic and aggressive nationalism. This made him perceive 
German unification rather than European integration to be his fundamental task. His 
speeches were a mixture of nationalism and socialist internationalism. His popular 
nationalism was an attempt to attract electoral support and to protect democracy by 
emphasising German national rights. Thus he attempted to hinder the emergence of 
totalitarian nationalism, a view that determined his relations with other countries. 
Between 1945 and 1949 Schumacher's views on European integration can be divided 
into two phases, although the ideas of German unification and equality remained 
constant. From 1945 to 1947 he saw a neutralised Germany as a major actor in a 
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Europe organised on a classical balance of power lines. In 1947 and 1948 he 
perceived Europe as a third force between the two superpowers.146 
An explanation of Schumacher's stance can be found in his experiences in the 
Weimar Republic and the Nazi era that taught him not to underestimate the 
nationalist emotions of the Germans. His obsession with the mistakes of the past led 
him to try to make the SPD play the role he thought it ought to have played in the 
Weimar Republic. Moreover, his deep mistrust of all communist proposals can be 
traced back to his personal encounters with the communists in the Weimar era. 
Finally, he never forgot the fact that during the Weimar era the party was blamed by 
the voters for the national political and economic instability. 1 4 7 
An alternative approach to Schumacher was offered by the small, but prestigious 
group of Lander politicians in the party who closely identified with the policies of the 
allies and attempted to maximise economic benefits at the expense of ideological 
coherence. They were convinced Europeans and most of them joined the Socialist 
Movement for the United States of Europe (MSEUE). The guiding light behind this 
movement was Philip, whom we wil l meet again in the next section. One of them, 
Kaisen, against the official party line, even participated at the 1948 Hague Congress 
for the United States of Europe. The most prominent Socialist to distance himself 
from Schumacher's line was Carlo Schmid. He saw a united Europe realising its 
potential as a third, not necessarily socialist, force between the two super-powers. 
This was to be encouraged despite the fact that Germany's division prevented her 
from joining the European integration process. 
1 4 6 Paterson, The SPD and European Integration , pp.6-10 
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A third power is necessary to prevent the world from being torn apart, but 
Europe can only become that power if it puts its house in order: in other 
words, its component states must abandon the principle of sovereignty, on 
which politics have essentially been based in modern times, in favour of a 
supranational community.148 
Since a free market was already operating, the Socialist opposition to the way the 
Federal Republic was created, focused on foreign policy with a nationalist rhetoric. 
This was appealing to refugees, but at the same time was antagonistic to West 
German participation in various European institutions.1 4 9 
Although Schumacher welcomed the Marshall Plan the first moves toward Western 
European co-operation were not received equally positively as the Brussels Treaty of 
1948 and the establishment of the International Ruhr Authority (IAR) were aimed 
against a revived Germany. It was with reference to German entry to the latter that 
the first clash between the CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats/ Christian Socialists) 
government and the SPD occurred. It was the positions taken and the arguments 
employed in this case, in relation to the country's sovereignty in particular, that 
anticipated later debates about entry into European institutions. The first German 
reaction to the IAR, in 1948, had been invariably adverse and Adenauer attempted to 
build a united front against it. Nevertheless, although the SPD was opposed to it the 
party leadership was not willing to adopt a common position. Schumacher was i l l and 
the party bureaucrats did not want to tie the leader's hands in the future. Following 
the reversal of Adenauer's negative stance, after his accession to the chancellorship, 
Schumacher, without the parliamentary group's approval, committed the party to 
uncompromising opposition to the authority. Since in his eyes French policy was 
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designed to gain control of German steel industry, Schumacher was particularly 
opposed to Adenauer's call for French investment in the sector. Moreover, he 
perceived West German entry to the IAR as legitimising foreign interference and 
restricting German freedom of action with particular reference to nationalisation. 
And contrary to his usual view, Schumacher at the Bundestag's first foreign policy 
debate argued that the process of integration in Western Europe should be 
encouraged even without British and Scandinavian participation. This should be a 
union of peoples and not of heavy industries. Finally, when the DGB (German trade 
Unions) Executive despite some reservations declared its support for the plan 
Schumacher was forced to compromise. Nevertheless, his style of opposition had 
already aggravated some party members. The most prominent dissident was the 
Minister President of Bremen, Wilhelm Kaisen. He was a member of the party 
executive and a convinced European who had gone as far as to join Andre Philip's 
MSEUE. Kaisen advocated co-operation with the bourgeois parties and separation of 
the questions of German reunification and European integration. He whole-heartedly 
supported the latter. He accepted German membership of the IAR, and called for a 
relaxation of the nationalist tone of socialist rhetoric. Kaisen was eventually defeated 
at all levels and lost his seat on the executive.1 D° 
The conflict intensified with Socialist opposition to West German entry into the 
Council of Europe. This reflected its continuing obsession with the problems of 
unification and Gleichberechtigung. The opposition was based on the issues of 
equality and the question of the Saar. The suggestion that both the Saar and the 
Federal Republic should be given associate Council membership provoked socialist 
suspicions of French policy towards Germany. French policy was perceived as 
1 5 0 Paterson. The SPD and European Integration , pp.22-33 
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aiming at German fragmentation. Consequently, Schumacher rejected Adenauer's 
acceptance of the plan on the grounds that this could indicate German acceptance of 
unequal status and its own division. On the other hand Schmid wanted not a little 
Europe but a supranational European federation based on a directly elected 
parliament. Such a federation should have responsibilities for foreign, defence, 
traffic, and even some financial affairs. He gave the Council of Europe a cautious 
welcome and, against the majority opinion, proposed associate membership for 
Germany. Moreover, against Schumacher, Hermann Brill suggested the separation of 
the question of Saar from entry to the Council. Again opposition to the leader came 
from the Lander politicians with some, like Willy Brandt, being in favour of entry 
and others such as Otto Bach against because the new organ did not go far enough 
towards a united Europe. At the May 1950 SPD Congress in Hamburg, policy 
towards the Council of Europe was debated. Against the party leader, Brandt found it 
hard to say that we should not go to Strasbourg because it only represents a 
makeshift Europe. The West, if it were better organized, would still be a 
makeshift Europe, and the task of creating a true Europe beyond the coastal 
strip facing the Atlantic would still exist15' 
The Congress eventually adopted by an overwhelming majority Schumacher's 
position (It is interesting to see how the French socialists reacted to the establishment 
of the Council, and this wil l be discussed in the next section of the present chapter). 
Finally, in the Bundestag on 15 June 1950, the government's policy was approved by 
218 votes to 151 against and 9 abstentions. 
The Schuman Plan was announced on 9 May 1950, when the inability of French 
policy to contain German development was becoming manifest. The objective behind 
1 5 1 Brandt speaking in the May 1950 "SPD Congress at Hamburg: Debate on the accession of the 
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the plan was to bring closer France and Germany. Schumacher gave it a cautious and 
reserved reception at a press conference two days later. The plan's basic idea was 
approved by the SPD leader but his support was restrained by a number of reasons: 
his views on how the proposed internationalisation of German coal and steel 
resources would affect prospects for their nationalisation; his suspicion of French 
intentions as facilitating German inequality; and his dislike of unification plans 
which did not include Britain and the socialist northern European states, and which 
were established upon an authoritarian system of integration. 
On 16-17 June 1950 the Socialist International met in London to discuss the 
Schuman initiative and the negative attitude of the British Labour party towards it 
resulted in a cooler SPD reception. In May 1950 in the statement by its National 
Executive Committee (NEC), the Labour Party had dismissed European Unity. After 
reaffirming the primacy of democratic socialism and of the interests of the British 
people, the statement stated that, 
no Socialist Party with the prospect of forming a government could accept a 
system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a 
supra-national European representative authority, since such an authority 
would have a permanent anti-Socialist majority and would arouse the 
I f 5 
hostility of European workers. 
The SPD only agreed to sign the communique with several reservations and on the 
understanding that the Ruhr authority would be abolished and Germany would be 
given equal status. 
Two months later, on 14 August 1950, at the seventh sitting of the Council of 
Europe, Professor Nolting speaking on behalf of the SPD subjected the plan's 
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approval to three preconditions. Production should be unrestricted. Arrangements 
should be made to ensure that all participating national economies start off at the 
same level and with equal chances of development. (This implied that the IAR 
would be abolished and that and production quotas would be lifted.) And finally, that 
trade unions should be represented both in the negotiations and the final institutions. 
As far as the institutional question was concerned, Nolting was against the 
introduction of a council of ministers, as proposed by the Benelux countries, and in 
favour of a supranational High Authority and a strong parliament. As the Schuman 
Plan came closer to realisation Schumacher's attitudes became more negative and on 
20 April 1951 the SPD executive published a seven point memorandum. It was 
argued that there must be complete equality in the institutions and workings of the 
proposed community. A l l democratic European countries should be members, 
including Britain and Scandinavia. There must be planning both at the national and 
the community level. The importance and volume of production must be the basis of 
representation in all international institutions. The executive should be controlled by 
a democratic parliament. Power politics should not interfere with the development of 
national economies. And finally, that workers should be granted equality of 
representation.154 
Although at the local level some party members were in favour of the plan, the 
strongest opposition to Schumacher came from the trade union leaders. The 
opposition of the party leadership to the ECSC continued until 1953. But once the 
Community was established the SPD indicated its acceptance by taking up its seats in 
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the Common Assembly in which it participated constructively. For Paterson the 
change of the SPD position from neutrality to firm opposition was due to four main 
reasons: the non-participation of Britain, with a Labour government in office, which 
would make any transition to socialism in Germany more difficult; the party wide 
suspicions and prejudices against France; the advice of party experts like Henssler, 
Baade, Nolting and Agartz who suggested that the plan would deny German 
economic equality; and the connection established between Adenauer, French 
agreement to the plan and the European Defence Community. And although the 
reunification issue, the Saar, and the shadows of the occupation regime, were 
marginal themes which would have been ignored i f Britain had joined, the basic 
tactic of an opposition with a nationalist tone remained the same.155 
The invasion of South Korea by the communist north was the catalyst that brought 
the question of West German security to the focus. Schumacher's reaction to the 
American suggestions of rearmament was to dismiss the parallel between the German 
and Korean situations and to stress instead the social danger. For him poor social 
conditions offered the best chance for Soviet expansion. When Andre Philip 
proposed at the Council of Europe the creation of a European army Carlo Schmid, 
speaking on behalf of the SPD, rejected the idea. I f the Allies were really short of 
modern weapons then West German troops could not be equipped. Such a move 
would give Stalin a justification for invading and would be unacceptable to 
Germany's neighbours. The army would acquire too much power in the weak Federal 
Republic. I f a European army preceded a European government it could only be a 
coalition army. Instead he called for the raising of living standards and the creation of 
a European political authority. At a press conference on 23 August 1950 Schumacher 
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explained the party's position on the proposed remilitarisation. He considered not 
only the military, but also the political consequences of such a development, and 
argued that West Germany alone, or even a Pan-European force for that matter, could 
not make a significant defence contribution. What was needed was the power of the 
United States to prevent Germany from becoming the initial battleground. Shortly 
afterwards, at a Party Executive meeting to discuss the defence question, Schumacher 
outlined the three paramount goals in the SPD defence policy. These included the 
promotion of the social aspects of democracy, a constant fight against 
authoritarianism in governmental policy, and Germany's restoration to a full place in 
the international scene.156 
The March 1952 Soviet proposals on German unity and the establishment of a neutral 
state led to a hardening of opposition to the EDC. The SPD stressed the importance 
of reunification. On April 25 Schumacher wrote that for the Social Democrats 
German unity takes priority over West European integration. Nevertheless, on 19 
March 1953 the relevant treaties were passed by a simple majority of the Bundestang. 
Less than two months later, on 11 May, the socialist, and some other members of the 
Bundestag appealed to the Constitutional Court to decide on the constitutionality of 
the treaties. They based their appeal on the grounds that any German military 
contribution constituted a revision of the Basic Law. As such it had to be ratified by a 
two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. The numerous legal arguments were rendered 
irrelevant by the Federal Election of September 1953 which resulted in the SPD 
losing control of the one third of the assembly's seats. Meanwhile, party unity on the 
issue of opposition to the EDC came under pressure. The view of preserving the 
status quo and continuing with the Occupation Statute, expressed by Dr. G.Luetkens, 
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was challenged by Carlo Schmid who emphasised the substitution of collective 
security for integration into the Western Alliance. A small group led by Klaus Peter 
supported the treaties. The differences were voiced at the September 1952 Dortmund 
Party Conference. The conference resulted in victory for Schmid. The party called for 
a system of collective security to replace the EDC It called for the abolition of 
national sovereignties and integration on an equal basis. It also called for the 
broadening of the process of integration to include more members than the original 
six. Finally, the social aspects of integration were incorporated in a criticism of the 
Coal-Steel and Defense Communities. 
On May 15 the Bundesrat adopted the treaties by 23 to 15 votes. At the third reading 
in the Bundestag on 19 May 1953 Ollenauer, who had succeeded Schumacher, made 
West German participation to the EDC conditional to a number of conditions. The 
FRG should be allowed to work for German unity. Freedom and equality should be 
the cornerstones of the new Europe. The FRG should be as secure as the other 
members. The UK, Denmark and Norway should participate. And domestic social 
welfare standards should be safeguarded. Finally the treaties were ratified by 224 to 
166 votes.1 5 7 
The most significant occasion of the SPD campaign for the second Bundestag was 
the presentation , on 28 August 1953, of the party document Die Europapolitik der 
SPD. It was primarily concerned with the condemnation of the ECSC, while the EDC 
treaty was criticised but no alternative was offered. The SPD defeat at the September 
election, despite Reuter's appeal for a clear definition of positive politics, did not 
result in a revaluation of policies. Ernst Reuter was the lord mayor of Berlin, and an 
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advocate of German-French understanding. The definite primacy of reunification was 
restated. 
It was the rejection by the French National Assembly of the EDC treaty on 31 August 
1954, together with the popularity of the idea of Euratom and the establishment of 
the WEU, which eliminated any prospects for actual opposition to European 
institutions. These reasons, along with the increased prosperity, led Ollenauer, who 
had succeded Schumacher, to drop his predecessor's emphasis on socialism at home. 
So opposition shifted to gradual support of European integration. In any case 
opposition to rearmament was expressed in mumerous ways until 1958. 
On 20 November 1954 speaking to the parliamentary party Ollenauer renounced 
German membership of the WEU, despite seeing it as an improvement from the 
EDC, on the grounds that it would jeopardise German unity. As we wil l see in the 
next chapter, the SFIO Germanophobes were persuaded to vote for the WEU treaty 
as it was the only way to prevent German reunification. Nevertheless, the signing of 
the WEU Treaty separated defence from European policy. As a result, it was made 
possible for the SPD leadership to support integration. The failure of the Paulskirche 
movement which discredited the militants and facilitated collaboration with the 
government, resulted in a change in the SPD's European policy. At a meeting in 
Paulkirche in Frankfurt, Ollenauer, Reuter and Heinemann, amongst others, launched 
a German Manifesto with a more pro-integrationist character. They called for an end 
to military integration with the West because it would hurt German unity. But this 
was not the only cause for this change of heart. It was further facilitated by a number 
of reasons: the pro-European attitude of the trade unions; the relaxation of tension 
over the Saar; the influence of the European Assemblies; the failure of the earlier 
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policy which was at odds with popular German opinion; the strong Europeanism of 
certain party functionaries which culminated in the November 1953 Frankfurt 
meeting, where 120 delegates adopted a pro-European communique; the Messina 
Resolutions which appealed to the SPD; and last, but not least, the influence of 
Monnet himself. 1 5 8 
The change in the party's attitudes was signalled by the entry into Jean Monnet's 
Action Committee, in October 1955. This signalled a reversal of priorities, as 
reunification was relegated to a secondary issue in the SPD's European policy. From 
now on, as Monnet wrote, 
the German social democrats became the most dedicated advocates of the 
Community, which they had opposed at its creation.159 
So the party lost all taste for opposition on European issues. On the proposed 
Economic Community, its attitudes on economic organisation were similar to those 
of the socialist parties of the other member countries and indistinguishable from 
those of the CDU's left. And as we saw earlier, Spaak, who headed the committee 
that was established at Messina, was a socialist. The commitment to reunification 
weakened to a simple wish so that all that survived of Schumacher's heritage was a 
bitter suspicion of the French among some party members. On 24 June 1957 the SPD 
Parliamentary Party decided to support ratification and on 5 July the Bundestag, by a 
large majority, ratified the Rome Treaties. The Bundesrat, unanimously, followed 
suit two weeks later. 
In his analysis of the party's European policy between 1949 and 1957, Paterson 
observed that it was determined mainly by domestic considerations and no European 
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institution had a major impact on policy formation. It was rather the lack of progress 
towards German reunification that facilitated the change in party direction. 1 6 0 
Since all foreign policy questions were dependent on their repercussions on 
DeutschlandpolitikXhe. SPD viewed negatively the process of European integration. It 
was forced to change this attitude as European integration became more popular in 
both the ideal and the practical levels. Long term devotion to a unified Germany was 
not abandoned however. From a socialist point of view, the SPD's future positive 
contribution to European integration was to be the interest in the Third World and, 
more important, the concentration on democratic norms. 
The party's very positive attitude towards European integration during the 1960s was 
an interplay of internal and external factors; the rise of the reformists in the party and 
the adoption of the Godesberg Program in 1959; the adaptability which resulted in 
bipartisanship in the form of the coalition government; and finally, the choice of 
Willy Brandt as the prospective chancellor candidate for the 1961 general election.161 
Following the signing of the Rome Treaties, and up to 1973, the SPD's European 
policy had been dominated by four themes: the feud between the Community 
institutions and President de Gaulle, changing attitudes to the institutional form of 
the Communities, the position of third countries, and the relationship between its 
Westpolitik and Ostpolitik. 1 6 2 
Adenauer's identification with Gaullist policies was criticised by the SPD in the 
name of the values it had previously attacked, i.e. European integration and fixed 
attachment to Atlanticism. In this the SPD was close to the SFIO position. The 
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Franco-German Friendship Treaty, negotiated at the time of the French veto on the 
British application to join the Community, was perceived as endangering European 
integration and Atlantic solidarity and omitting German reunification, which could 
only be achieved with American help. But a different and contradictory perspective 
was offered by Brandt who, in May 1964, supported the Gaullist attack on 
supranationality for facilitating East-West reapproachement as a strong Community 
would not be welcomed by the eastern block. 
Throughout the period the party had been preoccupied with the promotion of the 
democratic principle in the European institutions. It was the SPD which engineered 
the European Parliament resolution for the direct financing of the Community which 
sparked the 1965 crisis. While in power, as the junior partner in the Grand Coalition 
of 1966-9, the party's European policy was formed by Brandt. As foreign minister he 
was more interested in promoting Ostpolitik, and therefore preferred pan-European 
institutions to the Western Federal model. 
The party's opposition to de Gaulle involved a very positive attitude towards Britain 
and the US. The identification with the US can be explained by various motives. The 
position of Berlin and other strategic questions were one of them. Moreover, German 
survival was dependent upon British and American military support. On the domestic 
electoral front now, at a time when Adenauer was identifying with de Gaulle, the 
SPD could exploit German pro^-American feelings. Finally, the party's lack of 
commitment to the farmers who were not SPD supporters, made the CAP not a vital 
issue. At the same time, the commitment to British entry can be explained by the 
desire for EEC-EFTA reapproachement. 
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Finally, three periods of Social-Democratic policy have been identified. In the first 
years of the Federal Republic Westpolitik and Ostpolitik were seen as interconnected. 
After 1959 the SPD emphasised the Westpolitik. And in the mid-1960s Brandt's 
perception of a European Peace Order meant that the importance of the EEC should 
be relegated to a secondary position since a strongly supranational Community would 
hinder the development of East-West relations.163 
Discussing the SPD's European policy in the 1960s, Lodge observed that it had 
remained devoted to its major long-term aim although the stress had shifted from 
reunification of the two German states to the concept of preserving the central unity 
of the German nation. 1 6 4 As Paterson has noticed, SPD support for European 
integration was primarily highlighted in the early 1960s for two reasons. The Berlin 
crisis had destroyed the Deutschlandpolitik, and leading SPD parliamentarians saw a 
pro-European policy as a way of achieving a coalition with the CDU/CSU. After 
1966 though Brandt was forced to re-examine his policy because, although he did not 
view the European Peace Order as an alternative to the Community, such a policy 
towards the East affected the Westpolitik by marking a change in the single-minded 
quest for Western unity. 1 6 5 
In the seventies the attitudes of the SPD towards Community political integration 
oscillated between support for the idea of a federal Europe and pragmatic co-
operation. This incoherence mirrored the scepticism as to how the participation of the 
Federal Republic in a federal, as opposed to confederal Community, might affect its 
capacity to sustain interest in the concept of maintaining German national unity. 1 6 6 
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The recession in the early seventies led Brandt to advocate the idea of a two-speed 
Europe. His successor, Schmidt, continued to avoid supranational political 
integration that could entail substantial reduction of the national government's power 
to control the process itself. The SPD policy towards integration was contradictory. 
On the one hand, the party accepted the renaming of the Davignon committee the 
'political committee' as the committee was seen as symbolising cooperation and not 
institutionalisation of political integration. On the other hand, it also accepted the 
intensification of summitry and the regularisation of European Councils, which 
demonstrated the intention of national governments to cooperate in solving problems 
within a supranational framework. The party's support of the Community's external 
solidarity was prescribed by the conviction that national interests, i f justified by the 
Community's support of parallel and identical ones in partner states, promote the 
fulfilment of German national wishes. Moreover, the 1972 agreement between Heath 
and Brandt for a community policy on international monetary problems was made on 
individual national monetary considerations.167 
Similarly, as far as democracy in the EEC is concerned, established SPD domestic 
preoccupations were extrapolated to the Community. These included democratic 
control over political decision makers and codetermination in industrial matters. Also 
included were social welfare, economic democracy, and equality of opportunity. On 
the promotion of a common social policy, two German national interests met. There 
was the concern lest the flow of hot money to West Germany interfere with national 
stabilisation measures and antagonise EMU prospects and the German workers. And 
the unions' projected, to the Community level, their concerns with inflation control 
Lodge, European Policy , pp.44-7 
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and job security. These led them to demand the right to be consulted prior to 
mergers.168 
Moreover, the SPD was clear only in respect to supporting a general connection 
between the advancement of economic and political democracy. Although the 
proposition that the European Parliament should be given powers to compensate for 
the diminution in the control powers of the national parliaments was given verbal 
support, the shortage of relevant proposals meant that the party leadership was happy 
with the continuation of national executive control over Community decision 
making. Brandt's chancellorship, despite the party's good intentions with regard to 
the acceleration of the process of European integration, was characterised by basic 
incompatibilities in its approach to the problems posed by the Federal Republic's 
integration in the Community and the desire for German reunification within the 
environment of East-West co-operation.169 
As Telo has noted, Brandt could not be accused of nationalism. As a result he was 
free to promote policies that were free of any old nationalistic element. So, given the 
fact that there was a progressive evolution in this direction for some time, the SPD's 
opposition to European integration turned to positive support.170 In his first term as 
Chancellor, Brandt paid less attention to European integration than Ostpolitik. 
Following the conclusion of the main treaties with the East, Brandt shifted his 
emphasis to the West. In his second Governmental Declaration of 18 January 1973 he 
stated that his paramount aim would be European Union, but albeit an economic one 
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in inter-governmental terms.1 7 1 The final objectives of his European policy remained 
vague. His failure to live up to his rhetoric by making the necessary financial 
sacrifices weakened the appeal of the European ideal to the party and the German 
people in general. 
The SPD's concern with the problem of pan-European co-operation and collective 
central European security can be explained by the wish for German reunification by 
means of civilian power and in terms of West Germany's geopolitical position. 
German reunification had to be achieved with a delicate balance taking into account 
both internal and external factors and concerns. German rearmament would be 
difficult to digest, so the solution was to be found in the stressing of Germany's role 
as a civilian power, and by collective management of Germany's defense problem. 
So while in office Brandt supported the development of the Community's defense 
dimension. At the same time though he was conscious that any moves in that 
direction could be seen by Moscow as a continuation of the policy of strength. Brandt 
claimed that the West was obliged to work for German reunification. This could only 
be done by means of Europeanization of the German problem. And this because by 
surrendering reunification to operational causes concerned with European integration 
and peace preservation, the Germans have made sacrifices for Europe. This of course 
was a plea for self-justification with little appeal in other member states. German 
unification would not have been a very popular idea throughout the continent at the 
time. 
(T)he preservation of peace has precedence over the question of the nation. 
This is a service which the German people renders the European peoples.172 
1 7 1 This can be associated with the growing authority of Schmidt in the party and the government. 
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The Europeanization of German reunification has partly been realised by placing it 
within the environment of a central European collective security system. Meanwhile 
alignment with NATO continued to be the sine qua non of the SPD's European 
policy. Moreover, whereas the idea of a central European nuclear-free zone was 
given some thought in the early 1970s, it never became a central one since it could be 
seen as threatening FRG's solid NATO links. 
With the SPD in power we can distinguish between the Federal Government's 
European policy, and the party's policies developed with reference to its programme 
for the construction of a model Europe. The government's predominance over the 
party can be verified by the relative overshadowing of Brandt by Schmidt, in the 
European context, since the latter replaced the first as chancellor. The SPD attitude 
on Europe has remained, in broad lines, the same since the change took place. 
Schmidt's elevation brought a change more in emphasis than in substance with a 
concentration on Westpolitik as West German prosperity was linked with western 
developments. As Friedrich put it, Schmidt has always been European out of German 
national interest, and Atlantic for Europe's sake173. His government's declaration of 
May 17,1974 is indicative of his European motivations: 
For we know that our wealth depends also on the well-functioning and the 
continuation of the European Community and the Common Market.174 
Schmidt's perception of Europe was founded on an accommodation between 
individual nation-states, unlike party declarations of the mid-1960s which were 
calling for an extension of the Commission's powers. Party pronouncements on 
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Europe at the time were confined to a few very cautious and short-term statements in 
the context of world politics and economy. And unlike Brandt, who was more 
accommodating towards his Community partners, Schmidt was prepared to use 
German power to the advancement of both the Federal Republic and the Community. 
He managed to accelerate Community economic and political integration, and he 
generated further spillover by emphasising a minimum, co-ordinated, i f not 
integrated approach to economic and monetary problems.175 
Schmidt's preoccupation with realistic issues was apparent despite the fact that the 
Second Draft of an Economic-Political Orientation Frame for the Years 1975-1985, 
adopted by the party leadership on 1 s t February 1975, asked for the transfer of 
sovereign rights to democratically organised supranational institutions, and for the 
direct elections to the European Parliament which should be entrusted with 
controlling powers. As Jenkins mentions in his European Diary, Schmidt was 
favourable to Jenkins' proposals for a substantial increase in the Communities' 
borrowing role. 
The change of emphasis is clear when one considers Brandt's promise, at the 1970 
Saarbrucken congress, to make Europe the world's socially most advanced large area. 
In the same spirit one can see the 1973 congress resolution which demanded a link 
between economic and social progress and called for the wage-earners' interests to 
become central in the Community's work. Schmidt's policies can be characterised by 
the belief that partnership offers the best opportunities. By making the EC part of his 
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political calculation which concerns German national interests he diminished the old 
boundary between domestic and foreign policies.1 7 7 
The SPD gave critical support to the 1976 Tindemans Report on European Union, 
claiming that some of its provisions can be traced back to old SPD ideas. And 
although it proposed some changes to stress social democratic considerations, it 
embraced its general aim. At the November 1977 Hamburg conference the party 
emphasised once more its support for a federal European Union, with a democratic 
constitution, and called for a more powerful, directly elected parliament. In 
December 1978, the party held a European Congress in Cologne, and adopted a 
European election manifesto for the forthcoming elections. It demanded an EC 
Charter of Civil Rights, humane and balanced growth, measures to safeguard ful l -
employment, economic convergence, a European Monetary Fund, as well as an 
increase in the parliament's powers and the abolition of the unanimity principle at the 
Council decisions.178 
Nevertheless, the preoccupation with German affairs was obvious. The main 
campaign slogan was: Spokesmen for Germany - respected throughout Europe: 
Social Democrats Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt - SPD. The Schmidt coalition 
government continued to support further Community integration and it was his Free 
Democrat Foreign minister, Genscher, who in 1981 with his Italian counterpart 
Colombo launched the initiative that bears their names, and which has been 
discussed in the first section of the present chapter. Here it should be noted that 
coalition government in the FRG meant that the pro-European attitudes of 
Genscher's Free Democrats had a great impact in German attitudes towards European 
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integration. Nevertheless the chancellor remained preoccupied with the recession and 
the community's budgetary problems. Meanwhile, the SPD backed the applications 
of the Mediterranean countries, partly because of Socialist internationalism, partly to 
increase its own influence among weaker European parties.179 
After losing power in 1982 the SPD leadership became more positive on European 
policy. Kohl was criticised for not pushing his counterparts hard enough and for not 
achieving results. When the debate on European Union came to the forefront at the 
July 1985 Milan Council, the party made clear its support on this issue. So, in 
contrast to the early phases of European integration, the German Social-Democrats 
identified themselves with the goal of European unity. One explanation for this can 
be found in the fact that when in opposition the SPD could afford to become more 
internationalist whereas when in office it had to operate within the constraints of the 
governmental responsibilities and the protection of the German national interests. 
Another one can be found in the fact that following Mitterrand's election to the 
French presidency a socialist government was in power in France in the 1980s, and 
this trend was followed by the election of socialist parties into power in a number of 
European countries. 
The party's 1984 European manifesto called for institutional reform: to give the 
parliament more budgetary powers, and the rights to initiate legislation; to co-
determine community policies, and to consultation before the appointment of a new 
commission; to force the Council of Ministers to reach decisions by set deadlines and 
to limit its power to change or veto legislation; to increase popular participation in 
1 7 8 Featherstone, K. Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History , (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1988) , pp. 156-7 
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the policy making process, and to establish a common voting system in subsequent 
European elections.181 
Writing in 1989 Telo observed that, although in June 1986 it looked that the party 
would adopt a pro-European stance in the forthcoming program to replace the famous 
Bad Godesberg text, a tendency pulling towards the direction of German national 
modernisation can be detected. So, among the new SPD ideas, proposals for German 
isolationism can be found which can be explained by a number of reasons. In 
Germany there is a strong national Keynesianism which was rooted in the civil 
service and the big industrial labour unions (as we will see in the nest section 
national Keynesianism is not an option anymore in the modern interdependent 
world). At the same time a new left ecosocialism, which required measures that could 
not be extended to the rest of the Community, had started to emerge. Another reason 
can be found in the unification of fiscal policies that could lead to the abolition of 
measures hitherto essential to encourage qualitatively different consumption and 
production criteria. There was also the fear that the implementation of the minimal 
threshold would entail a net loss for West German workers. Finally Glotz's 
reproposition of the Mitteleuropa notion, which can be traced back to Karl Renner's 
interstate internationalism, was seen as leading to German hegemony of the area and 
the weakening of the Community's political unity. 1 8 2 And despite the fact that in the 
mid-eighties some like Oskar Lafontaine were more interested in the nuclear issue 
than in European integration, especially after the success of the Greens, the party's 
1 8 1 Featherstone, Socialist Parties , p. 161 
1 8 2 Telo, SPD pp. 134-8 
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official policy declarations indicate that it had paid more attention to the need for 
European unity. 1 8 3 
Writing on the Community's future, just before the 1989 European elections, Hans-
Jochel Vogel the SPD's president called, for majority voting in the Council, a 
common European transport policy, strengthening the Community's executive 
powers in competition policy, an independent central bank and a uniform European 
currency. Finally, he promised 
to continue to strive to ensure that the European parliament obtains the 
rights of participation which the national parliaments have long since lost in 
to c 
many areas of European policy-making. 
And at around the same time he identified three major problems, in the realm of 
security, the persistence of unemployment and the destruction of environment. They 
all must be tackled jointly at the Community, i f a lasting satisfactory solution is to be 
found. Furthermore he asked for an increased role for the European Parliament and 
an international decision making structure to deal with the internationalised problems 
of the era. And concluding he wrote: 
To fulfil this role, Europe does not need to become a superpower. It can do so 
by wielding its economic importance, as well as its tradition of ethics dhd the 
experience it has gained in two thousand years of history - sometimes 
through serious errors and tragic bloodshed. Europe must find a new 
1 8 3 Featherstone, Socialist Parties p. 163 
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The analysis of the previous narrative demonstrates certain points. The European 
policy of the SPD can be divided into various periods. In the Federal Republic's first 
years the dominant theme was German unification and Westpolitik and Ostpolitik 
were seen as interconnected. After 1959 Westpolitik was emphasised. SPD support 
for European integration was primarily highlighted in the early 1960s for two 
reasons. The Berlin crisis destroyed the Deutschlandpolitik, and leading SPD 
parliamentarians saw a pro-European policy as a way of achieving a coalition with 
the CDU/CSU. In the mid-1960s Brandt's perception of a European Peace Order 
meant that European integration was seen as secondary since a strong supranational 
community would derail East-West reapproachment. After 1966 Brandt was forced 
to re-examine his policy. That was because, although it was clear that the support for 
the European Peace Order was not seen by Brandt as an alternative to the 
Community, such a policy towards the East affected the Westpolitik. It marked a 
change in the single-minded quest for Western unity. Contradictions and ambiguities 
in Social-democratic European policy can be observed despite persistence of major 
goals; and from Adenauer to Schmidt reunification is unwelcome i f it requires 
withdrawal from West European treaties. Following Kohl's ascendancy to power, 
and free from the responsibilities of government, the Social Democrats were able to 
claim the moral high ground again and advocate a more federalist policy. 
It can be said therefore, that throughout the post-war period the SPD has put the 
interests of the German state, as it has perceived them, above any socialist 
internationalist ideas, and any differences in the policies pursued can be explained by 
the different approaches various people adopted towards the same end, ie. the 
promotion of German interests and the need to win elections. When European 
integration came to be regarded as a means of serving national-statist interests, it was 
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something worth fighting for. In any case it seems that the SPD is nowadays aware of 
nationalism's power. This confusion can be seen in the problem of rhetoric, and of 
the vocabulary used, in the arguments about the German state and the German 
national interests. 
2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND FRENCH SOCIALISM 
According to Criddle, the French Socialist Party (Section Francaise de 1'International 
Ouvriere, SFIO) represented the essential socialist dilemma of orthodoxy vs 
revisionism in the tension between its respective wings. Of all the European socialist 
parties it was the one which despite strongly expressed resistance to reformism has, 
in practice belied its own words. On top of that French socialism had suffered from 
the peculiar lack of consensus on fundamentals. This meant that the party had to 
wage war on the communists on the one hand, and on the petit-bourgeois anti-statists 
of the Right on the other. Meanwhile, it had to use a revolutionary rhetoric, to satisfy 
Marxist followers, and to press for mild specific reforms to satisfy the liberal ones, 
1 RR 
thus limiting its own room for manoeuvre. 
Featherstone has divided the French socialists' approach to Europe into four periods. 
The first, from the 1929 Briand initiative until the post-war liberation, symbolises 
socialist ambitions for greater European co-operation. The second, from 1947 until 
the late 1960s when the SFIO was disbanded, was a period dominated by an 
opportunist reformism and the party's partnership with Centre parties while the 
French Communist Party (PCF) remained excluded. The third, from the birth of 
Partie Socialiste (PS) until Mitterrand's election in 1981, is characterised by the 
adoption of a left-wing rhetoric and closer relations with the PCF, and the evolution 
1 8 8 Criddle, B. Socialists and European Integration: A Study of the French Socialist Party , (London, 
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of a new European policy. And finally, since 1981, a period covering the experience, 
and the difficulties, of office. 1 8 9 
The SFIO supported the general idea of the Briand initiative although, writing in Le 
Populaire, Leon Blum detected the plan's contradiction of advocating a European 
federation while national sovereignty remained intact, and emphasised its political 
aspects and the need for disarmament. As prime minister in 1936-7 Blum promoted 
European co-operation through the creation of a political and economic solidarity and 
calls for disarmament. During the war he championed the idea of a super-state 
dominating individual national sovereignties.190 
At the June 1943 reconstitution of the SFIO, its executive committee following 
Blum's universalism called for a world society, while French fears of Germany were 
present. 
This world society should be equipped with real economic and political 
powers. It must be a superstate, with power to enforce its decisions, and not 
be bound by outworn formulae ofpolitical non-intervention.... 
We must destroy the German military machine, assist the popular revolution, 
solve the agrarian problem, abolish heavy industry, socialise the Junker 
estates, and so on. Without prejudice to German unity, which is an 
undeniable fact, we must establish a federal regime which will do away with 
Prussian predominance, and must supervise political institutions and the 
educational system.191 
In the December 1943 proposal for a common Resistance programme, the SFIO 
inspired by Blum and assuming that nationalism had led to Nazism and that it would 
be impossible to introduce socialist reforms in isolation within the nation-state, 
Featherstone, K. Socialist Parties and European Integration: a comparative history, (Manchester, 
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called for a United Socialist States of Europe as a first step towards a United States 
of the World. Again though the German problem was apparent. 
The political and social democracy that we intend to build in France will not 
be viable or stable unless it is integrated into a European order, or rather, 
since the present war has diminished Europe's place on the map of the world, 
a universal order.... 
...Germany should be rendered for ever incapable of repeating her policy of 
expansion by force of arms... 
The only way to resolve this contradiction and make Germany harmless in a 
peaceful and stable Europe is to incorporate the German nation in an 
international community powerful enough to re-educate her, discipline her, 
and if necessary master her.192 
In March 1944, the Socialist Party at Algiers published the Government Action 
Programme. In order to avoid offending the Communists though, no mention was 
made of a European super-state.193 Blum saw the individual countries' interests as 
interlinked with those of the other European countries and even of the world as a 
whole. He perceived Socialism as the realisation of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity 
that could only be achieved within an international environment which could be 
utilised to control Germany. 
Faithful to its traditional policy, the Socialist Party declares that the 
condition for a just, lasting and prosperous peace consists in the political and 
economic co-operation of all free peoples, that is to say a world organisation 
for collective security founded in justice. This organisation must not be 
placed under the hegemony of one or more great powers, but must be a 
federation offree nations each of which must yield part of its sovereignty to a 
higher organisation with its own authority, possessing a budget and an army 
sufficient to ensure the security of all... 
Lipgens, Documents , Vol.1 p.333-4 
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Only within this framework can effective measures be taken to permit the 
future integration of Germany, reformed in its structure and mentality, into 
the civilised community from which it has been cut off by Nazi barbarism.194 
Philip advanced the concept of the big market, i.e. the idea that only a large market of 
more than 200 million people with a minimal reliance on imports could be 
sufficiently autonomous to follow a successful independent social and economic 
policy, something that could not be accomplished by the individual European 
states195. 
After the war the SFIO was not a passive witness in the process of Western 
adjustment. Blum was the ambassador-extraordinary who negotiated the Washington 
Agreement of May 1946 which was decisive in anchoring France in the Western 
camp 1 9 6. As we saw in the previous section this was not the case with the German 
Social Democratic leader. Whereas Blum was western orientated, Schumacher was 
looking to the east. Blum justified his western orientation as compatible with 
internationalist socialist objectives since, as he saw it, the threat was coming from the 
Soviet Union which was 
working to set up national sovereignties, which actually resuscitated the 
interests, instincts and dangers of economic nationalism and could lead to the 
emergence of two antagonistic blocs.197 
In 1947 Blum rallied support for the Marshall Aid proposal on the basis that the 
resulting organisation would be a step towards a supranational international 
1 9 4 "Socialist Party (SFIO): Manifesto 12 Nov. 1944" in Lipgens & Loth, Documents, Vr .3 p.25 
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community. At the same time Schumacher, the leader of the German SPD, as we 
have seen, welcomed the Marshall Plan. 
The party's leading European was Andre Philip, and his position was unquestionably 
on the right. He was the guiding light behind the creation of The Socialist Movement 
for the United States of Europe, the pressure of which led to the convening by the 
SFIO, in May 1948, of the Conference Socialiste de Paris et les Etats-Unis d'Europe. 
It was attended by delegates from 15 socialist parties and defined the United States of 
Europe in terms of a supranational entity involving the delegation of national 
sovereignty. 
It is worth mentioning however, that Blum's advice to the conference was that the 
European idea should not be allowed to substitute itself for, but rather be seen as a 
step towards, the international socialist idea, which should be the final aim. And 
although any reference to socialist objectives was omitted from the conference report, 
the socialists expressed their hope for democracy, social justice and peace in the 
universalist tradition of Jaures and Blum. As Criddle has noted, the French Socialists 
managed by combining the internationalism of the great leaders with Philip's concept 
of the big market to drive their enthusiasm towards the attainment of European 
, 198 
integration. 
At the 1948 Congress Andre Philip, in his capacity as Economics minister, spoke in 
favour of the Marshall Plan as necessary for reconstruction, and justified it as 
important for the building of European unity. Philip saw the danger in not using the 
opportunity for industrial development and European economic unification presented 
by the aid. Opposition came from the exponents of third forcism who were not 
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confined only to the party's left. In the late 1940s a nationalistically inspired 
tendency for third forcism, seeking to create a vehicle for reconciliation between the 
two superpowers, was apparent in most French parties, and Philip went some way to 
accommodate this disposition.1 9 9 The idea of the third force can be seen as 
nationalistically inspired since any idea of a third force in France would have as its 
natural leader France itself. It was therefore an atempt to put France at the driving 
seat of Europe and elevate her to a position at par with the two superpowers, the USA 
and the USSR. 
On the party's left the two most important Europeanists were Pierre Rimbert and 
Marceau Pivert. Rimbert was the party's most prominent Marxist economic theorist. 
He maintained that the continuation of the nation-state constituted a contradiction for 
capitalism and socialism alike. He believed that the state was gradually forced to 
intervene to boost capitalism. This means that the kernel of socialism was visible 
within the capitalist state and progressive socialisation would be pushed by 
international competition. We should surpass the nation-state framework to build 
socialism, and as the process of building an international community was a major 
step towards this end, European integration within the Marshall Plan outline was to 
be encouraged. 
The April 1948 Bulletin Interieur reflected the SFIO's suspicion of the American 
offer, and detected two serious threats for socialism in it. The privatisation of the 
public sector; and the safeguarding of the social privileges of the bourgeoisie. It 
advocated the establishment of democratically-controlled European Commissions 
and the organisation of a common economic union aiming eventually at a complete 
Criddle, Socialists pp.29-30 
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customs union. Nevertheless, squeezed between American capitalism and Soviet 
expansionism, the socialists found the idea of the third force as a natural escapist 
heaven.200 
The resolution of the 1948 congress, while considering that the Franco-German 
problem could only be solved by German integration into a new European structure, 
called for a United States of Europe. As we have seen previously, for the German 
SPD, priority had to be given to German reunification rather than European 
integration. 
...the Franco-German problem can only be solved by integrating the German 
economy into the new European structure... 
The Socialist Party is determined that its continued efforts to bring about the 
United States of free Europe should not be diverted in favour of either of the 
existing blocks.201 
Western defence demands compelled the party to retreat from third forcism and 
internationalism by 1949 but the establishment of the Council of Europe in May of 
the same year offered some hope to the internationalists in SFIO. Writing in March 
1949, Philip had gone as far as to advocate economic integration. He was especially 
concerned about the Ruhr, and said that its 
collieries and steel works should henceforth be placed firmly under European 
management.202 
Philip saw the Strasbourg Assembly as the democratic element binding together the 
individual member states. The party's 1949 congress accepted the Council's 
1 9 9 Criddle, Socialists pp.32-5 
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limitations and called for the popularisation of the European idea. At the same time 
the German SPD opposed West German entry to the Council of Europe. The policy 
document L 'Union Europeenne advocated close co-operation between the assembly's 
socialist parties, excluding the communists, as the socialists saw the issue as an 
opportunity to increase their domestic electoral appeal among French workers vis a 
vis the PCF. 2 0 3 The manifesto adopted at the July 1949 Congress argued that 
European unity was an economic necessity: 
If she remained cut up into segments, shielded behind autarchic economic 
policies, at the end of Marshall Aid Europe could neither retake her place in 
international commerce, nor avoid a lowering of her living standards, of 
which the working-class would be the major victim.204 
The setting up of NATO marked the end of third forcism as the party was compelled 
to make its position clear in the developing superpower rivalry. As Criddle has 
observed, there is no doubt that the leadership and the overwhelming majority of the 
rank and file membership were in favour of the Atlantic Pact. The unanimously 
adopted international policy motion of the 1950 Congress abandoned neutrality for 
the sake of the Western alliance, although writing in the same year Mollet held that 
an independent, but not neutral, third force was still possible. Again it was the 
animosity between communists and socialists in France, as demonstrated by the 
latter's active involvement in putting down communist-led strikes and 
demonstrations in 1947 and 1952, which determined the SFIO's degree of 
commitment to Western defence205. 
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Speaking at the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly in August 1950, Philip called for 
a United Europe to repel the Soviet threat and listed the necessary institutions: 
a European army, a European bank of investments, a federal reserve bank 
system for Europe, joint organizations for coal, electricity, basic agricultural 
products, purchases and sales; finally, an Assembly to which these 
institutions, one and all, shall be accountable.206 
Speaking at the same body, in August 1951, Philip portrayed the Schuman Plan of 
functionalist integration as the prototype for future functional structures extending to 
the areas of power, transportation, labour and agriculture and thus gradually leading 
to prospective federalism. But for the SFIO, as for most parties in France, the 
underlying attraction of the plan was the possibility of containing German economic 
recovery and political autonomy. Discussing the question of the internationalisation 
of the Ruhr, the 1949 Congress welcomed the idea on condition that it did not imply 
a restoration to power of the old magnates. Philip offered a realistic approach by 
accepting that cartelization was both good and unavoidable in some cases, like the 
big primary industries where technical conditions rendered the process inevitable . 
His concern was the modernisation, rather than the overthrow, of capitalism and he 
argued that socialism was mainly about the creation of new, and not the equal 
distribution of the existing, wealth 2 0 8. 
The party's numerous views of its own tradition found expression in the conditions 
placed in its official reaction to the Schuman Plan. Its socialism and belief in popular 
sovereignty were reflected in the condition that the controlling authority should 
include workers' representatives and be accountable to a European assembly. Its 
2 0 6 Philip, A. "For a Political Authority", in Lipgens & Loth, Documents Vol.3 , p. 123 
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romantic esteem of Britain was apparent in the condition that efforts should be made 
to incorporate as many nations as possible, and Britain in particular. And its French 
fear of Germany in the condition that the reconstitution of a German dominated 
private steel cartel should be prevented209. These conditions were less socialist than 
the ones defined by the Socialist International in September 1952 which reiterated the 
need for the protection of full employment, protection of the right of national 
governments to nationalise coal and steel industries, and the publication of regular 
reports on workers' living standards, migration and unemployment210. Finally, in 
December 1951, the SFIO voted for ratification of the Paris Treaty in the National 
Assembly. According to Newman the acceptance of the Plan constituted a major step 
down the road to the castration of any remaining socialist notion of European 
integration within the party 2". Again this acceptance of the Plan by the SFIO 
contrasts with Schumacher's restrained support. 
As became apparent during the EDC debate, the French fear of being left alone with 
a resurgent Germany was instrumental in the desire to include Britain in the proposed 
ECSC. Mollet's desire for such an outcome led him to propose confederal, rather that 
federal, institutions i f this could ensure British participation, claiming that the 
community should not be confined to six nations and that it should create strong 
bonds with outside states. In October 1952 he resigned from an ECSC sub-committee 
in protest against the increasing of its powers. Writing at the Socialist International 
Bulletin, Mollet justified his action in anti-clerical terms, as an act against a catholic 
domination of the community, an argument which was used against the proposed 
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EDC in 1954 2 1 2. Such an argument indicates something about Mollet's ideological 
style. 
In October 1950 the announcement of the Pleven Plan, linking European integration 
with German rearmament, provoked the utmost degree of dissent within the SFIO, 
and from 1952 to 1954 dominated party congresses. The opposition case was based 
on a French nationalistic anti-Germanism, although sometimes dressed in an 
internationalist rhetoric, whereas the cedistes (i.e. EDC advocates), like Mollet and 
Philip, manifested a distinct anti-Russianism. Their basic argument was founded on 
total support for the building of Western defence as part of European integration with 
ful l German participation. The leadership's case was put by Philip who repeated his 
position that the nation state was unable to efficiently defend itself, stressed that 
rejection of the EDC would damage the whole European project and that only by 
allowing West Germany to integrate on equal terms could the danger of a revitalised 
German nationalism be curbed. At the end of the 1952 Congress the leadership 
introduced a set of conditions on which the ratification of the plan should be 
dependent: the creation of a supranational political authority able to exercise 
democratic control over the EDC; continued US involvement with European defense 
matters; and British association. As Aron has observed, the fact that the first two 
were mutually exclusive is characteristic of French wavering, as on one hand they 
wished the creation of a European authority to minimise the hazard of German 
rearmament, and on the other they wanted no part of such an authority in which 
German power would not be offset by British participation213. 
2 1 2 Criddle, Socialists , pp.50-4 
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Moreover, Mollet had to compromise his own position in order to accommodate 
internal party unease with the EDC and to protect the SFIO from the successful 
Communist-led attack on the proposed community. The party division became 
deeper as subsequent French governments refused to take the treaty to the Assembly 
for ratification. In the vote taken on the issue at the May 1954 Congress the 
ratification carried the day by 1969 to 1215 mandats in favour, not a decisive victory 
indeed, and thus the 1954 Puteaux Congress was also called to decide for a 
disciplinary vote, as demanded by Mollet. His position was that as the EDC was a 
European matter the socialists, themselves a European party, should ensure its 
accomplishment but, as Criddle has pointed, his motive could have been to achieve 
French agreement to German rearmament by means of coupling the latter with the 
popular idea of European integration. Against this position, Schumacher and the SPD 
leadership opposed any idea of German rearmament. Finally, at the National 
Assembly debate 53 socialists voted for the procedural motion by which the 
consideration of the treaty was rejected.214 
Comparing the socialist leadership with the other pro-EDC forces, Criddle observed 
that, with the exception of Mollet who talked of breaking free of the national 
sovereignty straitjacket, it emphasised more the community's defensive (anti-
0 1 S 
German) rather than its constructive (supranational) character . 
The effects of this bitter controversy on the party's European policy were twofold. 
On the one hand, following the national trend, it became more assertive about 
national goals and more restive about the US, which was seen as unconcerned with 
2 1 4 Criddle , Socialists , pp.66-72 
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French needs. And on the other, it weakened any socialist justification for French 
participation in European integration216. 
In December 1954, in the vote following the debate on the Paris Agreements of the 
WEU (the less supranational way of linking Western and German defences) 18 
socialist deputies defied the leadership and voted against the treaty, the rest of the 
Germanophobes being persuaded that this was the way to prevent German 
reunification. On the same issue Ollenauer had renounced German membership of 
the WEU. But for the pro-Europeans in the party the WEU was a relapse since it 
restated the predominance of national sovereignty. They now turned to the 
exploration of functional integration in the fields of economy and energy, and the 
direct elections of a European Parliament, where they played a critical part. As the 
reality of the Europe of the six became widely accepted harmony in the party was 
achieved by late 1955. The process was accelerated by the formation of the socialist-
led government following the 1956 election. This produced a Europeanist majority in 
the National Assembly, thus making any greater commitment to European integration 
by Mollet a reflection of political necessity. The same motive underlined his position 
on the Euratom and the EEC, a political case rooted in a resurgence of third forcism, 
although the most prevalent argument was the isolation and international weakness of 
France following the Suez fiasco. From a failure of French international prestige, this 
217 
was turned into an argument in favour of European integration. 
Introducing the Rome treaties to the assembly the SFIO leadership had to disperse the 
strong fear among its own party that integration would be disastrous to national 
industry. On the contrary, integration was not seen as an obstacle to socialist 
2 1 6 Newman, Socialism , p.32 
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objectives. But by now the socialist championing of the EEC manifested an 
acceptance of the fact of French economic recovery which meant that competition 
was both, desirable and essential. In the meantime, following the Saar Agreements, 
anti-Germanism had completely vanished from party rhetoric. As Newman has noted, 
Mollet's EEC policy indicated some changes from previous socialist policy. The 
assertion of national sovereignty became more prominent. British non-participation 
was not seen as vital any more. And socialism almost vanished from the party's 
9 1 SI 
attitude towards the Community . 
In the late 1950's the SFIO was undergoing a theoretical transformation which, 
although it did not result in a Bad Godesberg, offered a pragmatic approach dressed 
in a left-wing jargon, and in this pattern capitalism was becoming less of an issue but 
instead the new technocratic Leviathan was perceived as the main villain. A clear 
example can be found in an article by Gerard Jaquet, entitled Socialism and the 
Construction of Europe and published in Le Populaire on 29 March 1961, in which 
the author called for a European parliament to control the technocratic power, but 
which also demonstrated a lack of any true socialist ideas. The SFIO did not produce 
any important prescription for the Common Market. 2 1 9 
Concluding his study Criddle pointed that throughout the Fourth Republic the SFIO 
had been instrumental in supporting European integration by providing a concrete 
pro-integration block in the National Assembly, which never had fewer than 95 
deputies. It is worth noting that the SFIO was constantly involved in the business of 
coalition politics. The arguments used by both supporters and opponents of 
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integration in the party were expressed in political rather than economic terms. This 
tendency was boosted by the fact that there was a wide agreement on the need for 
indicative planning among French parties, the difference being that socialists insisted 
on popular control and participation in the process. Any possible economic 
reservations were, as Philip has shown, those of a small producer facing large foreign 
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competitors 
During the party's period in opposition, socialist belief in supranational European 
integration and Atlanticism was in conflict with Gaullist policies, a conflict which 
the SFIO managed to present as a conflict between nationalism and internationalism. 
As a result the Franco-German treaty was opposed because it was an inter-state, 
rather than a community, affair, and the force de frappe was rejected as an attempt to 
compromise Atlantic, and therefore integrationist, defence. Again, while not 
doubting the basic honesty of socialist Europeanism, Criddle has detected an attempt 
on the SFIO's part to use the matter to mobilise the left against Gaullism. La Gauche 
Europeenne called for a workers', as opposed to a fatherlands', Europe to be brought 
about by supranational means . 
De Gaulle's return to power in 1958 marked the begining of a new period. Between 
1958 and 1969 he endeavoured to increase French prestige in the global scene by 
following a more independent road. This was marked by an attack on established 
Europeanism and Atlanticism. He pursued a special relationship with Germany. He 
temporarily boycotted Community institutions (the 1965 crisis) and he vetoed the 
British applications to join the EEC. Finally, he advocated the creation of a 
European, as distinct from Atlantic, Europe. 
Criddle, Socialists, p.91-5 
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At the same time the disintegration of the SFIO, on one hand, and the resemblance of 
Gaullist and communist rhetoric, on the other, made the formation of a socialist 
European policy a much more complicated, uncertain and elusive issue. Between 
1958 and 1962 the SFIO reverted to its accustomed position on Europe. After having 
been careful on supranationalism while in office, now in contrast to the Communists, 
it reaffirmed its devotion to the United States of Europe. It opposed de Gaulle's veto 
of the British application and argued that the Franco-German treaty was motivated by 
out-dated concepts, derived from the wil l to power and hegemony that could damage 
the Community. In their opposition to de Gaulle, the French socialists found an ally 
in the German Socialdemocrats. The replacement of Defferre by Mitterand as joint 
left presidential candidate for the 1965 election had a limited impact on European 
issues. French socialist leadership was now closer to its German counterpart as both 
opposed Gaullist policies. In his campaign he attacked de Gaulle on European and 
Atlantic grounds and calling for a federal Europe and a directly elected parliament. 
/ am European and I hope that one day all the French left will unite around 
the Common Market...a political Europe, built according to the methods used 
in the economic and technical domains, a Europe which will become the 
decisive factor in the coexistence of East and West.223 
During the campaign Mitterrand attracted agricultural voters against de Gaulle by 
portraying his policies as unfavourable to the farming communities. His European 
statements were in line with SFIO traditions, and he hinted at a Union of the left with 
the Communist Party calling for a democratic peoples' Europe instead of a capitalist 
technocratic one. At the same time he called for a political Europe with transfers of 
2 2 1 Criddle, Socialists , p.89 
2 2 2 Newman, Socialism , p.71 
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sovereignty, and his candidacy was endorsed by Jean Monnet. 2 2 4 The PSU, the 
Unified Socialist Party 2 2 5 which was established in 1960 by dissidents from SFIO, 
the PCF and other left-wing groups, only managed to produce a foreign policy in 
June 1965. It was a combination of Europeanism and left-socialism. They called for 
democratisation of the existing institutions; for co-ordination of social struggles at 
Community level and conclusion of collective European agreements; for the 
establishment of European planning with constant workers' participation; for 
safeguarding of European independence with regard to international trusts, and 
widening of the Community. The attitudes of the representatives of this trend, the 
best known being M.Rocard, are examined in detail in the first section of the next 
chapter. 
In an attempt to reconcile communist and socialist views on Europe in face of his 
candidacy, Mitterrand appeared to share communist suspicions of the community 
because in historical terms Europe had been dominated by America, but claimed that 
the left's task should be to prove that Europe had a role to play in the search for 
peace and progress.227 
In 1966 the Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et d'Education Socialistes (CERES), a 
new left group run by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, was founded advocating women's 
rights, ecology, workers' self-management and the union with the communists. Its 
argument on Europe was twopronged. On the one hand it was argued that the main 
enemy is American political and economic hegemony in Europe. On the other it was 
2 2 3 quoted in Haywood, E. "The European Policy of Francois Mitterrand", Journal of Common Market 
Studies , Vol.31, no.2 (June 1993), p.271 
2 2 4 Haywood, "European policy" , p.276 
2 2 5 for an exposition of the PSU's attitudes towards European integration see Chapter Three. 
2 2 6 Newman, Socialism , pp.72-3 
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claimed that the acceptance of the existing Community should be conditional upon 
the latter's non-interference in domestic socialist policy. Moreover, further 
integration should be supported only i f it would be useful for the attainment of 
socialism in France.229 
Nevertheless, despite his wish to find common ground with the PCF, Mitterrand 
emphasised that national independence was meaningless, 
while American capital and management infiltrate the Common Market 
economy and the Russian Army ... possesses a nuclear force capable of 
annihilating each of the six countries of "little Europe " in the first quarter of 
an hour of war.230 
The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was, for him, a clear demonstration of 
the need to explore the paths to French independence in an independent Europe, 
which could overcome the division of the continent. European integration and 
socialism were seen as complementary to each other as industrial specialisation was 
the prerequisite to economic expansion. Moreover, since integration based on 
capitalist principles would strengthen US domination, a real Europe would be a 
socialist one. This should be the task of a French socialist government by means of 
advancing its domestic policy within the Community and placing the industrial 
spearhead under public control. 
At the June 1971 Congress at Epinay-sur-Seine Mitterrand was elected first secretary 
of the unified PS. On 11-12 March 1972 the party's national convention drew up its 
own programme and invited the PSU, the Radicals, and the Communists to join it in 
2 2 7 Newman, Socialism , p.76 
2 2 8 Johnson, R.W. The Long March of the French Left, (London, Macmillan, 1981), p.65 
2 2 9 Newman, Socialism , p.74 
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hammering out a common programme. In June the Common Programme of the Left 
was signed.232 The European question did not hinder the rapprochement between 
Communists and Socialists. At the Communists' insistence, the reference to uphold 
the unanimity principle in the Council of Ministers was included in the programme. 
In exchange, and in order to satisfy the Socialists, the programme allowed for the 
possibility of an increase in the Community authorities competence. Meanwhile, both 
partners agreed on the need to combat capitalism, neo-colonialism, the multinationals 
and US domination. The PS-PCF Common Programme of the Left for the 1973 
legislative elections incorporated a general deal on the principles directing their 
European policy when in office, based on two tasks. One was participation in the 
building of the Community with the aims of freeing it from the dominance of 
monopoly capital, democratising its institutions, and directing its objectives towards 
workers' interests. Secondly, the partners, while in the Community's centre, should 
be free to pursue their policies. As Haywood has noticed though, in the 1970s 
Mitterrand's comments on European integration were muted. This was the result of 
the need to achieve and retain leadership of the PS, to unite the various party factions 
and to develop a common platform with the Communists.234 
During the ten year period leading up to the Socialist victories in 1981, Mitterrand's 
brokerage managed to unite the different party factions. He combined a socialist and 
a national appeal, and thus prevented the expression of unresolved contradictions. 
The March 1972 programme endeavoured to spell out a range of policies which 
would allow a socialist breakthrough in France and strengthen Europe, without at the 
2 3 1 Newman, Socialism , p.77 
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same time reinforcing capitalism. Nevertheless, it was not clear how this was to be 
achieved. It was argued that supranational decision making should be bolstered. But 
this should happen only after agreement that measures suggested by the left would be 
seriously considered by all. As Newman has observed, Mitterrand was trying to blend 
SFIO's Europeanism with the view that the Community could frustrate the socialist 
advancement. In parallel he attempted to persuade the voters that national and 
European independence were interlinked. In 1973, instead of building socialism in 
France, he was more concerned to strengthen Europe against the US, and in August 
at a bilateral meeting in London with the Labour Party he, as the French government 
did next year, almost dismissed Labour's grievances with the Community. Mitterrand 
strove to bring the socialist parties of the EEC closer to each other and he managed, 
despite strong opposition from the left, to persuade the PS to accept his idea of 
sending party envoys to all Community's member states. Thus he elevated the 
Community to central status in socialist strategy. At the extraordinary congress on 
Europe at Bagnolet in December 1973 the conclusions of the motion of Mitterrand's 
supporters were, as Newman has noted, wholly European. They called for more 
planning, common action to combat inflation, a common, independent from the 
dollar, monetary system, and an exploration into a European scientific and 
technological independence. They should all emanate from a democratic central 
authority. Nevertheless, the federalist solution was rejected. 
To the left of this, CERES offered a left-wing analysis characterised by a number of 
features: a distinction between Soviet dominance of a limited geographical sphere 
and US imperialism which was perceived as the main obstacle on the road to 
Newman, Socialism, pp.92-8 
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socialism; a more comprehensive repudiation of SFIO traditionalism arguing that the 
degree of Europeanism is related to class collaboration; a claim that the Rome Treaty 
was incompatible with socialist aims since it considered competition as the exclusive 
motor of the economy; and finally, an emphasis on the necessity for a broader 
coalition, not only with foreign socialist parties but with all anti-capitalist forces, to 
combat capitalism on an international platform. The final resolution included 
elements of the above view but it was more European than the early majority motion. 
It was less conditional than the 1972 programme. At the same time it accommodated 
the left by suppressing the outright supranationalism of the ex-SFIO's right while 
permitting the pragmatists to claim that the PS's Europeanism would promote 
national independence. The party's advancement exacerbated internal conflicts as 
Mitterrand's standing was boosted and the proportion of CERES members increased. 
The situation deteriorated with the influx of a number of new members from the 
CFDT and Rocard's PSU. This resulted in more ideological vagueness. At the early 
1975 Pau Congress Rocard joined the party directorate. CERES found itself isolated. 
The PS expressed a firm Europeanism supported by arguments similar to those of the 
SFIO. Mitterrand, while co-ordinating southern European socialists, established three 
joint working parties on Europe with Brandt thus bringing the party closer to the 
SPD. Europeanism was affirmed as the only way forward in a situation in which only 
limited progress was possible. It was often implicit, and sometimes explicit, that the 
PS would maintain its European orientation whatever the reaction of the PCF. 2 3 6 
In 1976, attempting to settle the issue of direct elections to the European Parliament, 
Mitterrand proclaimed that 
Newman, Socialism, pp.99-101 
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Election by universal suffrage will give it the authority and prestige of which 
it is now deprived and will clearly establish in public opinion the European 
idea which has up to now been fuzzy. A decision was made in December 1973 
at Bagnolet...For socialists, a large scale political policy must be substituted 
for the economic power of grand capital..Europe will either be Socialist or 
she will not be, and it is now appropriate to pave the way for the massive 
entry of workers into the European institutions and the intellectualisation of 
the struggle.237 
On February of the same year the Comite Directeur of the party supported direct 
elections by 97 to 34 votes. Later in the month in order to distinguish its 
Europeanism from that of the centrists, it rejected the Tindemans Report. 2 3 8 
Two months later Mitterrand presented the party's attitude towards Europe which he 
identified with the European Economic Community. He mixed traditional 
Europeanism with the PS's new socialist critique by attacking the US, the FRG, and 
De Gaulle. The arguments in favour of Europe came to sound more like those of the 
SFIO. In 1977 the theoretical journal of the PS, La Nouvelle Revue, held a debate on 
the issue of Europe. 'Europeanism' was the dominant theme, and emphasis was 
placed upon the inability of any single nation-state to deal with the problems of 
inflation and unemployment alone. Moreover, it was suggested that the power of the 
TIG 
multinational companies could only be curtailed by a European political authority. 
Thus, the themes that came to dominate the discussions about the future of socialism 
much later (sovereignty, interdependence, etc.), as we wil l see in the last chapter, 
were introduced. This trend was reinforced at the June 1977 Nantes congress where 
CERES was again marginalised and Rocard even supported positions irreconcilable 
with the Common Programme. Nevertheless, in July 1978 CERES called for the 
2 3 7 quoted in Featherstone, Socialist Parties , p. 121 
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complete rejection by the PS of a common platform of Community socialist parties 
which had originated from the above mentioned initiatives of Brandt and 
Mitterrand. 2 4 0 
In October the party's Euroelection manifesto Socialists for a Europe of the Workers 
called for better democratic control of the Community, stronger workers' 
participation in the decision making process, and addition to the EP's powers, so it 
can control directives that now elude national parliamentary control. Under these 
circumstances the extension of EC competence would be satisfactory but this 
supranationalism was withdrawn a few years later.241 
In the winter of 1978-9 Mitterrand had to restrict his Europeanism and this was the 
price to be paid i f CERES was to support him against the challenge by Rocard and 
Mauroy. In these terms the 1979 Euroelection's campaign was difficult and not very 
successful. The PS, while not altogether opposed to any future extension of 
Community powers, believed that the directly elected parliament must progress 
within the boundaries of the existing treaties. Any transfer of sovereignty could take 
place only with the agreement of national parliaments and governments. 
Nevertheless, the party's European orientation, after the April 1979 Metz congress, is 
of more long term importance. Having silenced CERES, Mitterrand was able to 
revert back to Europeanism. Furthermore, he continued his attempts to forge tighter 
links between the Community's socialist parties. 
The question of Community enlargement tested the socialist Europeanism as the 
party's strong agricultural basis meant that domestic interests should be safeguarded. 
Newman, Socialism , p. 102 
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In contrast to previous ideas about a Europe du Sud, the PS advocated a reform of the 
CAP. Products affected by enlargement should be assisted and a system of minimum 
prices checked at the national frontiers should be established. Regional policy should 
be reinforced and public intervention to sustain living standards should be facilitated. 
It was also proposed that new entrants should advance from one stage to the next not 
on the basis of time elapsed between the two, but on the basis of performance 
achieved.242 
Having defeated Rocard within the party, Mitterrand and the PS were elected to 
power, in 1981 with a contradictory Europeanism to appeal to both the left and the 
right, critical of most Community institutions and policies, and poised to reform them 
to create a workers' Europe. At the same time it was stressed that it was vital for 
France and Europe in general. During his campaign Mitterrand sought to distinguish 
his Europeanism from that of his opponent by criticising the Franco-German alliance 
and calling for a more cautious policy towards Britain. 2 4 3 As far as institutional 
reform of the communities was concerned, the socialist 1981 election manifesto, 
without ruling out reform, stressed the literal application of the treaties and 
highlighted the preservation of the unanimity principle. 
Once in office, Mitterrand's first European initiative was the European Social Area. 
The concept of a Workers' Europe was one the Socialists shared with the 
Communists. But opposition from Britain and Germany, and the difficulties faced at 
home by the Mauroy government destroyed its chances for success. It was used 
though as a sweetener for the acceptance of the neo-liberal structure of the internal 
Featherstone, Socialist Parties , p. 123 
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market and as a link between the pro and anti-integration factions of the party. 2 4 4 For 
Chandernagor, the new administration's European Affairs deputy minister, the 
institutions should return to the roles assigned to them by the treaties. The 
Commission should be made a secretariat organisation, and although the parliament 
had a role to play, it would be the Council that should be taking decisions. In the face 
of opposition both from inside (the communists and CERES) and outside the 
government (the Gaullists) the October Memorandum on revitalisation of the 
Community was ambiguous. It suggested some small improvements, but indicated a 
move backwards by reintroducing, without defining it, the practice of declaration of 
"national-interest" to avert a vote even on a minor issue. The Genscher-Colombo 
initiative was met with a cautious response on the French government's side. 
Haywood offers two reasons for this apparent lack of interest. Probably they did not 
understand the link between majority voting and their own motions for EC policy 
reforms like / 'espace social or, like the socialist group in the EP, they gave priority to 
socio-economic aspects of policies over EPC and institutional reform. This helps to 
explain the socialist government's dismissive attitude towards parliamentary 
reform. 2 4 5 In fact, EC was a low priority compared with the domestic programme. 
As Featherstone has observed, the Mitterrand administration wished to increase the 
size and range of Community expenditure but without disproportionately increasing 
its own budgetary contribution or cutting -back the CAP. France was not happy with 
the Future Financing of the Community option of the 1983 Green Paper that CAP 
beneficiary states should contribute more. Without blocking CAP reform, Mitterrand 
managed to persuade the other leaders, at the June 1983 Stuttgart summit, that such 
2 4 4 Haywood, "European Policy" , pp.274-5 
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re-examination should consider the global position and not be limited to a maximum 
on specific pieces of expenditure and that the costs should be shared among member 
states. Moreover, at the March 1984 Brussels summit and after, he managed to 
isolate and put Mrs Thatcher on the defensive with regard to refunds, thus proving 
true to his campaign declarations to protect French national interests. This was also 
true with regard to the Iberian enlargement as Mitterrand called for increased 
resources for Community policies to prevent France for becoming a net contributor, 
although an agreement on how this could be done was not reached. This put a strain 
on the relations between the French and Spanish socialists. Finally under the French 
presidency in 1984 a programme of negotiations was prepared aiming at Spanish and 
Portuguese entry in January 1986.2 4 6 Haywood has noticed that between 1981 and 
1984 French attitudes towards European institutional reform underwent a major 
transformation. The explanation can be found in the failure of reflationary 
programme of the early Mitterrand years. As Wright has noticed, the socialists' 
industrial policy was five-pronged. It included a neo-Keynesian expansionist macro-
economic policy based on the expected upturn in world trade, with the creation of 
new state jobs, increased salaries, benefits and pensions etc. It also included greater 
rights and powers for the workers in the factories, increased research budgets, the 
expansion of the public industrial sector, and finally, the vertical integration of entire 
sectors of related activities, such as electronincs, etc. This was accompanied by the 
nationalization of big companies and banks.247 But the deflationary policies pursued 
by France's major trading partners at the time, the high American interest rates, the 
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turbulence of the economic environment of those days, and French technological 
dependency on the US and Japan resulted in three devaluations of the franc by March 
1983. So, whereas in 1981 they believed that no institutional reform was 
necessary, three years later this had been reversed to the point that Mitterrand 
speaking at the EP, expressed support for the Draft Treaty on European Union. 2 4 9 As 
the official line on Europe represented a compromise between the opposing party 
sections, any policy change should be cautious and justifiable in terms of making the 
implementation of domestic socialist measures on the Community scale more likely. 
The bypassing of the British veto at the 1982 agricultural price fixing session 
provided Mitterrand with a chance to show to the British, and to the anti-British 
lobby in France, that the socialists were prepared to be tough and not intimidated by 
the British demands, while safeguarding French farming interests. This sparked a 
new debate around the Luxembourg compromise interpretation with the French 
government referring not to "very important" interests, as the original text, but to 
vital or essential ones, a more firm interpretation. They were also claiming that the 
national interest must have a direct bearing on the issue of concern. The same line 
was advocated by the French representative at the ad hoc group discussing the 
Genscher-Colombo plan. Moreover, as far as the Genscher-Colombo proposals for 
EP and EPC reform were concerned, France adopted a cautious approach to the 
development of a common foreign policy and the progressive harmonisation on 
defence issues. In addition, France was hesitant by the time of the 1983 Stuttgart 
Summit to agree to the creation of an EPC secretariat, whereas Mitterand went as far 
as to call the EP an Assembly. The Spinelli Initiative divided the Socialist group in 
2 4 8 Wright, "Socialism", pp.294-5 
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the EP as many MEPs, the French among them, insisted that policy and not 
institutional reform would humanise the European Union. It should be noted here that 
whereas the CERES faction opposed the initiative, the Rocardians supported it. At 
the first vote in the European Parliament on the initiative the PS representatives 
voted reluctantly for the guidelines resolution. In the next vote though, in September 
1983 only two of them defied the party line and voted in favour. This can be 
explained by the fact that at that time candidates were selected for the forthcoming 
Euroelections. In the main vote in February 1984 they all abstained.250 
As Mitterrand had become more dynamically involved in foreign policy, the change 
from Mauroy to Fabius did not result in substantial changes in European policy. 
Addressing the European Parliament in May 1984 Mitterrand offered a new stimulus 
to Community policy discussions, which was welcomed at a time when socialist 
domestic economic policies were under attack. Although his speech saw the EUT not 
as a replacement but as a supplement to the old treaty, he deviated from the French 
custom by supporting the idea of institutional reform. The speech manifested French 
leadership and a threat to Britain, at the time of discussing her budgetary 
contribution, to either accept the offer to be made at Fontainebleau or risk being left 
behind. 2 5 1 
Next month the Fontainebleau summit engineered the creation of the Dooge 
Committee and another one to deal with a People's Europe252. The Dooge Committee 
was to a great degree Mitterrand's brainchild. Campaigning for the 1984 
Euroelections the PS abandoned the idealistic rhetoric of pre-1981 and adopted a 
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more realistic approach and reminded the electorate that it was a socialist government 
which signed the Rome Treaties, while at the same time calling not for just a 
exchange zone but a real community to overcome the recession.253 Only one party 
publication for the 1984 Euro-election suggested that national sovereignty was still 
an issue. And despite the fact that it called for the extension of the Parliament's 
powers, for a permanent secretariat for the Council, and for majority voting in it, the 
role of the institutions was not yet a priority. On the eve of the June 1985 Milan 
Summit a Franco-German communique proposed a draft treaty on European Union, 
limited to EPC and similar to the Howe draft, which included suggestions for 
institutional reform that went further than any earlier French Government document 
on Parliamentary powers. These included the power to discuss and amend texts to be 
discussed by the Council, although in case of a stalemate the latter would have the 
final say. Moreover, the Parliament would have the power to be consulted on the 
budget's global expenditure package and possibly the increase of own resources. 
Finally, it proposed the creation of a Council secretariat, dealing with EPC matters in 
particular. Following the Milan Summit, France took an active part in the 
negotiations and submitted many proposals though not as far going as the 
Commission's ones concerning parliamentary powers. 
In the meantime, while the Fabius administration emphasised the issue of modernity, 
Jospin introduced Rocardian market ideas to the party. The March 1986 elections 
pro-Community manifesto was supported by all party factions and stated that the 
future of France goes via the renewal of Europe.254 The defeat of the PS at the 
National Assembly elections was followed by the dissolution of CERES, although 
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Chevenement founded a new group to succeed it. This meant that next presidential 
elections would be met with a unanimous strong pro-integrationist policy. 2 5 5 
Writing before the 1989 European elections, Laurent Fabius, at that time the 
President of the French National Assembly, offered A left programme for the 
European Community. Stating that the message of the Left is internationalist he 
declared that, 
The Single Market, once it has been completed, will automatically reduce the 
margin of autonomy of these national instruments. It will force the Left, 
whether in opposition or in power, to consider its actions in genuinely 
European terms. It is a challenge.256 
But this should not be just a single market for capital and products, but for the people 
and their ambitions and hopes as well. The idea of community symbolises liberty, 
equality, fraternity and democracy in all domains. For Fabius the goal of economic 
efficiency without free market excesses and planning paralysis, but with social justice 
distinct from the American and Japanese models, is what unites the European 
socialists. He perceived the strategy of the European left as consisting of four main 
guidelines. One, an environmentally conscious prolonged growth policy, which wil l 
be achieved by two measures. By building a commercial strategy to protect a few 
sensitive sectors which are now subject to national protection. And by harmonised 
rules to make environmental concern a major objective throughout the community. 
Two, fair competition which wil l be guaranteed by juridical rules and public 
intervention. Three, balanced industrial development, which wi l l be achieved by a 
number of moves; an increase of the resources available to the structural funds; 
2 5 5 Featherstone. Socialist Parties , p. 133 
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redirection of the technological development strategy of the member states by means 
of wider access to public contracts; the formulation of specific programmes; the 
increase in risk capital; and the making of public authorities responsible for the 
provision of organisation and management advice strategy. And four, social progress. 
This will be brought about by building a Europe of human solidarity and of workers' 
rights of expression and consultation. By building a Europe of harmonisation 
between systems of social distribution, of more coherent social policies, and of social 
dialogue. 
. So the left must put forward a way of using the internal market that is based 
on the development offreedom and equality jointly: freedom of movement for 
men, goods and capital, equality between regions with regard to growth, 
between undertakings with regard to competition, between men with regard 
to training, employment and the redistribution of revenue.257 
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CONCLUSION 
There are a few common, and interlinked, points that can be identified in the 
discussion of the policies of the German SPD and the French Socialists. The 
difference of statements when in opposition, and actions when in power, is one of 
them. 
When in opposition they can afford to claim ideological purity, sometimes. The need 
to get elected, to appeal to the electorate, to perform their duty as opposition parties 
determines their rhetoric. One can see Schumacher's reaction to European integration 
through such a lens. After a long period in which the Social-Democrats were seen as 
unpatriotic, he had to reaffirm the party's German credentials. German unity became 
the paramount issue. 
Both parties had to modify their policies once elected. Now they had to run the 
country, the room for manoeuvre was limited, and most of the time had to follow, 
more or less, established patterns of action. It is clear that domestic policy 
consideration has been the determinant of their European Community policy making. 
For example, as Bulmer has observed, Chancellor Schmidt's political fortunes at 
home had improved his freedom of manoeuvre in launching the European Monetary 
System (EMS). The FRG economy's dependence on steady trading relations made 
necessary some response to the uncertainties in the international monetary system. 
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The European Community containing Germany's closest trading partners seemed an 
appropriate framework for a response like this. 
As we have seen same events produced opposite responses in the two parties. The 
reactions to the Schuman plan, to the EDC and the WEU indicated that the first 
criterion of both parties had been their respective country's national interest, as they 
perceived it at the time, rather than the common European interest. And both Brandt 
and Mitterrand turned to Europe after their respective first years in office when they 
realised that their other alternatives were not available any more. 
The role of the political leader is another point. Nowhere this is more obvious than in 
the case of Mitterrand. European policy, foreign policy in general, was his 
prerogative. In the 1980s and 1990s, more than any of his contemporary leaders, the 
French President was in the forefront of European statesmen driving the Community 
member states to closer political and economic integration.259 Although throughout 
the Fourth Republic he was more interested in colonial affairs and in the 
maintainance of French presence in Africa, he gradually turned into a convinced 
European. His shift had started in the 1960s and the 1970s, despite the fact that for 
tactical reasons he had allowed CERES to write the PS programme in 1971. So, his 
clear turnaround in the after his elevation to the presidency, can be explained by 
several reasons. Domestic Keynesian economic policy failed disastrously. For 
Wright, the Mitterrand experience of industrial policy-making from 1981 to 1984 
demonstrates the external interdependence within the industrialised world in general. 
In order to implement an effective statist industrial policy a favourable economic 
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environment is vital. But this is dependent on the outside world. France is the 
interdependent economy par excellence since it depends 80% of its energy and 40% 
of its imports are dollar denominated.260 Antoher reason can be found in the fact that 
the PS defeated the Communists in the left constituency. The Communists were 
marginalised in electoral terms and the Socialists became the dominant party of the 
left. Moreover, Delors, a socialist, was appointed President of the Commission. At 
the same time, economic policy became Europeanised. According to Haywood, 
Mitterrand's commitment to European integration and his method of advancing the 
cause were the result of three factors: his own historical perspective, his ideals, and 
most important of all, national self-interest and party advantage.261 
The last one, the national interest, is the most important one for the present thesis as 
well. It has been the major factor in determining socialist parties' attitudes towards 
European integration in the period discussed. For the German Social-Democrats on 
the one hand, as for the other political parties in the Federal Republic, the national 
interest has been identified with German unity. The way to achieve this has changed 
at different times, but the end task has remained the same. On the other hand, for the 
French socialists, as well as for the rest of the French society, the national interest has 
been tantamount to the containment of Germany. Despite Mitterrand's strong 
Europeanism, France was reluctant to grant enhanced powers to the European 
Parliament at the beginning of the current decade. For Haywood this is to be 
explained by German unification. The population of the new Germany would entitle 
her to a greater number of MEPs than any other member state. A more powerful 
2 6 0 Wright, V. "Socialism and the Interdependent Economy: Industrial Policy-making under the 
Mitterrand Presidency" , Government and Opposition , Vol.19, no.3 (Summer 1984), pp.287-303 
2 6 1 Haywood, "European policy", p.270 
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assembly would thus mean German dominance in political, economic and monetary 
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issues. 
We have seen therefore, that both parties I have examined in this chapter, the French 
SFIO/PS and the German SPD dealt with the process of integration in the western 
half of the continent in accordance with perceived interests emanating from the two 
nation states. As far socialism is concerned, it was relegated to secondary position. 
So, the need to get re-elected, and the task of serving the national interest, as 
expressed by the interests of their respective states when in power, have prevented 
the Prench and the German socialist parties from pursuing an internationalist policy 
when it really mattered. Their fortunes were linked with those of their national 
domestic electorates in their countries and any internationalist claims had to be 
forgotten. It can be said that the actions and the rhetoric of both parties under 
consideration in this chapter can be characterised by confusion. Policies that aim at 
satisfying the domestic electorate have to be dressed in an internationalist 
vocabulary, the need to pursue foreign policies of nation-states has to accommodate 
the national feeling, etc. It is not surprising therefore that both parties failed to live up 
to their socialist international ideals. If, following Manning's and Robinson's 
definition, as has been stated in the introduction to the present thesis, political 
ideology is the form of language which has made the construction of political life 
possible, then this confused rhetoric and vocabulary signifies the confusion in the 
ideology itself. The reaction of the PS/SFIO and of the SPD to the process of 
European integration has illuminated this point. But i f the parties were bound to 
Haywood, "European Policy", p.277 
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states, what about the thinkers. How did they respond to the same challenges? This is 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Socialist Thinkers and European Integration 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I am looking at the first wave of socialist responses in the early 1970s 
as some of the early implications of European integration started to sink in. In 
particular I am examining the views of the French Rocardians, then in the PSU 
(Unified Socialist Party), of Johan Gaining, and of Ernest Mandel. 
One should note the gap between Rocard's rhetoric and later his action as Prime 
Minister of France. Rocard's political position in general had shifted considerably 
between 1973 and he became PM and even he himself would no longer have adhered 
to the ideas exposed in the book I am examining here. Johan Gaining, a Scandinavian 
academic produced a structuralist analysis of the process of European integration 
based on power categories. Ernest Mandel, was a Belgian economist who had been 
Secretary General of the Fourth International. His analysis offers a typical marxist-
internationalist approach. 
Rocard's views are important for the present discussion because of the special weight 
he carried in the French socialist parties. He has remained a key player in an 
important political party that has, as we saw in the discussion of the SFIO/PS earlier, 
an important role in the process of European integration. Galtung, an academic freed 
from party affiliations and the responsibilities of office produced an intellectual 
explanation. And finally, Mandel an internationalist of the non-parliamentary left 
offered a more orthodox marxist view. 
All three theoretical approaches though failed to provide a satisfactory analysis partly 
because of failures to appreciate nationalism or national questions, and partly because 
they were preoccupied with statism. Recent discussions of the issues examined here 
have attempted to fill these gaps, as we will see in the last chapter. 
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1. THE FRENCH ROCARDIANS 
In France in 1960 a new political formation, the Partie Socialiste Unifie (PSU), was 
established by dissidents from the SFIO, the Communist Party, and other left wing 
groups. The name of M.Rocard, a later socialist prime minister, figured prominently 
among its members. Their views on the EEC in the early seventies were expanded in 
Le Marche Commun contre I'Europe co-written by B.Jaumont, D.Lenegre, and 
M.Rocard.263 
They claimed that the identification of Europe with the product of the Rome Treaty 
was one of history's greatest myths. In the Community's 15 years' history never has a 
European policy been adopted i f it contradicted either the national interests of a 
member state or those of a big company; therefore any increase of the powers of the 
Community institutions and the Parliament would be a fallacy, as such a move would 
destroy any resistance to the wild capitalist development. A socialist Europe can be 
founded on the workers' solidarity and against the Common Market, otherwise 
socialism is used to justify, and provide popular support for, the multinationals' 
profiteering.264 Their analysis was based on an examination of the multinational 
companies and the assumption that by 1980 200 to 300 multinational companies 
would dominate international trade through the control of 75% of Western 
companies.265 This process will be facilitated by the creation of common organs 
which open the gates of Europe to the American multinationals since any move 
towards a Common Market would benefit, above all, foreign , i.e. American, 
companies by allowing them to take advantage. This would result in a power 
2 6 3 Jaumont, B., Lenegre, D., Rocard, M . Le Marche Commun contre I'Europe , (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1973). 
1 am using the Greek edition I Koini Agora enantion tis Evropis (Athens, Nea Synora, 1976) 
2 6 4 Jaumont et al. 1 Koini Agora pp.22-3 
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vacuum, at both the national and the local level, leaving these companies 
unaccountable since they will be collaborating with each other in any member state 
without anyone having the authority to coordinate them.266 
Jaumont et al saw the establishment of the Common Market as an attempt to 
introduce into Europe the foundations of a modern capitalist economy. The Treaty of 
Rome was condemned for not distinguishing between European and foreign 
companies. Any increase in the powers of the central organs of the Community, and 
the Commission in particular, would result in the destruction of any remaining 
national policies. And this not for the sake of a European policy but for the sake of 
the big corporations, irrespective of their country of origin. By replacing the 
protectionist policies of the individual member states with the principles of the so 
called wild capitalism, the Common Market benefits above all the American 
corporations which seek only profits and do not regard Europe as a permanent body, 
but as a step in their development process. The Common Market does not create 
European companies and does not lead to the emergence of a ruling class that could 
protect the common interests against an onslaught from abroad.267 So we have here 
the assumption that socialists should resist the spread of international capitalism, and 
that national or European capitalism is preferable. 
For Jaumont, Lenegre, and Rocard the CAP was an exercise in passing from the pre-
capitalist to the capitalist stage of production with the governments' blessing. The 
decreasing number of small (smaller than 10 hectares) holdings, and the 
corresponding increasing number of holdings larger than 35 hectares bears witness 
2 6 5 Jaumont et al, 1 Koini Agora p.28 
2 6 6 Jaumont et al. 1 Koini Agora p.64 
2 6 7 Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.84 
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to this. The Social Policy was seen as an attempt, on the one hand to heal the wounds 
created by competition, and on the other to provide the European bosses with the 
necessary flexible work force. As far as other community policies are concerned, 
monetary policy is seen as a failure, regional policy has not prevented the gap 
between the regions of the Community from widening, energy policy is simply non-
existent, and finally, industrial policy has benefited foreign companies which have 
taken advantage of the relevant legislation. The only successful Community policy, 
CAP apart, is considered to be the transport policy which in turn is dismissed on the 
grounds that it benefits all businesses in the field, and not only the European ones, 
which means that although it is a policy it is not a European one. For them the choice 
is not between nationalism and Europe but between nationalism and free 
competition, and although the deepening of the Common Market reduces the powers 
of the nation state, its purpose is only to facilitate free market competition. 
For the authors, socialism in one country is impossible and international action is 
needed, but this action must be directed against the idea of Europe as identified with 
the EEC. This is another invention, on part of the dominant classes, to distract the 
workers' attention following the failure of older myths like nationalism, "grand idea" 
etc.269 The main use of Europe as an ideology is to contain the power of the unity of 
the forces of the left and to compete with socialism for popular support, by providing 
a consumer's paradise. A European Nationalism has been cultivated by the European 
capitalists to suit their interests. They have promoted a spirit of European coexistence 
in order to hide the real class conflict. Its hidden motives are the replacing of class 
conflict with nationalism, the hot war with the communist block, containment of 
2 6 8 Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p. 112 
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revolutionary tendencies in Europe and increase of profits. Its purpose is to act as a 
new grand idea replacing the old nationalism in a period when the traditional 
imperialism was suffering humiliating defeats in Indochina and Algeria, and to 
maximise profits by creating a bigger market, and to abolish state intervention by 
doing away with protectionism. 
The traditional concept of the nation has been undermined by the development of 
multinational corporations. And as the community declines, the currency which is the 
expression of common interests, loses its importance. For Jaumont et al the 
prevailing economic conditions determine the political institutions. It follows then 
that the EEC institutions are based on the multinationals' pattern. So, any such 
institutions would be senseless since they would be exercised in a state where the 
inhabitants have in common nothing more than some weak solidarity links, and 
where the technical or economic activity has no logical continuation on the state 
level. Moreover, as long as the main motive will be profit maximisation and the 
economic structure will be dominated by the multinationals, the real centre of 
decision making will always be outside these institutions. What is even worse, such a 
process would lead to nationalism, chauvinism, and isolationism, which wolild be 
971 
disastrous for the international workers' solidarity. 
If socialism is essential for the birth of Europe, the European dimension is also 
essential for the attainment of real socialism, as any government determined to break 
away from capitalism needs an alliance with neighboring states i f the process is not 
to be brought to an abrupt end. This now sounds like an argument for socialism in 
2 6 9 Jaumont et al, 1 Koini Agora pp. 145-6 
2 7 0 Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora pp. 155-62 
2 7 1 Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p. 173 
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several countries. On the defense issue they argued that individual European states, 
like Britain and France, can not construct a credible deterrence, something that could 
only be achieved by a true European union and not just by an interstate cooperation, 
as the failure of the Europe missile made clear, but that could only be achieved 
through socialism. Moreover, such a force is a prerequisite for the passage to 
socialism, as there is always the danger that such a move, as the cases of Vietnam, 
Czechoslovakia etc. indicated, could be opposed by either of the superpowers. Also a 
military strong Europe could assist socialist experiments, by providing security, in 
other parts of the globe i f she does not want to be seen as an island of egoism. 
In the economic sphere the European dimension is even more important in the 
passage to socialism, as independence is inconceivable in the case of the 
industrialised world, and the same is true as far as technology (computers, space 
program etc.) and environmental protection are concerned. On the political level the 
European dimension is critical. It is critical i f the European nations are to break free 
from the superpowers' straitjacket and if Europe is to retain its distinct voice and help 
the emancipation of the developing world. The last one is something every socialist 
should be aiming at but it could only be achieved in a bigger scale. This Europe 
though is incompatible with the Common Market. 
The PSU concept of the construction of Europe was exposed in the last chapters of 
the above mentioned book. For Jaumont, Lenegre, and Rocard, at first glance there is 
very little space for those concerned with building a European socialist society. 
Social-democracy, which acts as a caretaker of capitalism, nationalistic Soviet-led 
communism, and compromised trade unions have dominated the field. Europe's 
2 7 2 Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora pp. 184-5 
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construction, as they perceived it, should be based on the forces which, having 
questioned the rationality of profit, are led to look for ways to take their fate into their 
own hands. No channel to power passes through the organs created by the Rome 
Treaty, and therefore capturing these very organs can not be the basis from which to 
change the structure of capitalism. We should start from the middle level of capturing 
the mechanisms of at least one of the nation states member of the EEC as this is the 
only way. All the desires for a real internationaiism, for the negation of chauvinism 
should be given a new impetus and a political meaning they never had in order to 
help the building of Europe on the basis of self-management and against the 
principles of the Rome treaty. The effort should begin from within the Community 
institutions themselves, and in all levels, by confronting nationalism with European 
solidarity and capitalism with self-management. Through the supporting of the 
workers' demands in a sector of the economy, by making the others mobilize and 
present their position, we gradually move the arena and the target of the struggles and 
we encourage the construction of structures which can express the wishes of both. 
This would then turn the Brussels organs into the vehicle of popular demands for the 
breaking up of the Common market mechanisms. The antagonism between tire actual 
aims of the Treaty of Rome and the construction of Europe becomes clear when the 
problems that are excluded (at the time the book was written) from the treaties like 
energy, scientific research etc., are examined. And it is here a real European policy 
can be applied to express popular feelings and contest capitalist interests.274 
It is a deceit to try to make the others believe that the European construction 
was the realization of the Common Market. But one can easily use the effects 
Jaumont et al, 1 Koini Agora pp. 193-203 
Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.215 
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of such a deceit against the very people that have benefited from it and thus 
construct Europe against the Common Market.275 
In the last chapter, titled the immediate duties, they called for a coordination and 
cooperation between the European trade unions and socialist organisations. More 
important, for the purpose of the present study, they advocated opposition to any 
moves to abolish the unanimity principle, as such an attempt would jeopardise any 
attempts by any national government to introduce socialist policies. Also they called 
for real freedom for workers' movement. This should be an attempt to counter the 
freedom of movement for the companies which benefits them vis-a-vis the working 
class. The abolition of economic barriers forced the workers to concentrate in the 
more industrialised regions, but the continuation of political barriers has prevented 
them from exercising their rights and thus has effectively turned them into 
immigrants ripe for exploitation. The only way this could be remedied is by granting 
equal rights to everybody working in the Community irrespective of country of origin 
and residence, which means to revise and abolish the traditional notions of national 
solidarity and national interest, in itself a prerequisite and a model for the advance to 
socialism.276 
It is worth pointing here to the fact that a similar notion has been advanced recently 
by a number of thinkers. The notions of citizenship and multiple identities are among 
the topics of discussion of the final chapter of the thesis. For instance, the 
development of a sense of common citizenship is of crucial importance to Miller's 
model of Market Socialism, as discussed later. Moreover as we will see in the 
conclusion, Meehan sees the European Union as an arena for the realization of 
2 7 5 Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.216, own translation 
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democratic citizenship, and its framework allows for the recognition of people who 
have more identities than their nationality. This kind of pluralism is a necessary 
condition for a modern radical politics. 
The other major area where common action is needed is technological 
interdependence as, with the domination of the multinationals, research laboratories 
have been dispersed in several countries which could hinder the passage to socialism 
by bringing to a halt whole sectors of activity. Discussing the case of atomic energy 
they observed that the domination of the European market by two or three companies 
(Westinghouse, Siemens-AEG) means that no individual state can regulate their 
activities and the EEC Commission lacks the means to perform this function. 
Moreover, even if it had wider powers it would only use them to protect free market 
principles, but not to back a European solution. Even nuclear reactors made in France 
by Westinghouse use American produced enriched uranium which further increases 
European dependence on the USA. 2 7 7 
Finally, they claimed that the state powers, following the ascendance to power of a 
socialist government in a EEC member state, could provide the European ideology 
with a real meaning. From that moment onwards some of the aims of the Rome 
Treaty, which otherwise would have remained a dead letter, will be realised in the 
name of the European idea. Only under these circumstances the Treaty mechanisms 
could be used to help the breach with capitalism in other Community member 
states.278 
Jaumont et al. I Koini Agora pp.224-9 
Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.235 
Jaumont et al, 1 Koini Agora p.243 
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This argument suffers from several defects. The claim that the Common Market does 
not promote European companies and does not lead to the emergence of a ruling 
class that could protect the common interests against a foreign offensive sounds 
more French than left. The claim that the Community institutions that are determined 
by the multinational companies would be meaningless is an odd one. The EEC 
institutions would logically reflect the interests of the multinational companies. The 
Rocardians' opposition to any moves to abolish the unanimity principle sounds more 
nationalist than internationalist. Furthermore, the veto power has generally been 
accepted to be a nationalist slogan (Here it can be said though that this argument has 
been associated with arguments about the defense of socialism) . Their criticism of 
the lack of a common scientific research policy has been rendered invalid by the 
adoption and promotion by the Community of a relevant policy. And there are several 
achievements that can be credited to such a policy. European projects like the 
ESPRIT, to name one, and technological products like, the DECT telephones, and the 
GSM mobile communications' system have given the Community a technological 
lead over its main competitors. Finally, their main failure, with regards to the present, 
thesis is their inability to comprehend globalization and interdependence. The nation 
state remains the focal point and they seem to rely very much on the individual 
national powers for the promotion of a socialist policy. It was a socialist government 
in France in the early eighties that was forced to learn the realities of globalization 
the hard way. The first Mitterrand government had to embrace Europeanism 
following the disastrous effect of their policies in a country where 40% of its imports 
are dollar denominated and 80% of its energy is imported. 
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In a nutshell their argument is based on two propositions. Opposition to any form of 
European integration which is based on market principles since this leads to new life 
for multinational capitalism. And since some member states are closer to achieving 
socialist objectives than the EEC, then integration threatens this situation i f national 
veto is removed. This again goes back to the claim of socialism in one country. 
But rather peculiarly, and with a certain logic, they also seem to favor a highly 
protectionist and interventionist Community, which would be like a Euro-state for 
realizing socialism. Moreover, they prefer European capitalism to US or 
multinational versions and advocate a form of European statist-socialism. This would 
be a future European state transcending the existing nation states, based on a new all-
European nation to which they would have no problem in adhering once such a new 
European nation-state has been established. In any case, how such an entity might be 
created is not revealed. 
It seems therefore that the Rocardians have offered an account of the process of 
integration in western Europe that, for a socialist analysis does indeed take into 
account the importance of nationalism, but that was inconclusive. For example, when 
they say that the Common Market does not create European companies and does not 
lead to the emergence of a ruling class to protect the common interests, they are in 
essence calling for the creation of a European nation that wi l l emanate from the 
fusion of the old nations of the continent. This reveals an interesting preoccupation 
with state, and assumes that states can represent common interest even when class 
interest is present. Their whole conception of socialism also involves a great usage of 
the state in terms of intervention and control of resources (e.g. public ownership), 
introduction and implementation of social policy. Moreover, they touched upon the 
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delicate issue of the democratic deficit in the Community. Both issues have become 
of central importance to all discussions about the future of socialism as we wil l see in 
the final chapter. 
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2. JOHAN GALTUNG AND STRUCTURAL NEOIMPERIALISM 
As the title of his book indicates, Galtung perceived the European Community as the 
new emerging superpower. His argument is that the EC is a counter-historical 
venture to recreate a unicentric (i.e. Western dominated) Europe in a Eurocentric 
world. It is an attempt to overcome the situation in which Europe, following the 
Second World War, was itself colonised and became bicentric, with centres located 
in Washington and Moscow, and bipolar with the consolidation of the two opposing 
military alliances. These developments, combined with the anti-colonial movement, 
signified the end of a long Eurocentric era. In the light of these developments he saw 
the Community as an exercise in neo-colonialism. An exercise whose emphasis 
primarily lies in the market element. The common and European elements are only of 
secondary importance.280 
The logic of EC development, as he perceives it, is based on the staircase hypothesis, 
i.e. a process of widening the community through increased membership which is 
followed by a deepening with consistent issues. He perceived European integration as 
a chain reaction process of transnationalisation which wi l l exclude groups and 
interests that are not well articulated at the national level, or are in a minority in 
member states, or can not afford a transnational organisation. This wi l l lead to the 
generation of anti-EC forces at the grassroots of society which, in turn, will increase 
Community vitality at the top. The European superstate wil l be realised 
2 7 9 For Galtung's views on Imperialism see Galtung, J. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" , Journal of Peace 
Research. Vol.8, no.2 (1971), pp.81-117 , and Galtung, J. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism-Ten Years Later", 
Millenium. Vol.9, no.3 (Winter 1980-81) pp. 181-196. For a general overview of Galtung thought see Lawler, P. 
A Question of Values. Johan Galtung's Peace Research , (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995) 
2 8 0 Galtung, J. The European Communitv:A Superpower in the Making (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1973) 
Chapter 1, pp.11-7 
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the day there is a massive demonstration of say, youth and workers from all 
member states rallying at Commission headquarters in Brussels, in front of 
the Berlaymunt building at the Place Schuman, and this demonstration 
confronts a transnational European Community police force.28' 
Writing in 1973, Galtung thought that the principles governing EC enlargement are 
structural (i.e. similar level of techno-economic development and institutional 
political framework) and ideological similarity which essentially preclude certain 
states from joining. In an effort to turn history backwards the Community will 
increase its membership to fourteen so that, with the exception of Russia, all colonial 
powers are included, and thus 
sharpen the cleavage between itself and the rest of the world. 
Galtung distinguished between power-over-others and power-over-oneself and 
between ideological (i.e. cultural), remunerative (i.e. trade and economic), and 
punitive (i.e. military) powers. The co-ordination of all these, and the power of 
communication constitute what is called politics. Power pressure can be resisted by 
directing counter-power in the opposite direction, or by developing more power-over-
oneself which means autonomy. Finally, as far as power-over-others is concerned, he 
distinguished between power from something one is or has (i.e. resources) and 
structural power (i.e. centrality in world trade structure). This in turn can be divided 
into three aspects. Exploitation has to do with the direct exchange relation between 
two countries. When one country gets much more out of the exchange than the other, 
then the latter is being exploited. Exploitation is based today on the multinationals 
and the distinction between exploration and standardisation. Fragmentation is a 
" Galtung, European Community Chapter 2, p.26 
1 2 Galtung, European Community Chapter 2, pp. 18-32 
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method that one party uses to dominate several parties, it s the method of divide and 
rule. This can be achieved by means of preventing horizontal contact between the 
dominated countries, avoiding multilateral contact involving the dominant and more 
than one of the dominated countries, and limiting contact between the dominated and 
the outside world. And penetration , i.e. penetration of the dominant country into the 
countries to be dominated. This can be achieved either as subversion, penetration 
from the bottom or the periphery, or superversion, penetration from the top. 
Superversion has two aspects. In the first the elite of the dominated country serves as 
a bridge-head for the elite in the Centre nation by acting as a recipient for its ideas, 
patterns etc. In the second, inequality is in itself distributed in an inegalitarian way 
between the dominant country and the dominated one. There is more inequality in the 
periphery than the centre. The combination of all these is imperialism. Another word 
for this is dominance. Dominance is based on dependency, the belief, after 
indoctrination, that only the centre can provide the periphery with something the 
latter regards as essential. Dependency and identification with the centre perpetuate 
the mechanism of structural power which helps to undermine autonomy. 
The resource power of the EC of the ten (Galtung presumed that Norway would join 
the Community) compares favourably with the other major powers (USA, USSR, 
Japan, China) as it would command one third of World trade, but the picture is 
overturned when one considers the number of computers in use. The Federal 
Republic of Germany has only 8000 computers whereas the US has 72000. The 
Community's dependent territories, the ocean floor, and the North sea which 
following the enlargement will become an EC lake with obvious benefits as far as 
Galtung, European Community Chapter 3, pp.33-47 
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energy is concerned, compensate for its very small area and offer unlimited 
opportunities for expansion under the 1958 Geneva Convention. This convention 
concerning the ocean floor defines the continental shelf as that part of the ocean floor 
adjacent to a coastal state and down to 200 meters, or even beyond that as far as 
exploration and exploitation are possible. The only limit is the mid-line principle 
defining the floor borderline between two coastal states. He then goes on to predict 
that the EC wil l catch up with the US and Japan on the tertiary sector, the services, as 
percentage of the GDP. At the time he was writing, unlike the US and Japan, this 
sector did not overshadow the secondary one. The same wil l be the case with civil 
aviation while, with the inclusion of Norway and the UK, its merchant fleet's capacity 
wil l outweigh that of all its competitors together. Thus the Community's 
remunerative powers are considerable. Moreover European cultural domination is 
solid and it is safe to predict that the EC wil l be a giant.2 8 4 
Discussing the structural power of the EC he observed that relations between 
Community members were based on equality. The EC as an alliance for economic 
defence vies for partnership on an equal basis with the US. Relations with the Third 
World are characterised by the three faces of dominance, vertical division of labour, 
fragmentation, and penetration. Other Western European countries have been treated 
individually. The same applies, at the initial stages at least, to the European socialist 
states, which have also been treated individually rather than as a group. Different 
policies are administered in the direction of the Soviet Union, of Eastern Germany, 
and of the other members of the Warsaw Pact. This has resulted in an integration race 
with the establishment of the CMEA. Finally, the rest of the world countries have 
Galtung, European Community Chapter 4, pp.48-54 
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been treated separately. In a few words EC policy aims at equality with the USA and 
• 285 
Japan and domination over the others, particularly the Third World countries. 
The Community's policy towards the Third World is characterised by exploitation in 
the forms of the vertical division of labour maintained through the instruments of 
investment, research, and level of processing, with quotas replacing tariff restrictions. 
It is also characterised by fragmentation apparent in EC's relations with the bulk of 
Third World countries, where divisions between the group are encouraged by 
selective preferences, and the countries of the Yaounde Agreement in particular, 
which maintains the status quo and thus hinders horizontal trade and solidarity. The 
final characteristic is penetration into the elites of the former colonies, in the form of 
ideological identification with the European elites, and dependency on an enduring 
relation with them. 
As far as the Socialist countries are concerned, the policy pursued is one of vertical 
division of labour leading to increased dependency and, to a lesser degree, 
penetration and fragmentation. An integration race can be detected which might lead 
to a European Socialist Community (ESC) comprising the smaller Eastern European 
states, and which would challenge both the EC and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 
the degree of integration in the West, and soon also the East, works against a pan-
287 
European rapport. 
As the membership of the EC almost coincides with that of NATO, a transformation 
of the latter is what is needed for the first to acquire a military character as the chain 
effects of integration wil l result in attempts to create an independent defence force. 
2 8 5 Galtung, European Community Chapter 5, pp.55-67 
2 8 6 Galtung, European Community Chapter 6, pp.68-85 
148 
The changes in NATO's structure from hegemony to partnership combined with what 
he describes as the fall of the American empire and the EDC blueprint wi l l push in 
this direction. This is the underlying motive behind European efforts to break the 
American uranium enrichment monopoly. The process wil l be accelerated by a series 
of inevitable domestic and international crises.288 
Galtung then goes on to predict the future of the EC which, in his opinion, resembles 
Charlemagne's empire and which wil l become a political entity with a new capital 
and a single leader symbolising the new superpower. The world then wi l l be divided 
into two opposing camps, USSR and US/EC on the one hand, and Japan and China 
on the other. This though suggests that the EC is not an emerging superpower, but 
part of an emerging Atlantic superpower. The new super-state wil l be the result of a 
geopolitical race, a new non-military formula for empire-building and wi l l pose a 
new threat to world peace by introducing more conflict configurations. 
In chapter 10 he presents the demands that should be directed to the EC in terms of 
exploitation, fragmentation and penetration. As far as the first is concerned, relative 
to the Third World, this means giving up the idea of using these countries as raw 
materials' sources and markets for goods, and instead paying higher prices for raw 
materials, no quota restrictions for manufactured goods, free transfer of technology, 
abolishing vertical division of labour, and promoting horizontal trade among poor 
states. Relative to the socialist countries this means increased imports from them and 
transfer of technology instead of goods exports. As far as the second is concerned, 
relative to the third world it means the abolition of all preferential and differential 
2 8 7 Galtung, European Community Chapter 7, pp.86-98 
2 8 8 Galtung, European Community Chapter 8, pp.99-116 
2 8 9 Galtung, European Community Chapter 9, pp. 117-129 
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agreements, and channelling maximum capital and assistance to build strong third 
world organisations to negotiate with, thus moving away from the idea of dealing 
with individual countries and regional groupings. Relative to the socialist world this 
means preserving their solidarity and negotiating with the CMEA. Finally, as far as 
the last is concerned, relative to the third world and socialist countries it means a 
policy aiming at a better quality of life for the masses and closing the gap between 
the latter and the local elites, forming one's own development goals, and opening EC 
institutions at all levels to both groups of states. New forces would have to be 
provided to turn the European Community in such directions.290 Discussing the 
present forces he observed that the present Community apparatus is ill-suited for any 
fundamental change. The Commission is isolated from general society and the 
Eurocrats are concerned only with higher salaries. The extension of the Community 
wil l not boost its radicalisation, and an increase in Parliament's powers will not result 
in basic changes. The Western European working class is not a radicalising element 
either and any progressive hopes rest with the youth. A strategy for change should 
aim at increasing consciousness inside the Community as tremendous reservoirs of 
opposition wil l start flowing once the US supremacy is under dispute. Such a strategy 
should involve withholding of working power from the Community, revealing 
commercial secrets, and a strong reaction from the Third World and the Socialist 
291 
countries. 
Galtung saw European integration as a two pronged attempt by Western Europeans to 
regain control of old colonies and break free from American domination. But 
Gaitung, European Community Chapter 10, p. 138 
Galtung. European Community Chapter 10, pp. 130-52 
Galtung. European Community p. 153 
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the European Community, where its global role is concerned, is not the 
beginning of anything new, but the end of something old. If the EC inspires 
anything at all, it is a feeling of deja-vum 
Its structural power is unprecedented in history, but this power creates counterforces 
which someday may lead to a more fair and diversified world. 
It is easy to criticise this thesis. Galtung himself has admitted that the concept of 
superpower is not synonymous with a powerful superstate and that his book suffers 
from certain shortcomings. The American military and moral defeats in Indo-China 
led.him to underestimate US control over Western Europe and its ability to establish 
new forms of imperialism, as illustrated by the creation of the International Energy 
Agency. Examining the Lome Convention, which succeeded the Yaounde one, he 
accepted that the whole process was more one between equals than its predecessor. 
Exploitation was reduced since the new trade arrangements wi l l facilitate the export 
of industrialised goods from the ACP countries to the Community. The joint 
negotiation highlights the reduction of fragmentation. Also the possibility of 
concluding equally favourable agreements with the rest of the world reduces the 
latter's fragmentation. But essentially Lome is a bad treaty because its character 
emphasises not human but structural development issues and strengthens private 
capitalism. Moreover it perpetuates the present division of labour by paying the raw 
material exporting states for remaining so and not turning to more advanced 
processing and thus prolongs internationalised capitalism.294 
2 9 3 Galtung. European Community p. 157 
2 9 4 Galtung, J. "The Lome Convention and Neo-Capitalism", in Nairn, T. (ed.) Atlantic Europe? (Amsterdam, 
The Transnational Institute, 1976) pp. 101-10 
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Galtung says little about the Community's internal affairs and constitution. As 
Holland has noted his thesis is an exaggeration. He failed to notice the lack of a 
combination of political, state, ideological, and economic relations that determine the 
quality of power, and ignored the Community's internal dynamics and the 
inability of its institutions to bridge the gap between super-power pretension 
and bureaucratic muddling.295 
It is not difficult to spot the shortcomings of his understanding of the process of 
European integration. His claim that de Gaulle vetoed the British applications 
because the Community was not yet ready to absorb new members contradicts the 
accepted version of events. As Urwin has argued de Gaulle's veto can be explained 
more by his fear that British participation might pose a threat to French European 
leadership, as well as his dislike of the American role in Europe.2 9 7 This view is 
shared by Greenwood.298 Moreover, his claim that de Gaulle's action has 
strengthened the integration process299 is doubtful and was not shared by de Gaulle's 
partners. His predictions about the future of the external role of the Community have 
not been proven true. EPC, which was replaced by CFSP under Maastricht, was 
never a great success story with member states putting their individual national 
interests above those of the Community as a whole. Galtung believes that among the 
Community members the policy pursued is one of equality. By this he means that the 
norm of equality is internalised and it cannot be said that the Community is a 
Holland, S. UnCommon Market (London. MacMillan,l980) p. 148 
Galtung. European Community p.21 
Urwin, D.W. The Community of Europe O pp. 124-5 
Greenwood, S. Britain and European Cooperation since 1945 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992) p.86 
Galtung, European Community p.21 
152 
hierarchy of countries exploited by Germany.300 A careful examination wil l show that 
this is not the case. This was certainly not the aim of de Gaulle, and the fear today is 
that the EC wil l be dominated by the reunified Germany. His view on European 
cultural domination is highly disputable and is not shared by, among others, Jack 
Lang who has called for 
genuine cultural resistance, a real crusade against this domination, against - let us 
call a spade a spade - this financial and intellectual imperialism.301 
Although not mentioned once in the speech it was clear, at least to the French press, 
that the Minister of Culture was referring to the US. 3 0 2 And this highlights the gulf 
between the Atlantic-Europe and the European-Europe assumptions. 
It can be said that Galtung's most notable shortcoming, at least for the purposes of 
the present study, is the lack of treatment of nationalism.303 As a good Marxist-
Internationalist he fails to address the issue. Nationalism is not even included in his 
list of the major European ideologies which includes conservatism, liberalism, and 
Marxism. 3 0 4 In any case, the account he offers of the birth of the European 
superpower has nothing in common with the traditional process of strong nation-state 
building. Wallerstein has developed an alternative approach, a theory for the birth of 
the strong western state. For him nationalism is tantamount to capitalism. Capitalism 
is based on the so-called unequal exchange. This means the appropriation of surplus 
of the whole world economy by core areas, that is by strong states. Given slightly 
3 0 0 Galtung, European Community p.57 
3 0 1 quoted in Mattelart et al. "International Image Markets", in During, S. (ed.) The Cultural Studies Reader 
(London, Routledge, 1993) p.427 
3 0 2 Mattelart, "International" , pp.427-8 
3 0 3 The same point is made by Nairn, T. "Super-Power or Failure? Johan Galtung's Europe" in Nairn, Atlantic 
Europe?, p.68 
3 0 4 Galtung. The European Community p.53 
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different starting-points, the interests of various local groups came together in 
northwest Europe and created strong state mechanisms. In the periphery they 
separated resulting in weak ones. This process facilitated capitalist development and 
the emergence of core, periphery, and semi-periphery.305 Strong state mechanisms 
result in strong capitalism. This creates some problems for Galtung. The European 
Community wi l l become a superpower only after strong Community level state 
mechanisms have been established. Nothing like this has happened yet. The 
Commission has not become a pan-European government and the Union is not a state 
as such. And the fact that people do not demonstrate in front at the Place Schuman is 
a clear indication of this impotence, although lately there have been agricultural 
protests in Brussels. 
European integration is an attempt to accommodate and unite various nationalisms. 
For Nairn, Galtung's historical perspective is a limited one, focusing only on the 
recent imperialist past of the continent, and thus giving an inadequate theoretical 
basis. On the contrary, a broader historical perspective would have to look at the long 
history of inter-state warfare which accounts for the development of European 
capitalism and ends with World War I I . Europe was divided and weak and 'it has 
remained in this historical limbo since the late 1940s. I f integration is an effort to 
create a multinational state based on rapid capitalist development, then it is doomed 
since the unevenness inherent in capitalist development was the cause of destruction 
of the old multinational empires.306 Farhi saw the differences between Northern and 
Southern Europe, expressed as opposition between their respective ruling classes 
3 0 5 Wallerstein, I. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis", Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 16, no.4 (Sep. 1974), pp.387-415 
3 0 6 Nairn, T. "Super-Power or Failure?" in Nairn, Atlantic Europe? pp.66-73 
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following the 1973 oil crisis, as the reflection of the contradictions caused by uneven 
development.307 
The relationship between capitalism and nationalism is characterised by a paradox. 
On the one hand capitalism is universalistic, and as such anti-national, but on the 
other needs, and depends upon, the nation-state and nationalism. It needs a strong 
state mechanism to safeguard its gains, defend it from outside competition, supply 
outlets, manpower and raw materials, and maintain internal peace.308 According to 
Kaldor the European nation-states, which are small by world standards, have no 
power to carry out effective parochial economic policies as the enormous growth of 
multinationals has eroded the traditional instruments of economic policy. European 
integration is an attempt to overwhelm particular protest and to protect more 
effectively certain parochial interests.309 And whereas in economic terms capitalism 
strives for continuous expansion by overcoming national particularities and local 
traditions, in social terms it has been forced to compromise with these very 
particularities and traditions. Capitalism has always started as a national 
phenomenon. Outside implantation by itself can not account for its rise. The EC is 
not a nation-state, and nationalism on a European scale does not exist as ye t . 3 1 0 ' 
Another of Gaining's shortcomings is that he has based his theory on power 
categories, but he has failed to provide an adequate answer to the question where 
does power come from. But again for the purposes of the present research, his major 
failure is the failure to comprehend the power of nationalism. His theory remained 
3 0 7 Farhi, A. "Europe: Behind the Myths" in Nairn, Atlantic Europe? pp.82-93 
3 0 8 Farhi, "Europe". The same point is made by Kaldor, M. The Disintegrating West (London, Allen Lane, 1978) 
p.15 
3 0 9 Kaldor, Disintegrating p.24 
3 1 0 Nairn, "Super-Power" in Nairn, Atlantic Europe pp.75-8 
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attached to structures, it did not take into account particularities and traditions, in 
short he is another example of a treatment that lacks all those elements that as we 
wil l see later on characterise a modern socialist understanding of the idea of the 
nation. 
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3. ERNEST MANDEL: THE INTERNATIONALIST 
Certain thinkers in the European Left have seen the process of European Integration 
as one of strengthening capitalist interests over those of the workers. A typical 
example of this can be found in the work of Ernest Mandel311. He studied, what he 
called the Contradictions of Imperialism from a 
viewpoint which sees the origins, rise and fall of states and societies as 
ultimately determined by objective laws?12 
Mandel began his study with the observation that, as a result of unequal development 
US power has been eroded very quickly. US ability to consolidate its relative, but not 
its absolute, superiority can be accounted for by three reasons. The Soviet departure 
from the capitalist system, the end of colonialism after the second World War, and 
the need to support economically Western Europe and Japan, the last being the result 
of the intrinsic economic necessities of American capitalism. The need to export 
surplus corporate capital led to the modern reconstruction of European industries, 
which in itself explains the European and Japanese sensational comeback into the 
world's markets.313 
The rapid expansion of the European economy between 1950 and 1964 was caused 
by the new industrial revolution, the need to close the gap in the consumer durables' 
production, the re-emerging arms industry, and the industrialisation of the 
underdeveloped parts of Western Europe. After the Second World War the 
sharpening of international competition led to increased international capital 
3 1 1 Although a convinsed Trotskyist Mandel does not seem to refer to Trotsky 
312 Mandel, E. Europe versus America, (London, New Left Books, 1970) 
3 1 3 Mandel, Europe , Chapter 1, pp.9-17 
concentration and centralisation aimed at the highly developed nations. The 
oligopolistic national trusts are driven towards international expansion in order to 
outstrip domestic competitors, acquire an international range of operations, or absorb 
foreign competitors threatening the monopolistic structure of the international 
market. This process takes four forms. These can be described as follows. Out-and-
out alienation, when a national industry suffers in favour of foreign capital. This is 
not applicable to Western Europe. Foreign capital penetration, i f the process is not 
completed and there is no qualitative change in politico-economic relations, this 
being the case of American capital in Europe. An example of this is the absorption of 
the French Machines Bull and the computer arm of the Italian Olivetti by the 
American General Electric. International capital interpenetration, with no single 
country holding a position of hegemony, is exemplified by the merger of the Belgian 
Gevaert and the German Agfa photographic companies. And finally, classical 
national capital concentration and centralisation, is symbolised by the merger of the 
Italian chemical giants Edison and Montecatini, which were eventually joined by the 
chemical arm of the state ENI trust. As far as multinationals are concerned for 
Mandel the concept of multinationality is a simple formality, since all American 
multinationals are controlled by particular American financial bodies. This combined 
with the fact that the American concept of multinationality is not reciprocal leads to 
the emergence of a European nationalism among European capitalists who must 
resist American economic expansion in order to survive.314 
Higher American productivity is the result of size, financial power and technological 
advance accelerated by the massive military spending and the European brain drain. 
3 1 4 Mandel, Europe , Chapter 2, pp. 18-27 
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Big research budgets, the US spends more per capita than the EEC, and state 
subsidies have given US companies the technological advance they enjoy in 
computers, lasers, etc. Mergers on a national scale can not produce companies big 
enough to challenge the US supremacy which can be explained by Marxist laws of 
competition, accumulation, and capital concentration.315 
Competition dictates the centralisation of capital, and in certain sectors like 
supersonic aeroplanes, satellites, and the list is increasing daily, state and 
international financing is critical for profitable production. Capital interpenetration is 
fundamental in all sectors of the economy, and this is recognised by employers' 
organisations and Community officials alike. The European company statute is an 
attempt by the Commission to facilitate the process. For Mandel this is a 
manifestation of how the relations of production determine the social superstructure. 
European integration, since the common market has intensified competition, has 
accelerated the process of capital concentration. This in turn has triggered counter-
tendencies as many West European bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, against their class 
interests, still think in the old national concepts. This has forced the big capital to re-
examine the state's role.3 1 6 
Nowadays the state has become the protector of the profits of the monopolies and 
oligopolies. This has led to the paradox that whereas, on the one hand, the capitalist 
class has to follow the economic developments and become international, on the 
other it needs direct state intervention to protect it against social unrest. Thus 
Gaullism is to be seen as a manifestation of the inability of French capitalism to 
overcome the post-war economic and social crisis and successfully compete with its 
3 , s Mandel, Europe, Chapter 3, pp.28-39 
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foreign counterparts. Moreover, in common with other European bourgeoisies, it 
represented a challenge to US capitalist leadership and a suspicion of the Eurocrats. 
As the Community is not a real state the bourgeoisie tends to defend its national 
sovereignty as only the nation-state can guarantee its welfare. But paradoxically 
Gaullism became American Capital's best ally in Europe as without merging with 
other European firms national companies were ultimately captured by the Americans 
as the case of Machines Bull indicates. This combined with European 
interpenetration of capital and the need of European capital of a European state led to 
De Gaulle's downfall. Here it must be noticed that this is a peculiar example of 
economic determinism. Nevertheless the process is not complete yet and the era of 
national capital and state is not over. European capitalism needs supranational 
institutions to compete with its American counterpart, but a united European front 
has not been achieved because of the divergent interests of national capitalism. The 
moment they disappear and the international capital interpenetration creates central 
common interests integration will become deeper. The dividing line between pro and 
anti-Europeans is the one between the wealthier and weaker businesses, their 
respective interests dressed in passions and ideologies. As the telecommunication 
industry illustrates the leading concerns in the member countries support and need a 
common European platform.317 
British entry to the Community was the result of British Capital fears of being 
squeezed between European and American firms. The formation of big European 
companies is the only way of resisting American domination especially in the 
advanced sectors like computers and aviation. This project involves the relinquishing 
3 1 6 Mandel, Europe , Chapter 4, pp.40-50 
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of national sovereignty. De Gaulle's inability to transcend his early nationalist beliefs 
led him to veto the British application. Here there is a paradox. By opposing British 
entry he lost an ally in his fight against supranationalism. Moreover, an independent 
Europe is almost impossible without the British economy and technology.318 
But the interests of capital are contradictory to those of the workers and mankind in 
general, and economic integration on a regional scale heightens universal 
competition, and turmoil. The CAP, tariffs on textiles and food and the 
discrimination in favour of the associated African countries constitute a great barrier 
to Third World exports. This combined with the tendency of developed nations to 
trade between themselves leads to international concentration of wealth. 
Furthermore, the generous EEC loans to associated African states have not 
accelerated their industrial development but instead have been used to benefit 
community exports. Meanwhile, the Americans dominate in Latin American, 
Japanese and south-east Asian markets, and the Europeans in Chinese, Soviet and 
East European and African markets respectively. This means that since the rest of the 
world market does not essentially change the power relations between the two poles 
of international capitalism, the battle between them takes place in the West itself. At 
present American trusts compensate for higher labour costs with greater productivity 
due to technological advance and economies of scale.319 
Currency reserves is the one field that reflects most clearly the loss of absolute 
American superiority. Whereas in 1950 the US had a reserve of $22.8 billion 
compared with $3 billion for the EC countries and $3.7 for Great Britain. By 1968 
3 1 7 Mandel, Europe, Chapter 5, pp.51-60 
3 1 8 Mandel, Europe , Chapter 6, pp.61-70 
3 1 9 Mandel, Europe, Chapter 7, pp.71-81 
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the US reserve was reduced to $14.6 billion and the EEC one was increased to $23.5 
billion. Nevertheless the US economy is the most powerful in the world and any 
difficulties it might experience would endanger the whole capitalist system. As the 
similarity between European and American capital interests becomes clear the calls 
for a world currency become louder which, for Mandel, is incompatible with 
competition and capital accumulation. This is a contradiction the system can not 
solve.320 
The fate of the Community's supranational institutions depends on the degree of 
capital interpenetration in Europe, as national governments will only relinquish their 
powers to a supranational authority i f compelled by domestic economic forces. And 
as the long expansionist period comes to a stand still the big capital will make 
heavier demands on the bourgeois state. But given the degree of capital 
interpenetration, anti-crisis policies and the necessary intervention will be impossible 
within national boundaries and will have to be adopted at the community level. This 
means that the process of integration will either be reversed or deepened. High 
finance and big business push towards the latter as the need to spread the social costs 
of the imminent recession cannot be met without an effective supranational 
administration. That will be the manifestation of the Community's consolidation.321 
In the past the bourgeoisie has been associated with nationalism whereas the working 
class was the incarnation of internationalism. Large scale capitalism however has 
found it easier to become international than the proletariat as the latter's political 
division, lack of international practical experience (languages, travels, etc.) and lack 
of self-confidence have prevented the formation of a united international trade union 
3 2 0 Mandel, Europe , Chapter 8, pp.82-94 
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movement. As a result European integration has shifted the balance of power against 
the workers. There is no justification therefore for the workers to abandon their effort 
to win power at the national level and concentrate at the EEC level instead or to wait 
for the socialisation of Europe via the universally elected European Parliament. Since 
the development of social and political forces in the Community is still controlled by 
the law of uneven development such a policy would only frustrate the socialist 
advance. And as long as the capitalists have not formed a competent European union 
and executive the objective possibilities for a successful socialist revolution exist in 
each individual country. The chances will be eliminated with the establishment of 
powerful supranational bodies following the international interpenetration of capital. 
Nevertheless it should be noted that this does not mean that the workers must prevent 
the interpenetration of European Capital. The alternative is not a retreat to bourgeois 
economic nationalism but Europe-wide actions leading to a united socialist Europe. 
And although the increasing international capital interpenetration will, in the 
beginning, weaken the economic power of organised labour at the national level, 
once the process is completed the international organisation of labour, as the only 
solution, will effectively counterbalance this trend. 
Answering Servan-Schreiber's proposals that the labour movement should support 
European capital concentration guaranteed by a mighty European federation, against 
transatlantic domination, Mandel saw no reason why the labour movement should 
renounce its aims. It is worth noticing here that Servan-Schreiber's proposals show 
some remarkable similarities with those of his fellow Frenchmen, the Rocardiens 
which were exposed in the first section of the present chapter. Without the abolition 
3 2 1 Mandel, Europe, Chapter 9, pp. 95-106 
163 
of the private ownership of the means of production, surrendering power to the state 
would strengthen the dominant factions of big capital. Under free market conditions 
states and parliaments cannot control prices and profits. Only far reaching workers' 
control of production, and not just the right to consultation, can achieve the desired 
ends which are in conflict with the very structure of capitalist society. Meanwhile, the 
long-wave of expansion is coming to an end, and a new wave of slow growth is 
looming as a result of overproduction which at the end cannot be contained in over-
capacity by organised capitalism. Only a socialist system of planning can solve the 
capitalist contradictions. In economic terms the relative prosperity and saturation in 
many consumer areas makes firm adherence to market economy meaningless. And in 
social terms automation emphasises the authoritarian framework of factories, and the 
society as a whole, and generates reaction against it. The 
socialist alternative is the key to the solution of the problems raised by the 
competition between Europe and America. 
For Mandel money is not the only factor determining where and how people will 
work. But even i f this was the case, socialist Europe will be able to close the 
technological gap with the US because more workers' children will have higher 
education. Moreover, American research is tied with military objectives. Finally, a 
solid alliance with the Third World could be cemented. And he closed his book with 
the following words: 
Forward, against American and European monopolists, to the United 
Socialist States of Europe!?211 
Mandel, Europe, Chapter 10, pp. 107-16 
Mandel, Europe, Chapter 11, pp.117-134 
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Mandel's is an example of a Marxist analysis. As he put it in the beginning his is an 
attempt to explain the erosion of American supremacy as a result of objective 
historical laws and inevitable revolutions. He offers an economic deterministic 
discussion of European nationalism.324 The relative superiority of American firms is 
explained in terms of size and technological advance.325 With respect to the first as 
GM and IBM, the American multinationals par excellence, have realised big is not 
beautiful and breaking up could be the solution to a giant corporation's problems. 
This can be highlighted by IBM's recently announced record losses and the problems 
facing GM. On this side of the Atlantic ICI offers another example of the 
disadvantages of size. Today there are 179 European companies among the world's 
500 biggest companies as compared to 135 U.S. and 128 Japanese.326 With respect to 
the technological advance Community policy is specifically designed to promote 
technological development and projects such as ESPRIT are examples of the 
importance that is allocated to this field. For Mandel US technological advantage has 
been boosted by the gigantic military expenditure and the brain drain from Europe to 
the US. This is disputable today in the face of the end of the Cold War. Converting 
military industries for civilian use is a very difficult task and trimming down looks 
like the only solution. And although it is true that mergers on a national scale can not 
produce industrial giants able to challenge the great American corporations as a 
result of Community policy transnational mergers and take-overs have multiplied 
recently. In the automobile sector Peugeot of France has bought Citroen, and have 
taken over the European section of Chrysler (Rootes in the UK and Simca in France), 
and the German VW has acquired Seat of Spain and the Czech Skoda. 
3 2 4 Mandel, Europe , p.25 
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Mandel's assumption that the bourgeoisie needs state intervention and that the time of 
laisser-faire, laisser-passer is over328 seems flawed in the aftermath of the 
emergence of the new right and the triumph of Thatcherism in Britain and the 
development of the Single European Market. And his belief that the British computer 
industry is the only feasible western European competitor of the American 
corporations is unfounded since ICL has been bought by the Japanese who are now 
the force to beat in the sector. Towards the end of the book he predicted that the 
abundance and saturation in many consumer areas will make firm devotion to the 
market economy implausible.330 Again the nature of the capitalist system has 
rendered such predictions absurd as they fail to comprehend the system's ability to 
transform and create new needs. Overall, Mandel's picture of capitalism seems very 
simplistic. It is largely based on multinational industry. Nowhere does he deal with 
multinational finance capitalism (he has only dealt with domestic finance capital in 
relation to multinational capital), and this is something that makes his theory even 
more outdated. Nowadays it seems that it is the banks and financiers like James 
Goldsmith and George Soros that have the controlling power. Industry, and 
especially heavy industry, has been curtailed and directed by the finance capital. This 
lack of treatment is a major shortcoming. Much of his analysis seems to be based 
upon an extrapolation of current trends which he identifies at the time of writing. 
This is always a dangerous type of argument. 
Mandel, Europe, p.28 
Fortune International, No 17, August 23,1993 
Mandel, Europe, p.36 
Mandel. Europe. p.51 
Mandel, Europe, p.65 
Mandel, Europe , p. 129 
166 
But Mandel's great failure, in common with most socialists, seems to be his neglect 
of the power of nationalism, and that of national identity. As a typical marxist, he 
failed to take into account the great power of popular adherence to the nation-state. 
Nowhere he considered the nationalist sentiments of the working class, or even left 
any role to popular participation in the development of community institutions. For 
him as we have seen, the fate of the Community's supranational institutions depends 
on the degree of capital interpenetration in Europe. Under fiis understanding things 
like the popular rejection of the Maastricht treaty in Denmark, for example, could 
only be seen as historical mistakes. It is typical of his misunderstanding I believe that, 
for Mandel, the working class has not become international enough because of the 
lack of international practical experience (languages, travels, etc.) and lack of self 
confidence. Recent theories have attempted to fi l l this vacuum in socialist thought 
and this is the topic of the fifth chapter of the present thesis. 
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CONCLUSION 
What is of some interest is the diversity of these early responses. From the 
examination of the above mentioned first wave of left thinkers, it becomes obvious 
that they all failed to grasp the reality of European integration and construct a 
reasonable response to it. 
Departing from different theoretical startpoints they produced theoretical models and, 
in the case of Jaumont et al., action programmes, which the reality of European 
integration has proven false. The common theme in all these works is the deep 
misunderstanding of the way the nation-state and international society have evolved 
in the second half of the twentieth century. An understanding of the challenges that 
the modem nation-state faces is still missing from the socialist analysis of European 
integration. Only the Rocardians, to a certain degree, seemed to understand the power 
and the opportunities that the popular attachment to national identities can offer to 
socialism, but that was in an inconclusive way. The fact that they had to operate 
within the realms of a mainstream party can be the explanation for this "success". 
But this also is the cause of the same confusion in the vocabulary and the rhetoric 
used that we saw in the discussion of the German SPD and the French PS/SFIO of 
the previous chapter. 
Gaining in turn, remained focused on his structures and power models having not 
time for any other factor in his discussion. And Mandel completely ignored national 
feelings and identities and the other notions that form the main body of more recent 
theories. All three theories remained mainly occupied with statism. Time has proven 
them to be irrelevant. All three strands of thought under consideration demonstrate 
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their aging by remaining attached to the economic determinism model of Marx and 
completely ignored any other issues that fall outside this category. It was only 
Spinelli, as we will see in the next chapter that managed to escape this straitjacket 
and provided the link with the new theories that form the backbone of the discussion 
of the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Altiero Spinelli: The Continuing Prophet 
INTRODUCTION 
Altiero Spinelli was born in Rome in 1907 and died in 1986. His significance cannot 
be overemphasized. Among the thinkers under consideration he was the only one that 
had the opportunity to try to put his ideas into practice. Moreover, he was the only 
one to have an inside view of the way the major Community institutions work, and to 
produce ideas that were a by-product of such a deep knowledge. His long political 
career can be divided into three stages. The first, covers his early years and starts 
with the Ventotene Manifesto, written in 1941, and ends in 1970. The second stage 
covers his period in the European Commission from 1970 to 1976. The last stage 
covers his years in the European Parliament, as an independent in the Italian 
Communist Party's (PCI) list, from 1976 until his death ten years later. The present 
chapter is an attempt to examine his intellectual development and to determine the 
nature of his European-socialism by looking at his words and deeds. Spinelli was a 
federalist. He was also a socialist with a flexible and non-doctrinaire understanding 
of the ideology. He attempted to produce a synthesis of federalism and socialism that 
took into account the importance of nations. In my examination of Spinelli I will 
place more emphasis on his theoretical works rather than the Crocodile Initiative and 
the Draft Treaty of European Union that followed it, as they were more the result of 
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compromising and accommodation of different interests, rather than ideological 
manifestations. 
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1.1941 -1970. THE EARLY YEARS 
The first recorded document in which Altiero Spinelli offered his vision of Europe is 
The Manifesto of Ventotene331 (July 1941), after the island where he and Ernesto 
Rossi, the heads of the group with the same name, were detained at the time. They 
dismissed the nation-state as having outlived its usefulness, as having developed 
hegemonic tendencies towards other nation-states, and as having become the arena 
for class and economic conflicts which could destroy any united front of progressive 
forces. Although in the past the idea of national independence was a progressive one, 
it was injected with the seeds of capitalist imperialism which produced totalitarian 
states and resulted in world wars. I f the nation-states are resurrected it will not be 
long before they are conquered by the reactionaries and they are placed against each 
other again. For Rossi and Spinelli, 
The question which must first be resolved, and if it is not then any other 
progress made up to that point is mere appearance, is that of the abolition of 
i l l 
the division of Europe into national sovereign states. 
Only a European Federation could solve the complex set of problems, such as the 
definition of boundaries, protection of ethnic minorities rights, etc., which plague 
Europe's international affairs. As the conflicts between the small principalities were 
resolved by the creation of large nation-states, so the problems between today's 
nation-states will be solved by their amalgamation into a European federation. Such a 
process will require the abolition of certain monarchical dynasties and will be a first 
3 3 1 The "Ventotene Manifesto", in Lipgens, W. (ed.), Documents on the History of European Integration , Vol.1 , 
(Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1985) pp.471-84 
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step towards a global political unity. In the same document they stated that what 
makes a political party more progressive is not more democracy or socialism, but 
more internationalism.333 During these early years therefore, and under the effects of 
the Second World War, Spinelli was preoccupied with was federalism. It was seen as 
the solution to the great evils of the war. At the time these line were written, the war 
was threatening the existence of civilisation in Europe, and federalism seemed the 
only solution. 
The same line of thought can be detected in Spinelli's other writings of the period. In 
the essay on The United States of Europe and the various political tendencies (1941) 
he dismissed communism for focusing only on the abolition of capitalism, which of 
itself does not lead to war, while overlooking the problem of an international political 
authority to draw up economic plans. 
The only way to avoid these evils is to create institutions which will frame 
and enforce an international law against the pursuit of aims that profit one 
nation at the expense of others.334 
In the essay on Marxist policy and federalist policy (1941), he distinguished between 
Marxism and socialism and saw federalism as the only cure to the evils of modern 
society. 
Recognising as we do the prime necessity of creating a federation of the 
existing sovereign states - at least, to begin with, in Europe, where 
imperialism has achieved its most terrible manifestations - the advocates of 
this solution are best distinguished from other groups by the name of 
federalists.335 
"Ventotene Manifesto" , in Lipgens, Documents. Vol.1 , p.478 
3 3 3 "Ventotene Manifesto" , in Lipgens, Documents , Vol. 1, p.479 
3 3 4 Spinelli, A. "The United States of Europe and the various political tendencies", in Lipgens, Documents , 
Vol.1, p.485 
3 3 5 Spinelli, A. "Marxist policy and federalist policy", in Lipgens, Documents. Vol.1, p.490 
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The nation-state should be abolished and the monopolies should be socialized in a 
revolutionary situation.336 Here another theme can be identified. Spinelli now 
introduced the idea of socialization, a classic socialist theme. So alongside federalism 
socialism came into his work. 
In the Draft Declaration of the European Resistance Movements1121, written largely 
by him in Geneva in July 1944, Spinelli called for the transcending of absolute state 
sovereignty and advocated a single world federal organization to be achieved 
gradually. The first step will be a European federal union to guarantee peace in the 
continent which will be the cornerstone of world peace. The geographical limits of 
the union were not specified but all countries that belong wholly or partly to Europe 
would be eligible for membership. The member states should irrevocably surrender 
to the federation the external affairs, defense, and international trade and 
communications aspects of their sovereignty. The declaration called for a Union 
government directly responsible to the people and not to national governments with 
its own armed forces, excluding all other national armies, and a supreme tribunal to 
interpret the constitution and settle the differences between the federation and the 
member states, or between the states themselves. 
Looking back at the European Union and the Resistance™ he justified Federalism as 
a reaction to the nation state with which Nazism and Fascism had been identified, 
3 3 6 These two essays were published in Rome by the underground in 1944 as: "A.S." (A.Spinelli) and "E.R." 
(E.Rossi), Problemi della federazione europea". They are discussed briefly by Delzell, C.F. "The European 
Federalist Movement in Italy: First Phase, 1918-1947", Journal of Modern History, Vol.32, no.3, (Sep. 1960), 
pp.241-250 
3 3 7 "Draft declaration of the European Resistance Movements, July 1944", in Vaughan, R. Post-War Integration 
in Europe. (London, Edward Arnold, 1976)), pp. 16-20 
3 3 8 Spinelli, A., "European Union and the Resistance", in Ionescu, G.(ed.), The New Politics of European 
Integration . (London, MacMillan, 1972), pp. 1-9 
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and which had failed to guarantee the independence and security of its citizens' 
despite all their sacrifices. 
The nation state had become, for those who sought guidance, a compass 
which had ceased to give any hearings.339 
The radical wing of the resistance was striving to achieve a democratic state with 
regional autonomy, a free market economic system with an element of planning to 
guarantee uninterrupted development and social justice, and a federal government in 
charge of foreign, defense, and economic policies.340 
It is here I believe that one can detect the themes that dominated Spinelli's thinking 
throughout his long career, the themes that chracterised it, the themes that set him 
apart from traditional thinkers of the left and the themes that can establish the link 
between himself and the more recent theories that are examined in the following 
chapter. These are federalism, development, market socialism, grassroots democracy, 
and rights. What, in Spinelli's words, were the aims of the radical wing of the 
resistance, are now the questions concerning socialism in a transformed world. 
Later, looking back to the growth of the European Movement since World War II , 
Spinelli attributed it to the combination of a number of factors.341 The war experience 
led to the downfall of the idol of the sovereign national state in the continent as all 
European people suffered military defeat. The predominance in all west European 
countries of Catholic political parties which were not eager to safeguard national 
sovereignty contributed significantly to the growth of the European movement. This 
3 3 9 Spinelli, "European Union", p.3 
3 4 0 Spinelli, "European Union", p.4 
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process was accelerated by the decline of the established nationalist forces such as 
the various national administrative, social and economic bodies. Moreover, the fear 
of Soviet expansionism boosted, by proxy, ideas of European unity as the only 
alternative to Communism. In addition the American influence favored a united 
continent. And finally, the need to find a solution to the German problem was 
becoming more pressing. 
Assessing the record of the ECSC Spinelli identified three limitations. One, the 
community was not completely separated from the national controlled economies, 
two the High Authority was restricted by the national ministers, and three the 
Common Assembly had no legislative power. In this document Spinelli, once more, 
advocated a federalist approach and attributed the failures of the past to the 
functionalist position which did not attack directly the problem of the limitation of 
national sovereignty. Instead of moving through conventional diplomatic channels 
the Schuman Plan should have been elaborated by a European constituent assembly. 
The failed EDC was a step in the right direction which was killed by the relaxation in 
international relations following Stalin's death, the economic boom, and the revival 
of national conservatism. Functionalism had contaminated Monnet's Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe which was interested only in the speedy 
achievement of an atomic pool. Again he stated his belief in the inability of national 
governments to promote serious European integration and to guarantee the economic 
and social welfare of their citizens. European union will be brought about only by the 
people and not by the bureaucrats. 
3 4 1 Spinelli, A., "The growth of the European movement since World War II", in Grove Haines, C. (ed.), 
European Integration , (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1957), pp.37-63 
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Again, federalism can be seen as the dominant theme in Spinelli's thought. 
Federalism that should lead to a United Europe. But the way this should be brought 
about is of importance for us. As we saw, the Schuman Plan should have been 
elaborated by a European Constituent Assembly, and European union should be 
based on popular participation. The subject of such an enterprise must be economic 
and social welfare for the citizens. These are the themes that set Spinelli apart from 
most of the other supporters of European integration of his time. 
In The Eurocrats (1966) Spinelli described what he called the centres of united 
European action. He was dismissive of the old notions of nationalism, national 
solidarity, and the nation state since these were the causes of European wars. It was 
the Second World War that dealt a final blow to the popularity of the states among 
their citizens and opened the way for a united Europe. It is not surprising that the less 
pro-European nations are the Swiss, the Swedes, and the British who, for different 
reasons, did not experience total defeat. The War disasters have turned Europeanism 
into 
a blueprint of political action which can offer an interpretation of, and a 
solution to, the problems of a Europe in misery and a Europe in affluence, a 
Europe politically and militarily impotent and a Europe once more an 
important factor in world politics..}"'2 
Discussing the various approaches to European unification Spinelli observed that the 
choice is between the federalists' determination to create democratic liberties among 
multinational Europeans, the functionalist Bureaucratic supranational structure, or 
the confederalist transformation of old nationalisms into a new European 
3 4 2 Spinelli, A., The Eurocrats. Conflict and Crisis in the European Community , (Baltimore, The John Hopkins 
Press, 1966), p.7 
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nationalism. His sympathy certainly lies with the first. Functionalism, on the one 
hand, suffers from the intrinsic weakness of political power as the possible 
unpredictability of the member states could destroy the Community and has created a 
centralised bureaucratic Europe. Confederalism, on the other, contains 
nationalist resentments, autarchical dreams, authoritarianism, disdain for 
democracy, and desire for power?4,3 
The Parliament must be capable of legislating, imposing taxes, voting budgets, and 
participating somehow in the choice of head of government. What the Assembly 
lacks, and thus is deprived of a genuine Parliamentary character, is true 
representation of political forces and effective participation in Community decision 
formulation. The Commission's indifference towards the EP has undermined its own 
authority in the face of the growing power of the various intergovernmental bodies. 
Moreover, the Parliament has failed to exploit the links of its members with their 
respective national assemblies and Commissioners to its own advantage. The 
enlargement of the parliament's powers will signify the passage from the functionalist 
Europe of offices to the federal democratic Europe.344 Once more here, the 
enlargement of the parliamentary powers can be seen as the issue that can emphasise 
Spinelli's importance for today's socialism. Giving more power to popular 
assemblies is one of the key issues in the recent discussion of socialist regeneration. 
Assessing the role of the political parties he observed that all parties have been 
infected with Europeanism which has given a feeling of general popular support to 
national ministers involved with European issues. Gaullist confederalism, designed 
Spinelli, Eurocrats , Chapter 1, pp.3-25 
Spinelli, Eurocrats . pp. 151 -72 
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to favor French national supremacy, resulted in a parting of ways for the left and the 
right corresponding to different concepts of Europe, with the left opting for the 
democratization of the Community. Nevertheless, these different concepts will 
remain vague until there is a democratic power struggle at the European level.3 4 5 
So, during these early years Spinelli's thinking was affected by the war experience. 
Federalism was his solution. But it was a federalism that was characterised by 
democracy and popular participation. 
Spinelli, Eurocrats, pp. 172-90 
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2. 1970-1976: THE COMMISSIONER 
Spinelli's ideas during the time that he served as a Commissioner were expanded in 
The European Adventure (1972). Here, he offered his vision of the European 
Community which he regarded as the expression of the European idea.346 It is clear 
that for him a common market is not the ultimate goal. 
The purpose of the European Community is to unite progressively the 
destinies of several nations by the development of a body of laws and 
. institutions common to them all, obliging them to face certain great tasks 
with a common policy and to adopt a common position and responsibility 
towards the world outside.341 
And although unions of nations have been brought about in the past by violence, the 
European Community is an effort to achieve unity by consensus in the aftermath of 
World War II. The cataclysm of the Second World War resulted in a catharsis of 
nationalism in Western Europe as it was held responsible for the tragedy. In contrast 
to the west, in the other half of the continent Soviet military predominance has 
discredited the notion of unity, and nationalism is seen as the reference point of a 
repressed and passive resistance. 
What he calls The European Adventure has met numerous obstacles in the process. 
Although Europe is popular and the differences in popular belief lie only in the 
characteristics each individual ascribes to it, the number of people involved in it is 
very small. The pro-European attitude is ever increasing along with the number of 
3 4 6 Spinelli, A., The European Adventure. Tasks for the Enlarged Community, (London, Charles Knight & Co 
Ltd., 1972), p.vii 
3 4 7 Spinelli, European Adventure , p. 1 
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problems which demand European rather than national solutions. Nevertheless, is not 
yet sufficiently articulate in political terms and has not created the agencies for 
popular participation, elections, parliament, a European government. The 
Commission has provided inspiration but its capacity has been hindered by the Rome 
and Paris treaties and its inability to develop the constructive political imagination 
which the European adventure needs. 
The substantial resistance of the national establishment forms the second obstacle. 
One may no longer believe in the supremacy of the national perspective, but 
all traditions, laws, centres of command, habits of obedience, working habits 
and standards, and calculations of profit and loss are national in character; 
the majority of personal relationships, public or private, are with fellow 
nationals, who think and feel in a similar way. Once homage has been paid to 
the idea of Europe, profound national conservatism is easy.24* 
This is particularly true with respect to economic policies. And although the centre 
governing parties adopted Europeanism, it was the two ends of the political spectrum 
that were reluctant. As far as the left is concerned, leftist nationalism, based on 
controls and measures imposed on the nation state, in association with communist 
loyalty to the USSR had penetrated the internationalist Left. In the right, the Gaullist 
variety aspired to a Europe where important decisions remain under national control. 
This confederal tendency is present in all national administrations and should be 
combated with the creation of supranational action centres based on a minimum of 
supranational administration Everyday issues make national governments inward 
looking and it is only in times of crisis that they become European oriented and are in 
agreement with each other. The Commission has been the most authoritative and 
Spinelli, European Adventure , pp.9-10 
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effective centre of common action, but the lack of a truly effective institution meant 
that substantial progress was made only at rare occasions. 
Assessing the process of European integration in the 60s, he found that it was a 
positive decade as the successes outweighed the failures of the era and the number of 
regulations, directives, and organisations created resulted in an advanced level of 
economic interpenetration among the member states. But this was not true for the 
political sphere where the Community appeared weak and divided and it was only 
towards the end of the decade that pattern started to improve. 
Writing before the 1973 enlargement, Spinelli identified the tasks for the 70s. These 
included the implementation of economic and monetary union combined with 
common regional, social, environmental, industrial, and scientific policies; the 
coordination of more areas of foreign policy; and the overhaul of the Community 
institutions. Without common international action in all fields the community 
structure is in danger of collapsing as none of the goals of the enlarged Community 
are included in the present Treaties. Declarations of principles in themselves, without 
the means to achieve the specified ends, are empty. The long crisis of Euratom is an 
example. If the then forthcoming October 1972 Summit were to work towards the 
realisation of its objectives by means of intergovernmental diplomatic negotiations 
then the national administrations would keep all their prerogatives. But, for him 
In reality, the Community is not merely an association of states; it is also a 
political entity with its own personality, superior in certain aspects to the 
states, possessing its own organisations, producing decisions which must be 
accepted by the member states and respected by their citizens. Thus, that 
which for the states is a treaty, is for the Community its own constitution; that 
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which for the states is a revision of the treaty is for the Community a revision 
of its constitution349 
The Treaty, according to democratic principles and in order to counterbalance 
national conservative tendencies, should be revised by the European Parliament with 
the Commission's support and finally should be ratified by national assemblies. The 
European Parliament should be directly elected and more powerful. New delegations 
should be nominated to the EP on January 1st, 1973 to coincide with the enlarged 
Community's birth. A new electoral law should be introduced and a date for direct 
elections should be set within a specific period. Again the concept of democracy, 
with emphasis on popular participation, accountability, constitutionalism and 
citizenship are emphasised. And these are combined with social, environmental and 
regional concerns. 
Given the different conditions in member states Spinelli saw the danger in monetary 
union that would lead either to a levelling-up of inflation rates or to slower growth in 
some member states. The solution to such a problem is to be found in 
interpenetration as increasing interdependence will result in greater convergence in 
economic performance. Acute competition and the emergence of transnational unions 
limiting the possibilities of wage explosions, will close the competitive gap between 
different countries. Productivity performance will become more uniform with the 
growth of multinational corporations. A common monetary policy will eliminate the 
possibility of disparate price trends and price expectations, a trend which is going to 
be boosted by increased labour mobility and common research, energy, transport, 
competition, and vocational training policies. The effects of interdependence will be 
3 4 9 Spinelli. European Adventure , p.26 
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strengthened by the harmonization of economic objectives, policies and institutions, 
and any country which finds that it will fail to achieve its goals should automatically 
have its strategy examined at Community level.350 Again, Spinelli touched upon the 
issue of the state and globalization. The inability of the traditional nation-state to 
cope with the emerging problems of interdependence are dealt with by means of 
common action at the European level. 
Next he attempted to offer a solution to the problem of regional inequality. Regional 
policies must be adopted in order to achieve balanced growth throughout the 
Community, but despite the good will expressed in the Rome Treaty the positive 
means for such a policy were not provided. A new idea of regional policy in the era 
of full economic integration would be a step towards political unioa New political 
mandates and institutions are needed for the enlarged Community. Problems of 
structural imbalance referred to as the declining periphery and the over-expanding 
centre occur in all the new member states. The policy's goal should be the healthy 
distribution of the working population. The first problem to be tackled is the 
inflation/redundancy syndrome. Bringing jobs to the workers should subordinate the 
stock-in-trade of regional policy provisions. Moreover, such a policy should end the 
non-sense of compartmentalised policies for agricultural structures and of 
the importation of third country workers into already congested areas while 
Community regions are still suffering from redundancies.351 
The Community countries have been undergoing a structural change characterised by 
the rapid industrialisation of certain hitherto pre-industrial regions since the end of 
World War II , the transformation, as a result of technological and commercial 
3 5 0 Spinelli, European Adventure , pp.92-6 
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change, of the old industrial and urban regions, and the changing nature of 
urbanisation which benefits the old financial and administrative centers. This is the 
second problem that must be dealt with by the regional policy and has come to be 
known as the dereliction/pollution syndrome. The last problem is that of congestion 
of political power. Regional planning power should be allocated to the appropriate 
level and this would entail the creation of a new Community jurisdiction and greater 
autonomy for the regions. This will form the bridge from economic to political 
union 3 5 2 The sticks and the carrots of the existing regional policy have failed to solve 
the problem of regional imbalance. I f a fairer distribution of workers is to be 
achieved, Community control and intervention is required. Agencies of 
entrepreneurial nature should be created, the importation of workers from third 
countries should be controlled and finally, a system of public funding should be 
devised to build the infrastructure necessary to give regional ventures a proper 
chance. The ideas of regional autonomy, free market with a degree of regulation and 
state intervention, and environmental concern, topics that were to dominate the 
discussion about the reconstruction of the left decades later were dominant in 
Spinelli's thinking in the early seventies. 
He called for a revision of the Treaties, the strengthening of the European Parliament, 
and for the Community to acquire a jurisdiction in physical planning.353 Spinelli 
identified four fields of action in regional policy. Regulation, combining within one 
Community field of action the distinct national regimes for economic and physical 
planning with the view of leading to a fully comprehensive Community policy for the 
distribution of the workers. Investment, the rationale of which would be to introduce 
3 5 1 Spinelli, European Adventure, p.102 
3 5 2 Spinelli, European Adventure, p. 106 
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a Community perspective into the thinking of the financial institutions and public 
budgeting practices of the individual states. Development, amalgamating into a single 
entity the various national fields of action. This 
is of the greatest importance for integration and economic union. The 
purpose of the measures included in it is to develop policies and institutions 
that treat the enlarged Communities as a single territory and so produce for 
the Communities as a whole, a unity of action and a sense of mutual 
responsibility analogous to that which characterises the action of a national 
354 
government. 
Finally, strategy to ensure that regional policy keeps up with the pace of economic 
and monetary union.355 
In fact everything is interdependent in the construction of Europe. The 
customs union provided the starting point for the monetary and economic 
union, which is intended to prolong and consolidate it; this postulates in its 
turn political union.356 
Spinelli outlined what he regarded as the Community's essential qualities. All these 
are of central importance to any discussion on the future of socialism in today's 
conditions. These qualities form the outline of the discussion in the following chapter 
of the present thesis. First come liberty and democracy, the essential values of 
socialist theory and practice. Secondly, there is respect for national identity and 
sovereignty, co-existing within the European Community. 
The goal of the Community is not a single European state, designed to 
become a single European Nation, but a Federation of Nations in which 
Spinelli. European Adventure . p. 107-11 
Spinelli, European Adventure , p.l 18 
Spinelli, European Adventure , pp. 111 -21 
Spinelli, European Adventure , p. 122 
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citizens will jealously guard their own traditional home country while 
becoming at the same time citizens of the Community}51 
Thus Spinelli understood the power of national allegiances and allowed for multiple 
identities. Thirdly, there is the development of increasingly compatible economic 
systems by subordinating national policies to an overall economic policy. Thus he 
touched on the problem of the changing nature of sovereignty and the unit of change 
in contemporary socialist ideas. Moreover, the Community has also to develop a 
policy for society and nature to counterbalance the negative effects of growth. What 
is needed is a new philosophy of education to allow for work for the youth, adult 
education, and political involvement as well as enjoyment of leisure for all. In the 
workplace the workers should be brought in during the process of decision making 
along with managers and owners. The problems of the cities should be tackled 
collectively so that a remedy is found for the development that threatens the life of 
this foundation of all great civilizations. This calls for a coordination of national 
decision making and reform of the Commission's consultative bodies so that the 
Community's bureaucracy can effectively carry out its role as the central body which 
"ICQ 
promotes the Community. Again all these ideas were to dominate the discussion of 
socialism in a transformed world years later. Spinelli seemed to share the ideas of 
workers' participation and of the new social movements before they became 
fashionable. 
Searching for ways to give a single voice to the Community he singled out the 
relations with the developing countries as the most important of the three aspects of 
foreign policy. The context in which future policy towards the West will be formed 
3 5 7 Spinelli, European Adventure , p. 147 
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has been changed by a combination of American frustration with foreign affairs and 
opportunism as regards to the post-war economic system, and the changing nature of 
international trade with the doing away of protectionism and concern with social 
issues which eroded the consensus on the emphasis of higher GNP. This translated 
means non-tariff barriers and concern with production itself as much of what is 
socially desirable (pollution control, etc.) is not economically efficient. All these 
mean that the Community should introduce a political element in trade negotiations. 
A unified Community should promote the idea of international integration among the 
developed countries along the EFTA lines and the Commission should be given 
powers to bargain. 
For Spinelli, the enlarged Community should strive towards the gradual transfer of 
prerogatives in certain fields from individual states to competent and democratically 
organised Community institutions, and the development of inter-state cooperation in 
the fields where interdependence is of a low level. The Parliament suffers from not 
having its function clearly defined, and as far as direct elections to the European 
Parliament are concerned, what is needed is the endowment of the Assembly with 
real authority, and population related representation. Constitutional reform must 
define the authority that has to be delegated to the Community institutions. And 
closing the book he stated: 
The old Community of Six created a customs union and an agricultural 
policy. The new enlarged Community has to fill the vacuum left by the 
collapse of the dollar system, to meet the need for common action against 
ominous threats to our environment, to pool resources in industry and 
technology, to find new social patterns and to play a new role in a multipolar 
Spinelli. European Adventure . pp. 145-55 
Spinelli, European Adventure, p. 186 
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Again, during these years, Spinelli remained a convinced federalist. But his espousal 
of environmentalism, popular participation, rights, and respect for national character 
were very apparent. And in practical politics he found ways of working towards these 
objectives. 
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3. 1976-1986: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Spinelli was elected to the European Parliament in 1976 as an independent in the 
PCI's list. During this time he was especially concerned with upgrading the power of 
the European Parliament, of the body that could promote accountability in the 
Community. His years as an MEP were spent working towards this direction. In 1978 
reflecting back on the Community's institutional crisis , he observed that conflict is 
endemic in the system since the essential elements of the Community, the functional 
Commission, the federal Court and Parliament, and the confederal Council, are 
founded on contradictory principles. Thus national governments have paralysed the 
Community, a possible collapse of which would revive nationalism and would result 
in American domination. Institutional reform is therefore overdue and the first 
directly elected Parliament should transform the Commission into a European 
government Such a body 
...can emerge only from an appropriate reform of the Commission. Since the 
Community has to be, on one side, a democratic body and on the other one a 
compound of different nations which intend to maintain theirown 
peculiarities, a Parliament representing the people and a Council 
representing the member states, are essential components of the institutional 
structure; both must participate in the formation and control of the 
Government, in legislating, in levying taxes and authorising expenditures. 
But these developments of the Parliament and of the Council can only result 
from the central decision to endow the Community with a fully-fledged 
common Government.360 
So, Spinelli was not only aiming at introducing democracy into the Community 
operation, but was also concerned with the preservation of national peculiarities, 
190 
something that proves, once more, the fact that, unlike the other theorists discussed in 
the previous chapter, he understood the importance of nations. As Burgess has 
noted, Spinelli's federalist and constitutionalist approach to the European 
construction, unlike Monnet's functionalism, led him to allocate to the Parliament a 
crucial role and he had endlessly encouraged the Commission to support i t . 3 6 1 In June 
1980 Spinelli circulated a letter to all MEPs describing his plan for a Parliament 
initiative. Eight members of various nationalities and party groupings responded to 
his invitation and they met on July at the Crocodile restaurant in Strasbourg. The nine 
agreed that reform of the Community was needed i f it were to become more 
sufficient. The European Assembly should undertake such an initiative. A club was 
formed named after its birthplace. The Crocodile Initiative stem from his awareness 
that, whereas the people comprising the Commission , the Parliament, and the Court 
do not represent their individual national interests, the Council is rendered impotent 
by the fact that ministers represent their respective countries.362 As Spinelli himself 
acknowledged, the need for reform occurred to the MEPs as they became aware of a 
number of facts. The power to reject the budget was only a blunt weapon. The 
Council ignored all of the Parliament's recommendations. The Commission rarely 
noticed the common popular interests while the Council was the real initiator of 
policies. There was no executive in charge of common foreign policy, and thus 
nothing to establish fixed points of reference for the parliamentary debates in this 
field. The recognition that previous suggestions for institutional reform, within the 
existing treaty framework, had been abortive. And finally, the acknowledgment that 
3 6 0 Spinelli, A. "Reflections on the Institutional Crisis in the European Community" , West European Politics. 
Vol.1, no. 1 (1978), p.87 
3 6 1 Burgess, M. Federalism and European Union , (London, Routledge, 1989), pp.93-5 
3 6 2 Spinelli, A. "Foreword", in Lodge, J. (ed.) European Union: The European Community in search of a Future , 
(New York, St.Martin's Press, 1986) 
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daily the solution to an increasing number of problems can be found by joint 
action. 3 6 3 
Discussing the Crocodile Initiative, which led to the draft European Union Treaty 
(EUT) 3 6 4 , Cardozo and Corbett noted that Spinelli acted as the catalyst required i f all 
political groups were to participate in the process, and he acted as an impartial 
mediator in the Committee on Institutional Affairs in order to achieve unanimity. The 
final resolution was supported by the EPP, Liberal, Socialist and Communist groups, 
while the Conservatives left a free vote and the Gaullists abstained. Furthermore, 
with the exception of Denmark, it was supported by the majority, of those voting, of 
every nationality.3 6 5 Lodge has divided the EUT's basic ideological premises into 
two categories. On the one hand there are the elements regarding pluralist democratic 
issues; and on the other, those manifesting federal arrangements, although federalism 
as a term does not appear in the text. These two sets of elements form the 
backbone of Spinelli's theory and underline his importance for the present 
discussion. Moreover, the Union's stated objectives include harmonious 
development, ful l employment, and protection of the environment. These are 
concerns that have dominated many recent discussions about the future of socialism. 
Within the implicit federal objectives, it should be noted that European Union 
institutions wil l carry out only those tasks that can not be dealt with effectively by the 
national institutions. According to Burgess, this notion of subsidiarity was 
incorporated in the Draft Treaty at the insistence of the Christian Democrats and 
3 6 3 Spinelli, A. Towards the European Union. Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, Florence 13 June 1983, European 
University Institute 
3 5 4 BuIl.EC 2-1984 
3 6 5 Cardozo and Corbet, "The Crocodile Initiative", in Lodge, J. (ed.) European Union: the European Community 
in search of a Future , (New York, St.Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 15-46 
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Spinelli himself did not care much for i t . 3 6 7 One might also note that in his study on 
the Draft Treaty's Policy for Society, Collins observed that while it did not break new 
ground in any sensational way, it was primarily concerned with the preservation of 
the existing policies, and to a lesser degree with the promotion of new individual and 
societal issues. The mark of political compromise was evident. But in the field of 
international relations common action wil l be the norm i f a decision falls under the 
Union's competence, but the stress is on promoting interdependence with the 
member states retaining a degree of autonomy. In accordance with federalist 
principles, the European Parliament is given a prominent role in the Union's decision 
making, while the proposed legislative process highlights the Council's 
accountability to the Parliament. 
So again we find the same themes of federalism and democracy, along with the 
attempt to empower the European Parliament, and concern for economic social, and 
environmental issues. These are combined in a package to invigorate the process of 
integration, while at the same time showing respect for national characteristics. 
3 6 6 Lodge, J. "European Union and the First Elected European Parliament: The Spinelli Initiative", Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Vol.XXII. no.4 (June 1984), pp.377-402 




Spinelli's career spans a unique period. His approach was important because he 
offered an inclusive view of politics and was concerned with both theory and action. 
Spinelli was above everything else a federalist, but also a man of the non-doctrinaire 
left, who was eclectic and open to a variety of influences. The federalism which he 
encountered through the liberal economist L.Einaudi remained the constant theme 
throughout his career. As Burgess has observed, federalism also became a 
Christian Democratic notion which could be combined with the Catholic view of 
organic society authorized in the papal encyclicals of the Rerum Novarum (1891), 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931) and Pacem in Terris (1963), which constitute a 
philosophy of man evolving around the federal principle. Adenauer, Schuman and De 
Gasperi were all dedicated catholics and a European federation is the stated goal of 
the EPP's party statute.369 
Recognizing this approach, one may still raise the question: what is is the 
distinctively socialist character of Spinelli's contribution and where is it to be 
located? Nobody can doubt his Europeanist convictions and evidence of his approach 
and activities are to be found in the history and developments of the European Union. 
But in what sense was he a socialist? In his early writings he mentioned the 
revolution but he distinguished between marxism and socialism. He regarded 
internationalism as the determinant of progressiveness. He called for a European 
Community with a stronger identity and international presence, increasingly 
3 6 8 Burgess, M. "Federal Ideas in the European Community: Altiero Spinelli and 'European Union", 1981-84", 
Government and Opposition , Vol.19, no.3 (Summer 1984), pp.339-347. 
3 6 9 Burgess, M. "Political Catholicism, European Unity and the rise of Christian Democracy", in Smith, M.L. & 
Stirk, P.M.R. (ed.) Making the New Europe , (London, Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 142-155. For the origins of 
christian democracy and its doctrines see Irving, R.E.M. The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1979) pp. 1-28. 
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independent from the USA. But his Europeanism was not an empty vessel in terms of 
ideology and policy. While rejecting the state socialist models of public ownership 
and central planning in favour of a mixed economy, he favoured a dynamic 
conception for popular public authorities. He campaigned for European public 
policies to promote economic growth, ful l employment, popular participation in 
public life including the workplace, and environmental protection. His European 
federalism, as we have seen, involved commitments to the principle of social 
solidarity, using European and national public authorities for the redistribution of 
resources to disadvantaged social groups and to regions. The development of popular 
education along with scientific research and technology were public responsibilities. 
Many of these objectives overlap with those of other political traditions, including 
the more progressive elements of Christian Democracy and social liberalism. But this 
is merely a recognition that none of the major democratic western political ideologies 
can be conceived as completely mutually exclusive. There are significant shared 
values and objectives. 
I believe his great contribution to socialism to be in his recognition and development 
of these linkages. As, in the early stages, an isolated integrationist in the European 
left he provided a vital link between socialism and Europeanism. While today the 
socialist parties act as strong advocates of integration this was not always the case, 
and Spinelli's contribution to this climate of ideas was important. His ideas also f i t in 
the current debate about socialism ~ where such notions as market, association and 
citizenship, and environmentalism figure prominently in the attempts to redefine the 
tarnished ideology. 
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This contribution should also be understood as arising in a particular political and 
cultural environment. He was an Italian. His socialist credentials were of an Italian 
origin with its unique socialist tradition, which has a number of strands where 
liberalism, political Catholicism, liberalism, and marxism have had fruitful 
encounters.370 Similarities with Spinelli's line of argument can be detected in the 
thought of Bobbio and Rosselli, who are to be be discussed in the next chapter. It is 
worth noticing here, that Spinelli was a member of Giustizia e Liberia, and a leading 
member of this group was Carlo Rosselli. The group's programme was based on the 
ideas of parliamentary socialism, large regional autonomies (almost a federal 
system), workshop democracy, and civil society which was conceived as a sort of 
federation of federations. Some clear similarities between Spinelli and Rosselli are 
easy to find. They both rejected Marxism and attempted to infuse liberalism into 
socialism which they saw as part of the dynamic idea of liberty. They saw socialism 
as a moral ideal and a commitment, as humanism, with the goal of extending 
democracy. Unlike marxism which they understood to envisage a homogenous future 
society, they allowed for a more pluralistic model which could include antagonistic 
features. And like Spinelli, Rosselli seemed to understand the power of nationalist 
feelings, recognising the positive role that nation states had played in human 
development while being critical of the existing state system. As Albertini said, 
Spinelli felt that the left should be more interested in the European ideal. The left's 
3 7 0 For an early example see Cammett, J.M. Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967) 
3 7 1 Rosselli, C. Liberal Socialism , ed. by N.Urbinati, trans, by W.McCuaig, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton 
University Press, 1994), pp.xxviii-xxix 
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view of development and reform would be realized through European integration.372 
This is his great legacy to socialists and Europeans alike. 
3 7 2 Albertini, M. in the E.P.'s Battling for the Union-Altiero Spinelli. 1988, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, p.51 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Socialism in a Transformed World 
INTRODUCTION 
The end of the eighties marked a turning point in European and world politics 
alike. In central-eastern Europe a revolutionary upheaval, albeit not the one 
expected by convinced Marxists, toppled the established communist regimes and 
thus dealt a blow to socialism from which the ideology has yet to recover. One has 
to agree with Baudrillard that revolution 
is even less kind to those who think it has already happened than to those 
who oppose it. 
But for Motchane the collapse of communism represents a double failure for 
Social Democracy as well. One, its inability to safeguard in the European 
consciousness an historical domain which is its own. And two, its failure to 
develop a practical method that would pursue its perspectives in the social 
consciousness.374 In the meantime, in the western half of the continent -the 
prevailing social democratic model has been on the defensive for some time in a 
process that was started by the 1979 Thatcher victory in Britain. 3 7 5 As Lemke and 
Marks have noted, socialism has been called into question in all of its facets, as an 
ideology, as a movement, and as a regime type. 3 7 6 Fukuyama went as far as to 
3 7 3 Baudrillard, J. Cool Memories , trans, by C.Turner, (London, Verso, 1990), p.7 
3 7 4 Motchane, D. "What's Left after Socialism" in Walzer, M. (ed.) Toward a Global Civil Society , 
(Providence, Berghahn Books, 1995) p.302 
3 7 5 See Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (ed.) The Politics of Thatcherism , (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1983) 
3 7 6 Lemke, Ch. & and Marks, G. (ed.) The Crisis of Socialism in Europe , (Durham, Duke University Press, 
1992) p. ix. 
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speak of the death of socialism.377 These developments combined with the 
transformations unfolding in the world arena and the changing nature of the 
capitalist system demand a new approach i f the left is ever to regain the 
momentum lost. One has to agree with D. Miliband when he says that the 
the task for the left is in this context less to show that reform is necessary 
5 7 0 
than that is possible. 
A combination of developments demand a new approach on the behalf of the left 
when, to use a quotation from Marx, 
all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his 
relations with his kind. 
Traditional assumptions are questioned, age old certainties disappear and a new 
way of thinking becomes necessary. These changes, although connected and not 
clearly separated, can be grouped under three headings. National sovereignty and 
the state. Class and new identities and movements. And socialist values, where the 
notion of democracy and the ideas of choice, rights, autonomy, and the market are 
becoming predominant. These correspond to developments associated with the 
unit of socialist change, the agent of transformation, and socialist theory and 
practice respectively. 
Developments in the three fields mentioned above are interconnected. A l l 
mainstream socialist trends have perceived socialism in terms of the antagonism 
between state planning and market. The collapse of the command economies of 
3 7 7 See Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man , (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992) 
3 7 8 Miliband, D. fed.1 Reinventing the Left, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994) p.4 
3 7 9 Marx, K. & Engels, F. "Manifesto of the Commmunist Party" in Feuer, L.S. (ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic 
Writings on Politics and Philosophy , (Glasgow, Fontana, 1984) p.52 
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Eastern Europe has led to a reexamination of the socialist rejection of the market. 
Market socialism is an attempt to come into terms with the market. At the same 
time, the power of the nation-state is being undermined. On the one hand power is 
moving up, to bodies that can not be controlled by the state mechanisms, and on 
the other, power is moving down, with regionalism and the proliferation of new 
movements and identities. Democracy, is becoming the dominant theme is 
contemporary socialist thought. But democracy requires a degree of social 
regulation, and globalisation has curtailed the scope for such regulation at the 
level of the individual nation-state.380 The European Union could become the 
arena where these new ideas might be put into practice. It is worth mentioning 
here that any discussion of the above mentioned issues brings into mind, once 
more, Spinelli. Most of the topics under consideration have been dealt with by him 
(power to the regions, concern for the less advantaged social groups, the 
environment etc.), and his ideas of non-doctrinaire socialism can be regarded as 
the forerunners of the ideas exposed in the present chapter. 
3 8 0 Newman, M. Democracy. Sovereignty and the European Union , (London, Hurst & Company, 1996), 
p.76 
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1. THE UNIT OF CHANGE: THE STATE AND GLOBALISATION 
When discussing socialism and the process of European integration, and the 
powers that have been pulling towards this direction, one cannot avoid touching 
upon the issue of sovereignty. On the one hand, most debates about the process of 
European integration evolve around the issue of sovereignty. Opponents of the 
European Union have been arguing that any transfer of national-state power from 
the member states to the Union amounts to a loss of sovereignty. Any discussion 
of the process of European integration has therefore to touch upon the issue of 
sovereignty. On the other hand sovereignty, seen as the location of power in the 
state, has been central to socialism. 
For Hobsbawm, the socialist ideal became tied to the conquest of state power 
when the labour movements, following both the Marxist and the Jacobin 
democratic tradition, took the road of collective political action. Thus the state 
became the central component in the building of socialism. As a result, all 
mainstream socialist currents saw socialism in terms of the antagonism between 
state planning and market.381 (Later in this chapter we wil l discuss the recent 
attempts by socialists to come to terms with the market, in what came to be known 
as market socialism) In order to break the logic of the market the left needed an 
alternative socialist logic. The state became the left's alternative center of power. 
The reformists saw the state as making inroads into the logic of the market and 
modifying its excesses. The revolutionaries saw it as destroying the market and 
3 8 1 Hobsbawm, E. "Out of the ashes" in Blackburn, R. (ed.) After the Fall: the Failure of Communism and the 
Future of Socialism , (London, Verso, 1991) pp.316-8 
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capitalism and gradually absorbing and taking over the main social processes. 
By making the national state the tool for the implementation the socialist ideal, 
state socialism nationalized the creed itself.383 
So, according to Keane, the program of state administered socialism, regardless of 
its substantial achievements in post-war Europe, lost most of its appeal since it 
failed to recognize the limits of state action in relation to civil society. State 
administered socialism, through its assumption that the state could become the 
caretaker and modernizer of social existence, cultivated the passive consumption 
of state provision and weakened the citizens' confidence in their competence in 
directing their lives. Socialism came to be identified with red tape and state 
control. The crisis became more profound when consecutive governments failed to 
deliver the goods, at the time when such provisions were most in need, that is, in 
times of economic recession and company modernization. In addition, the grand 
expansion of state agencies led to its overload, thus damaging its policies' 
coherence and weakening its authority. Finally, as the state became an organized 
battleground for social groups while it was itself dependent on the more powerful 
of them, its effectiveness was further crippled. 3 8 4 
I O C 
A major development of the recent past has been the crisis of the nation-state. 
According to Dunn, this crisis does not stem from a weakening in the appeal of 
the idea of the nation. Nationalism in East and West, North and South has in fact 
experienced a rejuvenation. Rather it stems from a weakening not in the normative 
3 8 2 Hall, S. The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left, ( London, Verso, 1988) p.224 
3 8 3 Luard, E. Socialism Without the State 2nd ed., ( Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1991) p.xx 
3 8 4 Keane, J. "The limits of state action" in Keane, J. Democracy and Civil Society , (London, Verso, !988) 
pp.3-6 
3 8 5 For a historical perspective see Hont, I. "The permanent crisis of a divided mankind: 'contemporary crisis 
of the nation state' in historical perspective" in Dunn, J. (ed.) Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State? , 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1995) 
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but in the practical effectiveness of the state idea. Here of course we must be 
aware of the two different views of this crisis. The first locates the crisis in a 
decline of national-state power as such, while the second locates it in the massive 
increase in the degree of threats now confronting its subjects.386 For the purposes 
of the present discussion, although several southern states would fall under the 
first category (Somalia, Iraq, etc.) 3 8 7, 1 take crisis to mean the inability of the state 
to protect its subjects from these new threats to their security. This coupled with 
the political integration attempts at the European and global level call for a new 
approach. Signs of growing system integration are visible in global society at the 
level of socio-economic relations and the development of cultural and political 
institutions. The global society's economic system is built around the global 
market which coordinates the international division of labour and the production 
and exchange of commodities, and consists of the international institutions like 
T O O 
GATT, IMF, etc. Discussing economic policy attention should be paid to the 
first Mitterrand government in France in the early eighties. The French attempt at 
reflation inside an open economy at a time of world deflation turned out to be a 
disaster. As the French socialists discovered at their own peril, the international 
environment within which the newly elected left-wing government had to operate 
was of major importance. To attempt to implement policies without the fullest 
reference to developments beyond national borders is to invite disaster. The only 
alternative, which is not an alternative after all, is to seal of f the country in an 
Albanian way. Studying the French industrial policy of the same period, 
V.Wright concluded that it demonstrated the difficulties confronting any reformist 
3 8 6 Dunn, J. "Introduction: crisis of the nation state?" in Dunn. Contemporary Crisis 
3 8 7 see Hawthorn, G. "The crises of southern states", in Dunn, Contemporary Crisis 
3 8 8 On the shift of power from states to markets see Strange, S. States and Markets, (London, Pinter 
Publishers, 1988) 
3 8 9 MacShane, D. French Lessons for Labour, Fabian Tract 512, (London, Fabian Society, 1986) pp.4-5 
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administration committed to a particular policy as it reveals the external 
interdependence within the advanced world as a whole. Favorable economic 
conditions, necessary for the implementation of a statist industrial policy, are 
dependent on the outside world. France is a typical example of an interdependent 
economy since it increasingly depends upon international trade and the state of the 
international money market, as 40% of its imports are denominated in US dollars, 
and it imports 80% of its energy. As the president himself admitted in 1984, the 
French socialists were not in control of the crisis which hit their country. This can 
explain his sincere campaign for the rejuvenation of the European 
Communities.390 Problems that could not be dealt with at the level of a major 
nation-state such as France, could possibly be solved by some degree of pooling of 
sovereignty. 
The political system is that of the competitive system of states and consists, in 
turn, of the global and regional institutions the most important of which is the 
U N . 3 9 1 As Held has noted, this process of globalisation emphasizes a number of 
disparities between the power of the nation state in principle and in practice. First, 
a disparity between the national political authority and the production, distribution 
and exchange systems that restrict it through the internationalization of production 
and financial transactions. Second, connected to these changes in the world 
economy, there is a disparity between the idea of the autonomous state and the 
emergence of the global state system dominated by powers and power blocs (such 
as the US and NATO respectively), frequently undermining national authority and 
integrity. Third, a disparity, and the resulting friction, between the idea of national 
3 9 0 Wright, V. "Socialism and the Interdependent Economy: Industrial Policy under the Mitterrand 
Presidency" , Government and Opposition , Vol.19, no.3 (Summer 1984), p.303 
3 9 1 Shaw, M. "The theoretical challenge of global society", in Shaw, M. Global Society and International 
Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives , (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp.11-21 
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sovereignty and the international decision making process. And fourth, the 
disparity between the idea of citizenship and the development of international law. 
The nature of global interconnections and the questions confronting the modern 
state contradict the idea of the national community of fate, the cornerstone of 
national sovereignty. The last two disjunctures can be illustrated by the practice of 
the European Union. 3 9 2 
In their treatment of sovereignty Camilleri and Falk, in addition to the 
internationalization of trade, finance and corporate organization, list the 
globalisation of the security system, the rapid transformation of technology, the 
resulting spread of environmental problems, and the mushrooming of local and 
transnational social movements as the trends transforming our understanding of 
the world. 3 9 3 As they put it 
we are living at a time when the hard certainties of an older political space 
are giving way to new but still only partially discernible constraints and 
possibilities. Shifting allegiances, concepts, identities and forms of authority 
are characteristic of our age. The complex forms of social, economic and 
political organization, the multiple tiers of jurisdiction, and the 
uncertainties over what is to follow reinforce the conclusion that we live in 
a time of transition.394 
The external dimension of the theory of sovereignty, treating the state as a 
foundation exercising absolute power and authority in society within its 
boundaries, is expressed by the state-centric world view. International relations, 
seen through this spectacle, were characterized by sovereignty, legal equality, and 
territorial integrity. Consequently, a sovereign state, free from outside 
3 9 2 Held, D. "The decline of the nation state" in Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (ed.) New Times: The Changing Face 
of Politics in the 1990s , (london, Lawrence & Wishart, 1989), pp. 192-201 
3 9 3 Camilleri, J.A. & Falk, J. The End of Sovereignty? the Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, 
(Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1992), p.3 
3 9 4 Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty , p. 9 
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interference, enjoyed absolute control within its territory, could not intervene in 
other states' internal affairs or compromise their integrity, while all states 
regardless of wealth, size, and strategic importance, enjoyed equal rights and 
duties.395 A state to be sovereign must have capacity, i.e. a plentitude of resources 
at its disposal to achieve its aims, and internal, external, and subjective autonomy. 
Internal autonomy means freedom of action unconstrained by other actors 
operating within its own domain. External autonomy means freedom of action 
unconstrained by external actors, such as other states or outside institutions 
Finally, subjective autonomy refers to a state's ability to formulate and seek to 
implement a variety of objectives. Any restriction in these domains means a 
limitation of sovereignty.396 The essence of sovereignty has been seen in the 
absolute primacy of the state power, its formal independence from any superior 
authority. This was the idea in de Maistre's treatment of the subject. As he put it 
in his Study on Sovereignty, sovereignty 
is always one, unviolable and absolute. Take, for example, the English 
government: the kind of political trinity which makes it up does not stop 
sovereignty from being one, there as elsewhere. The powers balance each 
other, but, once they are in agreement, there is then only one will which 
cannot be thwarted by any other legal will, and Blackstone was right to 
claim that the English king and Parliament together can do anything.398 
The traditional understanding of sovereignty has recently been challenged by 
developments in three key areas. Major structural changes in the global market, 
such as production dispersion and deterritorialization, market globalization and 
the resulting calls for the dismantling of national trade barriers, have challenged 
3 9 5 Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, p.29 
3 9 6 Camilleri and Falk. End of Sovereignty. p. 105 
3 9 7 Wallace, W. "Rescue or Retreat? the nation state in Western Europe, 1945-93" , in Dunn, Contemporary 
Crisis p.53. 
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the concept of national community.3 9 9 Moreover, whereas in the past the media 
helped in the cementing of national communities, now they promote a new image 
of international culture dominated by the values of this emerging global market. 
The rapid structural change in communications technology indicates that the 
international flow of messages, images and money, by means of an integrated 
global communications system, dominated by transnational corporations like 
News International, Time-Warner, and Bertelsmann, rather than national entities, 
confront state authority and call for a new form of regulation by an international 
body. Finally, the development of transnational environmental problems, such as 
the hole in the ozone layer, and the pollution of the Mediterranean to mention but 
a few, reveal the limits of national communities and imply a conception of global 
civil society.400 This view is essentially a similar one to that of the 
Interdependence theory which perceives international politics as a complex 
network of governments and non-state actors.401 
But whereas these developments have undermined the state's core functions, little 
has changed for the nation state as a focus for popular identity and a basis for 
legitimacy. And although a certain diffusion of loyalties and a certain broadening 
of horizons from the national to the European and the global are manifest mainly 
among elites, and to a lesser extent among the masses, it has led to fragmentation 
rather than integration, as challenges to the legitimacy of national institutions and 
elites have come mainly from the inside. The previous bases of state internal 
legitimacy, the ideological identification with the nation, and the rational ability to 
3 9 8 de Maistre, J. The works of Joseph de Maistre, selected, translated and introduced by J.Lively, (London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965), p.l 12 
3 9 9 For a discussion of the marxist treatement of this issue, see Murray, R. "The Internationalization of Capital 
and the Nation State", New Left Review, no.67 (May/June 1971), pp.84-109 
4 0 0 Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, pp.56-8 
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deliver security, prosperity and welfare to their subjects have come to be 
questioned. I f in the 1960s the West European states were able to deliver to their 
populations the goods and the state acquired legitimacy by becoming the welfare 
state, the end of the Keynesian era brought these provisions to a halt. The 
combination of slow growth, high unemployment, and huge social budget deficits 
of the early 1980s represented not only a crisis of the European welfare state, but a 
possible crisis for the idea of the nation state. For Offe, this crisis of the welfare 
state can be attributed to the fact that, instead of being a sovereign and 
autonomous source of well-being providing incomes and services as a citizen 
right, it is itself highly dependent upon the good fortune and profitability of the 
economy. Even for the Left the welfare state is seen as ineffective and inefficient. 
As its huge redistributive machinery works horizontally within the wage earning 
class, it is susceptible to the fiscal crisis of the state. It is also seen as repressive 
since it is highly bureaucratized and the individual in order to obtain its services 
has to comply with its routines and requirements. Finally, the welfare state is 
perceived as conditioning a counterfeit ideological perception of social and 
political within the working class by dividing the economic sphere from that of 
citizenship.402 Moreover, intermarriage, migration, cross-border movement have 
diffused identities and upset established presumptions about national political 
communities. As Wallace has noted, the nation as a political and social 
community is uncoupling from the state as provider of security and welfare. 4 0 3 
Advances in telecommunications and data processing have been instrumental in 
the globalization of financial markets, which in turn have provided the funds 
4 0 1 See R.O.Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition , 2nd 
edition , (Boston, Glenview, 1989) 
4 0 2 Offe, C. "Some contradictions of the modern welfare state", in Offe, C. Contradictions of the Welfare 
State , ed. by J.Keane, (London, Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 150-7 
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necessary for the development of these new technologies. The nation state's 
declining power to regulate the economy as a result of the fusion of trade and 
finance is clearly indicated by the breaking down of the Bretton Woods system.404 
National sovereignty is also contradicted by the existence of a hegemonic power 
in the world system, a role performed throughout the centuries by Spain, Britain 
and more recently the US, respectively. The hegemonic state enjoys privileges, 
responsibilities and functions not shared by other states and thus its authority 
extends beyond its own national jurisdiction. But recently we have witnessed the 
decline of American hegemony, as between 1983 and 1988 the US turned from the 
world's largest creditor to the largest debtor nation. 4 0 5 The end of the cold war 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and instances like the Gulf War can not 
hide the fact that the world's only remaining superpower has lost its hegemonic 
position in the world capitalist system. This process has been accompanied by the 
proliferation of strong protectionist pressures on governments and the erosion of 
GATT required discipline with a trade war between Japan and the USA looming. 
As recently as May 10, 1995 the US was threatening to impose the most visible 
trade sanctions ever against Japan.406 But this decline has not restored national 
sovereignty, but instead has resulted in a more subtle and less statist, centralized 
and predictable hegemonic matrix dependent on, but not constrained by, state 
apparatuses. The international capitalist order has survived thanks to a 
combination of factors. A network of military alliances offering American nuclear 
protection to Japan and Europe has to a great extent compensated for the decline 
of American economic power. At the same time other powerful capitalist state 
4 0 3 Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat" ,pp.55-75 
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structures have emerged promoting a unitary economic and foreign policy. In the 
meantime international institutions, such as the IMF, GATT, etc., have assumed 
many functions previously performed by the US. Here though, it should be 
remembered that the latter clearly plays a dominant role in these institutions. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the US had to relinquish its direct dominant role in the 
system is an indication that it has lost at least some of its capacity to dominate the 
international arena. Moreover, in times of heightened tension in the global market-
place, this process has been accelerated by the diminishing capacity of the nation-
state in general to regulate economic activity within its own boundaries.407 
International bureaucratization is itself evidence of the diminishing capacity 
of national bureaucracies to provide an adequate institutional framework 
for the complex task of economic regulation408 
A major feature is the proliferation of International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs), such as the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity. These 
owe their existence to, and are dependent on, states for their survival, but acquire a 
life and agenda independent of, and sometimes conflicting with, the member 
states' priorities. Alongside the IGOs, a number of Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), such as the World Council of Churches or the 
International Islamic Relief Organization, help to further erode national 
sovereignty. They redefine the political terrain by occupying 
political space and areas of decision-making which contrast sharply with 
the territorial delineation of sovereign jurisdictions. In the process they 
establish a framework of interaction which diminishes the importance of 
physical and legal boundaries.409 
The Independent, 10 May 1995, "America poised to strike Japan", 33 
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World market integration and the interpenetration of national economies blurs the 
dividing line between national and global markets on one hand, and the one 
between foreign and domestic policies, on the other thus undermining the very 
foundation of national sovereignty.410 And as Landesman noticed, while producers 
of various kinds coexist in world markets, a medium-size economy like even the 
major European states can only have marginal influence in the way world markets 
evaluate products, with all the implications this has for the prosperity of the 
producers who supply them. As a result any economic strategy for a medium size 
economy like the UK, even a strategy advocated by socialists, must take into 
account the regulatory mechanisms of world markets, which exert great influence 
on the economy's specialization model and output growth. In this way they control 
directly or indirectly its ability to generate real-income growth, jobs, and social 
provision. It follows then, that any policy framework must pay attention to the 
question of how the desired institutional, social and economic policy targets wi l l 
face the strain of global competition.411 The possibility of national policies has 
been reduced, and even nationalized industries, the last bastions of truly national 
capital, are involved in international projects. An example is British Aerospace 
which, even under state ownership, was deeply involved in collaboration with 
American and European companies, and heavily dependent on its arms sales. It 
can be said then, that in certain respects the company was denationalized before its 
privatization and given the market pressures it is not clear how much difference 
simple ownership can make. In several cases the advantages for the national 
economy, i f one can speak of one nowadays, would be greater i f the state 
4 1 0 Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, p.98 
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intervention took place on a European level. 4 1 2 Global economic liberalization 
threatens state ability to protect the welfare of its subjects and thus challenges the 
hitherto dominant Keynesian conception of the welfare state.413 
Whatever the kind of socialism, capitalism, or mixed economy, Islamic 
political economy, or other system that people may "choose", they cannot 
escape worldwide competition; it is a fact of life.414 
In the pursuit of national prosperity the apparent failure of national industrial 
strategies has been recognized by the European governments as Community 
programs such as ESPRIT, EUREKA, etc. have increasingly come to be seen as 
the motor of development4 1 5 Here it should be brought into mind the fact that 
Spinelli, whom I discussed in the previous chapter, was the father of the common 
research policy. The problem though with these programs is that they do not seem 
to have managed, despite the huge amounts invested, to rejuvenate the European 
high tech industry. Most often Europe follows the US and Japan. 
Discussing technological developments and their implications for national 
sovereignty Camilleri and Falk observed that, despite the fact that at first sight it 
might seem that advances in military technology reinforce national sovereignty, 
weapons by becoming part of a broader transnational weapons system can not be 
used in isolation. Therefore, powerful military arsenals do not guarantee freedom 
4 1 1 Landesmann, M. "UK Policy and the International economy: an internationalist perspective", in Nolan, P. 
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of action but instead are another indication of defense interdependence.416 Military 
alliances, such as NATO, are another manifestation of the erosion of sovereignty 
in the sensitive domain of national defense. A number of developments have 
called the traditional concept of security to question, and have proven the national 
state inadequate. The increasing range, speed, and sophistication of missiles have 
made all parts of national territory impossible to defend. The speed of military 
deployment has placed entire nations at the mercy of powerful neighbours, as 
Hungary, Poland, and Grenada discovered at their own peril. At the same time 
though, the changing nature of warfare, undertaken by non-conventional means for 
political rather than territorial purposes, such as guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan, or terrorism in Northern Ireland, means that even the most powerful 
states can be defeated.417 These are hard times even for superpowers. And in the 
area of arms production and procurement, individual nation states increasingly 
find themselves cooperating with each other. The European Fighter Aircraft is a 
good example of interdependence in military aircraft development and production 
at the European level. Furthermore, as Luard has noted, security maximization by 
unilateral means is based on the logical delusion of maximizing the opposite 
party's insecurity thus escalating the arms race and ensuring that both remain 
permanently insecure.418 What is needed therefore, is a new concept of 
international security. 
With special reference to Europe and the European Union, public order 
sovereignty was formally undermined with the 1985 Schengen Agreement 
providing for the abolition of internal border controls and subsequent measures for 
4 , 6 Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, pp. 107-8 
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police, immigration, customs, and intelligence cooperation, as well as common 
entry and residence procedures. More recently Titles V and V I of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the third pillar, set out to formalize, although in an intergovernmental 
framework, the extensive existing patterns of Cooperation in the fields of Justice 
and Home Affairs. The strengthening of the WEU, the Anglo-Dutch Marine Force, 
and the Franco-German brigade, all represent visible indicators of further erosion 
of national sovereignty in these vital fields. The acceptance of European 
Community law as superior to domestic law in all areas of Community 
competence under the Treaties, offers the sharpest onslaught on national 
sovereignty.419 
Advances in the technology of communications, Internet etc., reducing all 
transmitted information to a common digital form undermine state capacity to 
regulate information flows across national boundaries. Satellite television 
channels, such as the CNN, reinforce the global village image by bringing to 
screens across the globe, that can afford it, news and images that previously could 
have been at the state's prerogative to transmit. These changes call into question 
the whole notion of national culture.4 2 0 According to Tabb, an example of the 
integrating effect of innovations in transportation and communication can be 
found in the nineteenth century, when regions of the United States became 
integrated into an immense national economy with the construction of the 
transcontinental railways.4 2 1 
These developments and advances have been taken advantage of by the 
multinational companies which in turn further undermine national sovereignty. 
4 1 9 Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat" , pp.70-3 
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These companies, both as representatives and beneficiaries of the integrated global 
system, restrict the national state's room for maneuver, reproduce uneven 
development within the society, and champion a development model in contrast to 
the values, lifestyles and institutions of the host country, especially i f the latter is a 
third world one. 4 2 2 As the Moroccan writer Tahar Ben Jelloun put it, 
While waiting for further episodes of Dallas, Moroccan television is 
showing another series, The Conquest of the West. In French.423 
Even major industrialized states feel vulnerable in such an environment. At a time 
when most of the world's ten largest banks were Japanese and much of the 
American immense foreign debt was held by Japan (The situation has been 
reversed now following the crisis in the Far-East and Japan is coming to be the 
world's greatest debtor), the country's economic power was not paralleled by a 
corresponding international cultural power. Its contemporary verbal culture has 
been austere, even impoverished, dominated by comic books and talk shows, in 
short has been characterized by total dependence on the West in cultural 
discourse.424 And at the 1982 World Conference on Cultural policies in Mexico 
City (Mondiacult'82), the representatives of what used to be the Communist 
world, and of the Third World countries received well Lang's speech when he 
called for a cultural crusade against the "intellectual imperialism" of the 
multinationals. Needless to say that the United States registered their "total 
exasperation", although the US had not been named once in the speech of the 
4 2 1 Tabb, W.K. "Where we are in History: Introductory themes to world-transforming events" , in Tabb, 
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French Minister of Culture. 4 2 5 Benjamin Barber has spoken of a global move to 
what he calls McWorld, i.e. the world of Macintosh computers and McDonald 
hamburgers, although now one can say that Macintosh computers should be 
replaced by the software of Microsoft of Bil l Gates. This can be illustrated by the 
fact that during the Apartheid era, the most popular TV series among South 
African whites was the Bill Cosby Show, depicting the life of an American black 
family. 4 2 6 And more recently the f i lm quotas have threatened a trade war between 
the United States and Europe. The very fact that Japan lost its leading position and 
the Soviet block collapsed in the meantime, can be seen as strengthening the 
argument rather than undermining it. Even such powerful states such as Japan in 
economic, or the Soviet Union in military terms found themselves unable to 
maintain their position and, in the case of the USSR even their territorial integrity. 
The increasing interconnection of different regions both, between themselves and 
the global strategic order, the globalization of conflict, the cold war and the wars 
between the then two superpowers by proxies, in the Middle East for instance, and 
the subsequent detente, all demonstrate the internationalization of conflict. The 
inadequacies of the nation-state can, at the same time be caused and explained t>y, 
a number of developments at a time when, for the very same reasons, the 
contemporary human predicament has assumed global proportions. These 
developments include amongst others: the nuclear weapons' capacity for massive 
destruction; the interconnection between the various threads of global disorder, 
like terrorism and organized crime, cutting across policy and institutional 
boundaries; and the fast pace of change and communications. A l l these have 
highlighted state limitations in dealing with this complex new reality. As 
4 2 5 Mattelart, Delcourrt and Mattelart, International Image Makers, pp.426-7 
216 
Camilleri and Falk have observed, a new macropolitical agenda has been formed 
questioning the notion of sovereignty and the significance of territorial 
borderlines.427 The exercise of explicit sovereignty has been hindered by the 
destructiveness, the boundary penetrating capacity, the high costs, and the 
corrosive effect on democratic practices and institutions of advanced military 
technologies. 
On the ecological front, the Chernobyl disaster highlighted another limitation to 
national sovereignty. Environmental pollution knows no national boundaries and 
any solution to environmental problems must be tackled at an international level 
as the risks posed are beyond the control of any state. In Brazil the destruction of 
the Amazonian rainforests could have disastrous consequences for climatic 
conditions all over the world. More recently, in early October 1995, the prospects 
of the reopening of the Cozlondui nuclear reactor in Bulgaria, the same type of the 
one at Chernobyl, caused alarm in Greece as a potential catastrophe saw no 
national boundaries. The doctrine of sovereignty is an obstacle to the solution of 
the problem, while at the same time it is a cause of this very problem. 4 2 9 A number 
of arguments are available. The international system of nation-states can no longer 
provide a viable political framework for the collective management of the global 
environment. More and more nation-states find it difficult to deliver localized 
order and a satisfactory level of environmental management in their domain. As a 
result, the nation state loses its primacy as the focus of human loyalty 4 3 0 The 
partitioning of the biosphere, derived from the spatial distribution of political 
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power, contributes to environmental decay in various ways. The notion of 
sovereignty geographically separates the state from the global consequences of its 
conduct.431 Differences in national legislation may allow a polluter to transfer to a 
state with more lenient laws, and thus to continue polluting. Sovereignty conceals 
vital political and economic relations, such as economic and structural dependence 
that might limit the number of possible options available to a state, which 
contribute to environmental degradation. Finally, the concept of sovereignty 
disguises the degree to which the development of new processes and structures to 
deal with environmental problems is feasible.4 3 2 International action is the only 
feasible and effective course of action needed to protect the environment in 
several cases. The depletion of natural resources, safeguarding of energy supplies, 
sea and air pollution, the preservation of plant and animal species are a few of 
them. Again, the notion of sovereignty can sometimes be a brake on effective 
action as some countries would resist calls for higher standards, such as China and 
CFC emission into the atmosphere. This brings us to the need for broad 
international concerted action and the resulting globalization of politics as the 
conflict becomes one between short and long-term interests, and between social 
and individual purposes. The globe becomes the terrain for successful 
environmental political activity as national level decisions seem fruitless 4 3 3 
Managing global environmental issues involves a dramatic change in the 
character and goals of international society: away from the minimalist 
goals of coexistence towards the creation of rules and institutions that 
embody notions of shared responsibilities, that impinge heavily on the 
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domestic organization of states, that invest individuals and groups within 
states with rights and duties, and that seek to embody some notion of the 
planetary good.434 
Whereas in the economic field a deficiency in state domestic power can be 
detected, in the ecological domain the problem is one of disclination or incapacity 
for effective collective action?*5 
As Luard has observed, although the nominal power of governments within their 
own territory has never been greater than today, in real terms their capacity to 
control events and to promote the welfare of their subjects is frustrated by events 
and developments outside their domain. As a result, in order to achieve their aims, 
citizens and political organizations have to promote their causes at an international 
level. So, as the power of national governments gradually declines and the 
important decisions are taken at an international level, people come to realize the 
way the outside world affects their lives. This he calls the globalization of 
politics.™ 
International political movements have started to play an important role, Islamic 
fundamentalism being a prominent and topical one. Several Islamic movements, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad operate in more than one 
country at the same time. The controversy that followed the publication of 
Rushdie's Satanic Verses and Khomeini's fatwa with the corresponding problems 
in Bradford is a good example. Here of course we should remember that Islam is a 
Hurrell in Dunn (1995), 149 
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universalist religion since the imperative of the Islamic creed is the advancement 
of the umma, i.e. the Islamic community regardless of state boundaries.437 
European transnational party groupings have not managed yet to become an 
example of international political movement. So far, they have only remained 
loose alliances. Nationalist feelings and the different national leaderships' 
priorities have hindered such a development which has remained at an embryonic 
stage but with some potential. At this point it should not be forgotten that, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, Spinelli devoted his career in emphasizing this 
transnational European political dimension, from the time of the second world war 
to the Crocodile initiative and the draft European Union Treaty that followed it. 
The proliferation of transnational pressure groups such as Greenpeace, END, etc., 
associations of manufacturers and producers and the international process of 
institution building, are all manifestations of the same process. 
The politics of welfare is another area where the globalizing process can be 
observed. Here an upward movement of welfare provision is at work, from local 
to national and later international level, the last part being accelerated by the fact 
that inequalities within nations are surpassed by inequalities between them. So, 
whereas the OECD countries can afford eight (8) hospital beds per thousand 
(1000) people, the Sub-Saharan African countries can afford only 1.5. 
Connected to this is the rate of infant mortality. Here the OECD average, 
excluding Turkey, is 0.9%, and that of the Sub-Saharan African countries is 
4 3 7 Piscatori, J. "Islam and World Politics" , in Baylis, J. & Rengger, N. (ed.) Dilemmas of World Politics: 
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10.9%.4 3 9 The ease of communication in the modern world presses for more 
concerted action at the international level as epidemics and diseases are difficult 
to contain, and the funds necessary to combat them can not be provided by a 
single government. In this area the World Health Organization (WHO) is 
instrumental. AIDS is a disease that has to be tackled at an international level, 
while the recent Ebola epidemic in Zaire demonstrated the inability of the nation-
state to deal with and contain the spread of the virus. Furthermore, last year's 
tragedy in Rwanda indicated the need for international relief provision i f major 
tragedies are to be prevented. 
Over the last century it has come to be accepted that national political systems 
cannot always be trusted with the safeguarding of human rights and foreign 
governments and people have the right, and the obligation, to raise the issue of 
human rights in the case of a regime failing to respect them. This has been seen as 
interfering in another state's internal affairs and challenging its sovereignty. The 
international condemnation and boycotting of the South African apartheid regime 
is a notable example. Again coordinated action is needed as an individual state on 
its own wil l have limited power. In the human rights realm international society 
has become an interrelated unit. 4 4 0 A very recent example can be found in the 
European Union's calls for a just trial by Turkey, of the Kurdish leader Abdullah 
Ocalan. 
Economic inequality can be observed at its extreme manifestations today not 
between citizens of the same state but between the citizens of the first and third 
worlds as groups. For example, in 1988 the average GDP per head of the OECD 
countries was $17097, whereas for the Sub-Saharan African states was only 
4 3 9 The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics, p.214 
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$484. 4 4 1 Moreover, since third world populations are growing on average faster 
than those of the first world, a significantly higher rate of economic growth is 
needed i f they are ever to achieve first world living standards.442 It has been 
estimated that whereas the average annual population growth for the OECD 
countries between 1983 and 1988 was 0.7%, the corresponding number of the 
Sub-Saharan African countries was exactly double, i.e. 1.4%.443 A solution to this 
problem can only be found by means of international action, especially since the 
difficulties faced by the third world are international, rather than national, in 
origin. According to Luard, poor countries are doubly dependent on the rich ones. 
They heed outlets for their own exports, while they are dependent on imports from 
the developed world. The picture becomes even bleaker i f one takes into account 
the fact that future technological development depends on existing technological 
advances, thus making the chances of the poorer nations catching up with the 
richer ones slimmer. 4 4 4 
Politics has been globalized in part because inexorable technological 
change has had the effect that national endeavors are no longer adequate to 
achieve the goals which are everywhere demanded: the creation of a more 
peaceful, secure, environmentally acceptable life for the citizens of any 
state, free from the fear of military annihilation, environmental catastrophe 
or gross violations of their human rights. Because those tasks, even within 
states, today often require international rather than national action, 
political activity too must be international rather than national.445 
Here, it should be noted that the issues of equality and welfare have become 
global ones because it seems to be an ethic of international equality, which 
although not strong enough yet in order to demand a complete international 
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redistribution, it is powerful enough to stimulate the demand for some kind of 
action by the rich countries. Moreover, there is always the danger of consequent 
disorder spilling over national boundaries. The European Union has been forced to 
take some action by the fear of big numbers of economic refugees crossing the 
union's borders from the old eastern block and the countries of the Maghreb. 
As Enzensberger put it, sovereignty, the state's pride and joy, has lost its meaning. 
Bound by a thousand threads like Gulliver, the state's room for maneuver grows 
ever smaller. And despite all the efforts of the three Internationals, it was the 
anonymous market, symbolized by a few iconic brand names and dominated by 
the multinational companies, the big banks and the parastatal financial 
organizations that managed to establish the idea of a world society. In an ironic 
way, McDonald's has realized the principles of socialism in their purest form by 
offering the same service to people everywhere.446 
Some socialists, influenced by the effects of globalization and disillusioned with 
state socialism east and west, have gone so far as to reject the state as an 
instrument altogether. A prominent exponent of this view is Luard who called for 
the bypassing of the state, for a World Socialism, for Socialism in the 
Stratosphere as he put it. He saw the seeds of an international government in the 
network of international institutions established over the last thirty years or so, and 
advocated the strengthening of their powers.447 1 have already discussed the limits 
of the international bodies. The inertia of the United Nations and the European 
Union in finding a solution to the Yugoslav crisis with the parallel effectiveness of 
the American government is only another example that should make us a bit more 
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cautious. We must bear in mind that today's globalisation is prepared by states and 
is mostly not about bypassing states, but rather about reorganizing them and is 
taking place under their aegis. An example of this can be seen in the process of 
integration in western Europe. In order to face the increasingly difficult 
international situation, with sovereignty challenged on a number of fronts, states 
come together in an attempt not to destroy the concept of the state itself, but in 
order to reorganise it. This is going to be achieved by the establishment of new 
bodies that can be perceived as states in an embryonic form. They are not states 
yet, but they are moving towards this direction. It could be said that states emulate 
companies. Companies merge in order to form bigger entities, and in a parallel 
way, states attempt to bring together some of their functions with the prospect of 
forming a new state in the distant future. And as the centre of gravity shifted from 
national economies to the world economy as a whole the states were reorganized 
as having a responsibility to both. Under this light one can see the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which came into effect on January 1, 1994, and 
the importance of which, in President Clinton's words, lies in the guarantees it 
offered for US investment in Mexico. 4 4 8 Moreover, 
Not only is the world still very much composed of states, but insofar as there 
is any effective democracy at all in relation to the power of capitalists and 
bureaucrats, it is still embedded in political structures which are national or 
subnational in scope.449 
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Finally, the state is still a socially predominant idea which has won the popular 
imagination and provides a setting in which its behavior is important.4 5 0 We live 
in times of transformation. The state is changing and to a degree it is losing some 
of its powers. So, new mechanisms are needed and given the important role states 
can play as the focus of popular loyalty, probably what is needed is a new form of 
state, a new form of nation building that takes into account all the above 
mentioned developments. I f old states are becoming obsolete we might need new 
forms, new types of states. I f the modern nation-state was the byproduct of the 
French revolutionary changes, a new kind of state will be the byproduct of the 
current momentous changes. The European Union lacks the powers to be this new 
kind of state now. But i f empowered it could play such a role. 
One can see some of these tensions expressed in conflicting theories of European 
integration. Milward and Moravcsik4 5 1 for example see the process as an attempt 
by member states to strengthen themselves while recognizing the advantages of 
some collective action. The assumption is that the states can continue to set limits 
on the process of integration. Other theorists such as neofunctionalists (who owe 
something to federalist influences) see the process as having a dynamic which 
increasingly moves beyond the state-centric model 4 5 2 
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2. THE AGENT OF TRANSFORMATION: 
SEARCHING FOR A NEW SOCIAL BASE 
The second major development of the recent past is the decline of the traditional 
class identities and the emergence of new ones alongside the proliferation of new 
social movements separate from traditional class allegiances. As several of the 
new identities are ethnic in origin, this development cannot be distinguished 
clearly from the previous one. Furthermore, the domination of the omnipotent 
state has severely limited all possibilities for dissent and diversity. 4 5 3 The all 
mighty organization, as expressed by the state resulted in the decline of 
community and the death of individualism. The emergence of the new social 
movements introduces another discrepancy into traditional socialist thinking. 
Since a substantial number of these movements are environmental in origin the 
failure of the nation state can be seen as a major cause for their propagation. And 
this development has resulted in a number of proposals for new forms of political 
radicalism. At the same time, the potentials opened by the European Union must 
be underlined as it can provide the platform upon which transnational movements 
can be founded. 
Luard, Socialism , p.26 
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2. A. The Decline of Class and the New Movements 
Another of the notions that have dominated recent discussions about the future of 
socialism is the death of class. For Touraine, the concept of social class must be 
replaced by that of the social movement, and the analysis of situations must be 
replaced by that of action. A social movement confronts a power relation which is 
engraved in institutions and organizations, and explores cultural goals by working 
on power relations and relations of inequality.4 5 4 Besides, the role of the working 
class is in doubt because its reforming potential is in doubt. The British experience 
is very useful here, once more. The Labour coalition of 1945 was dominated by an 
exclusive ethos, viewed the class dimension as of paramount importance, and was 
incapable of transcending labour interests without betraying its origins. Working 
class interests were assigned a prime legitimacy denied to other interests. For 
Marquand, 
What working-class Labour voters wanted was a conservative society in 
socialist clothing. The reason they were prepared to wear socialist clothing 
was that they saw socialism as the means through which an essentially 
conservative society might come into being. To put it more simply, they 
wanted everything to be different, in order that it could stay the same.455 
From the 1920s onwards the Labour party has faced the very same problem, that 
of surpassing labourism without betraying the workers' interest, of closing the gap 
4 5 4 Touraine, A. Critique of Modernity , trans, by D.Macey , (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995), p.243 
4 5 5 Marquand, D. The Progressive Dilemma: from Llovd George to Kinnock , (London, Heinemann, 1991), 
p.71 
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between the old Labour and the non-Labour forces, and of building and sustaining 
a broad social coalition in order to form a viable reforming government rather than 
just a temporary parliamentary majority. 4 5 6 
In the 1980s what Ellen Meiksins Wood has disapprovingly called the new true 
socialism, the rejection of Marxist economism and class reductionism has 
virtually excised class and class struggle from the socialist project. By rejecting 
the correspondence between politics and economics and the workers' privileged 
position, this school of thought attempts to build a socialist movement 
independent from traditional class relations. This project, following Gramsci's 
ideas, ascribes to intellectuals a prominent role. Whereas the working class is 
dismissed as driven by material interests, the intellectuals constitute a more 
appropriate constituency because of their autonomy from material conditions. 
Wood summarized the fundamental propositions of the thinkers falling under this 
heading as follows. The working class, despite the Marxist prediction, has not 
produced a revolutionary movement. Consequently, any relation between class 
and politics is circumstantial and there is no privileged relation between the 
proletariat and socialism. As socialist politics should be independent from 
economic conditions, a political force can be constituted and organized on the 
ideological and political planes irrespective of the class connections or oppositions 
among them, with universal objectives transcending class interests. The struggle 
for socialism then, can be conceived as a plurality of democratic struggles and it 
may be possible to replace the concept of socialism with that of radical 
democracy. Finally, the natural constituency of the socialist movement is 
constituted by a loose collectivity with no common concrete identity, but a variety 
Marquand, Progressive Dilemma, p.207 
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of particular ones.457 The essential mistake lay in reading from class a 
revolutionary consciousness. The connection between the class location of the 
wage earning population and its political orientation can assume not only 
progressive but reactionary forms as w e l l 4 5 8 
For Bahro, the problem begins when we realize that the revolutionary subject is 
not 'functioning' as expected, and 
we can look round in vain for a revolutionary working class, which is more 
or less like looking for radio sources with an optical telescope.439 
The old concept of the dynamic of internal class contradiction in the advanced 
world had been rendered inadequate by three external contradictions: between 
East and West; between North and South; and between humanity and nature.4 6 0 
The last two remain today as vivid as ever. And although the first one has largely 
disappeared, other divisive manifestations, such as religion, are becoming clear 
now. 
Laclau and Mouffe have noticed that, whereas in the periphery exploitation has 
provided the popular struggle with a single center, in the advanced capitalist world 
a variety of antagonisms, many of them in opposition to each other, have 
permitted the multiplication of democratic struggles. This development, coupled 
with the rejection of privileged points of rupture and the confluence of struggles 
into a unified political space form the basis of a new radical and ambitious 
political agenda. Under these circumstances socialist demands should be seen as 
4 5 7 Wood, E.M. The Retreat from Class: a New "True" Socialism , (London, Verso, 1986), pp. 1 -7 
4 5 8 Miliband, R. Socialism for a Sceptical Aee, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp. 128-131 
4 5 9 Bahro, R. "Goodbye to Capitalism - Goodbye to our Concept of the Proletariat" , in Bahro, R. Socialism 
and Survival, intro. by E.P.Thompson, (London, Heretic Books, 1982), p.63 
4 6 0 Bahro, "Goodbye", p.65 
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part of the broader democratic revolution. Meanwhile, following the 
commodification and bureaucratization of social relations, the reformulation of the 
liberal-democratic ideology, and the expansion of the means of mass 
communication, new forms of political identities have arisen. These "new social 
movements" have embraced ecological, feminist, ethnic, and other struggles. It is 
important here to notice though, that these struggles do not necessarily have a 
progressive or left-wing character. Under the circumstances the left, instead of 
denouncing it, should deepen and expand the liberal-democratic ideology in a 
radical-pluralistic direction. So far this process has been prevented by classism, 
statism, and economism. For Laclau and Mouffe, socialization of the productive 
assets can not be reduced to workers' self-management. Such a reduction would 
ignore the demands of other groups such as women, consumers, etc. Therefore, an 
equivalence should be established between the various struggles. And finally, they 
called for the broadening of the domain of the exercise of democratic rights 
beyond the limited one of citizenship.4 6 2 Once more, it should be emphasised here 
that, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Spinelli inspired draft European Union 
Treaty's basic ideological premises focus on pluralist democratic issues, and its 
stated objectives include harmonious development, ful l employment, and 
protection of the environment. Which means that under certain conditions the 
European Union can provide the terrain upon which new progressive alliances and 
new movements can be build and function. 
The need for a new politics of the left emanates from the discrediting of both, 
centralized planning as practiced in the east, and bureaucratic forms of welfare 
4 6 1 For an interesting, but sometimes self-contradictory exposition see Gorz, A. Farewell to the Working 
Class: an Essay on Post-industrial Socialism , trans, by M.Sonenscher, (London, Pluto Press, 1982) 
4 6 2 Laclau, E . & Mouffe, Ch. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a Radical Democratic Politics , 
(London, Verso, 1985) 
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state in the west. The root cause can be found in the belief of both communists 
and social democrats. In the centralized state as the agency capable of 
guaranteeing economic growth and bringing about a more just, free, and 
egalitarian society. The formulation of this new left politics must begin with the 
deconstruction of the exclusive alternative between market and social 
regulation as its point of departure.463 
The failure of the Marxist hypothesis to materialize has a series of critical 
implications for today's left. The new radicalism wil l not be brought about by the 
emergence of a subject capable of personifying the universal, but by the expansion 
and proliferation of fragmentary, partial and specific subjects who enter the 
collective decision making process. The numerous identities emanating from the 
fragmentation of the labour process, the effects of environmental degradation on 
the whole of population, and racial and social differences, all have an interest and 
must participate in the global management of society. And the level of state 
intervention cannot measure the degree to which a radical democracy is reached, 
and socialism is not a simple blueprint for society anymore (the issue of state 
intervention is further later in this chapter). A radical democratic alternative wi l l 
be the result of a combination of political, economic, aesthetical, and 
philosophical interventions.464 
Along similar lines, Laclau saw Marxism's viable destiny as a partial and limited 
moment within the wider historical line of the western radical tradition. Its main 
limitation is the objectivism in the understanding of social relations. Using 
Derrida's terminology, he sees class struggle in Marxist theory as playing the role 
Laclau, E. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time , (London, Verso, 1990), p.xiii 
Laclau, New Reflections , pp.xiv-xv 
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of a hymen: the theory both requires it and makes it impossible. Hegemony is 
what is positive and retrievable in it. This means the 
contingent articulation of elements around certain social configurations -
historical blocs - that cannot be predetermined by any philosophy of history 
and that is essentially linked to the concrete struggles of social agents.465 
These changes can be seen as forming part of what has came to be known as 
Disorganized Capitalism*66 and which is seen as the result of a number of related 
developments. The globalisation of economic, social and political relationships 
has undermined the coherence and integrity of individual societies. As small firms 
proliferate more people become self-employed, while at the same time automation 
leads to a decrease in the number of employees of manufacturing plants and to the 
parallel growth in the size of the secondary labour force. A l l these lead to a 
situation where mass production of standardized products in massive plants 
employing vast numbers of male workers will be a thing of the past. At the same 
time, companies are now operating on a global, rather than a national scale, taking 
advantage of different wage and strike rates. And while the employers are 
becoming more innovative and more mobile, the workers are becoming more 
conservative. Meanwhile, as income and power inequalities do not produce 
homogeneous social classes, and more social groups are inclined to organize, 
social class is no longer the major factor around which culture and politics are 
organized. Finally, as a result of the growth of electronic mass media, the break up 
of unmixed neighborhoods, and the emergence of an uncommitted middle class, a 
radical individualism has surfaced. This has resulted in a new culture ready to 
4 6 5 Laclau, New Reflections , p. 184 
4 6 6 see Offe, C. Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics , ed. by 
J.Keane , (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985), and Lash, S. & Urry, J. The End of Organized Capitalism , 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987) 
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confront authority and difficult to gather support for traditional type of collective 
goals.467 So, as the structures of contemporary capitalism are being transformed by 
the combination of globalisation from above, decentralization from below, and 
disintegration from within, age old certainties and optimism associated with 
organized capitalism are vanishing. The Left has started rethinking the use of the 
state to correct social and economic injustices and inequalities. It attempts to 
reexamine the potential of class struggle as sufficient in bringing about the 
socialist transformation. And finally, it has come to appreciate that there is the 
realm of civil society, which is neither purely public or private. 4 6 8 
For Rutherford, Derrida's post-structuralism was the catalyst that brought into 
light the absence of a Marxist treatment of the issues of identity and difference. It 
has been the negation of essentialism and class reductionism that facilitated the 
proliferation of the sites of possible political antagonism, and thus broke the 
limited theoretical parameters of traditional socialism.469 The Marxist tradition, 
when faced with the actual implications of political diversity, reveals its 
deficiency since the idea of the class struggle fails to address the variety of modern 
conflicts and antagonisms 4 7 0 
Identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some 
people and what differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you 
a sense of personal location, the stable core to your individuality. But it is 
also about your social relationships, your complex involvement with others, 
and in the modern world these have become even more complex and 
confusing. Each of us live with a variety of potentially contradictory 
identities, which battle within us for allegiance: as men or women, black or 
white, straight or gay, able-bodied or disabled, "British" or 
"European"...The list is potentially infinite, and so therefore are our 
4 6 7 Urry, End of Organized , pp.97-100 
4 6 8 Urrv. End of Organized . p. 101 
4 5 9 Rutherford, J. "A place called home: Identity and the cultural politics of difference", in Rutherford, J. (ed.) 
Identity: Community. Culture. Difference , (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), p.20 
4 7 0 Mercer, K. "Welcome to the jungle: Identity and diversity in postmodern politics", in Rutherford, Identity 
,p.48 
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possible belongings. Which of them we focus on, bring to the fore, "identify" 
with, depends on a host of factors. At the center, however, are the values we 
share or wish to share with others.471 
As Weeks pointed out, identities are not neutral. Our quest for identity is shaped 
by different, and sometimes conflicting, values and beliefs. 4 7 2 The result then is 
that under this light the political agenda is radically altered. We cannot talk of 
priorities and dominant struggles anymore. There are no marginal and mainstream 
conflicts. 4 7 3 
And as the old central conflict conducted at the level of workplace struggles 
spreads to other areas of social life, new types of antagonism have come to 
supplement the old labour-capital contradiction, thus rendering the traditional 
class analysis obsolete. Workers no longer fundamentally challenge the capitalist 
relations of production at the workplace, but do so in their capacity as tenants, 
citizens, and consumers since it is in these kinds of environments that they suffer 
the deprivation caused by capitalist development. The new social movements wi l l 
become the bearers of socialist transformation when they ally themselves with the 
unemployed, the part-timers, and all those who do not identify themselves with 
their employment and who constitute what Gorz calls the post-industrial 
proletariat.474 As Habermas has observed, the common characteristic the diverse 
protest movements share is the increasing sensitivity towards what he calls the 
secondary dysfunctions of capitalist growth, and a readiness to resist them. There 
is a growing concern about the penetration of capital into areas of social life that 
were previously protected from it by tradition and within which capitalist values 
4 7 1 Weeks, J. "The value of difference", in Rutherford, Identity , p.88 
4 7 2 Weeks, "Value of Difference" , p.89 
4 7 3 Brunt, R. "The politics of identity", in Hall and Jacques , New Times, p. 157 
4 7 4 Gorz in Blackburn (1991), 288-93 
234 
were not dominant before. As the social composition of these movements is 
heterogeneous, they do not fit into the classical Marxist protest paradigm.4 7 5 Every 
individual occupies multiple functions, roles and places without identifying with 
any single one of them. As a result we all have to construct a personal identity, a 
never ending quest.476 In these conditions, the construction of a new "counter-
hegemony" is required, and 
(t)he problem for socialists is to show and make acceptable the link between 
them, and to explain that radical demands, for democratization, for equal 
rights for all, for the creation of communities of citizens, can only very 
partially be met, if they can be met at all, within the existing structures of 
power and privilege, and why their fulfillment requires the kind of 
comprehensive transformation which socialism signifies - yet to do this 
without in any way belittling the importance and value of the struggles 
which are conductedfor immediate and limited reforms477 
The decline of the Marxist paradigm has given rise to a debate about the nature of 
collective action in today's society. As Melucci has noticed, contemporary forms 
of collective action are not concentrated on struggles over the production and 
distribution of material goods, but 
challenge the administrative rationality of systems based on information 
primarily on symbolic grounds: the ways in which an information-based 
society generates meaning and communication for its members. 
They, as a result of growing interdependence, display a planetary dimension and 
have acquired a transnational reach.479 This plurality of cultures and discourses 
4 7 5 Habermas, J. "Conservatism and capitalist crisis" , in Habermas, J. (1992) Autonomy and Solidarity, ed. 
by P.Dews, (London, Verso, 1992), p.66 
4 7 6 Gorz, A. "A Left in need of redefinition" , in.Gorz, A. Capitalism. Socialism. Ecology , trans, by C.Turner 
, (London, Verso, 1994), p.22 
4 7 7 Miliband, R. Socialism for a Sceptical Age , (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), p. 157 
4 7 8 Melucci, A. "The new social movements revisited: reflections on a sociological misunderstansing" , in 
Maheu, L . (ed.) Social Movements and Social Classes: the Future of Collective Action , (London, SAGE 
Publications, 1995), p. 113 
4 7 9 Melucci, "New Social Movements" , p. 114 
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constitutes what Heller and Feher call the "postmodern political condition". And 
as the class scenarios disappear and the functionalist character of society ascends, 
traditional political patterns and programs are rearranged and reorganized. The 
state is not seen as a mere class agency anymore, and it and the democratic 
institutions are taken much more seriously by the left. Consequently, the political 
options are forged by movements rather than parties.480 
Once again, when discussing the importance of democratic institutions for the left, 
one has to remember Spinelli's contribution towards this end. Throughout his long 
involvement with the institutions of the European Community, and especially 
during the time he served as a Euro MP, he was particularly concerned with giving 
more power to the European Assembly, the Community's democratic institution 
par excellence. 
Heller, A. & Feher, F. The Postmodern Political Condition , (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988), pp. 5-8 
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2.B. New Forms of Political Radicalism 
The decline of class and the proliferation of the new movements is directly 
connected with the emergence of new forms of political radicalism. New forms 
that do not f i t in the traditional models of political organization and participation. 
For Giddens, today's world is one of dislocation and uncertainty, a runaway world. 
The advance of human knowledge and intervention, instead of creating certainties, 
causes unpredictability, or what he calls manufactured uncertainty. The risks 
involved in our lives are new, and therefore cannot be dealt with by any of the old 
remedies. They do not respond to the remedy of more knowledge and more 
control, as prescribed by the enlightenment. This uncertainty is the consequence of 
the long term development of modern institutions and has been hastened by the 
combination of various factors. Intensifying globalization, by which Giddens 
means the transformation of space and time resulting from the development of the 
means of instantaneous global communication, has led to the emergence of a post-
traditional social order, i.e. not the disappearance but a change in the status of 
tradition. Traditions are forced into open view, they have to be explained and 
justified. Part of this development is the emergence of the various 
fundamentalisms. Moreover, the growth of social reflexivity, the filtering of all 
sorts of information relevant to one's life by the individual and the consequent 
action based on this process, has exposed an interruption in the link between 
knowledge and control. And this change leads to greater autonomy of action with 
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important political repercussions.481 Socialism is no longer in the vanguard of 
history, whereas traditional conservatism can turn into fundamentalism. What is 
needed is a radical politics only loosely identified with the left. Meanwhile, an 
ever-expanding capitalism runs up not only against environmental limits in 
terms of the earth's resources, but against the limits of modernity in the 
shape of manufactured uncertainty; liberal democracy, based upon an 
electoral party system, operating at the level of the nation-state, is not well 
equipped to meet the demands of a reflexive citizenry in a globalizing world; 
and the combination of capitalism and liberal democracy provides only 
limited means of generating social solidarity.482 
This new radical politics should be built around a number of principles. Damaged 
solidarities should be repaired and this, sometimes, should include the 
preservation or reinvention of tradition. It has been said that the restoration of civil 
society could be the solution to this problem. This cannot be the case anymore as 
civil society was the end result of social arrangements that have been proved 
outdated. Since the idea of civil society was bound up with the state and its 
centralization, it is hard to see how it could be renewed in the time of 
globalization. Besides, the renewal of civil society might heighten fundamentalist 
tendencies and the potential for violence. External clear-cut enemies and internal 
solidarity cemented the nation-state and, most of the times, guaranteed internal 
peace. Furthermore, there is the danger of a possible tension between 
democratization and a renewal of civil society, since a proliferation of abstract 
universal rights, as advocated by liberalism, might destroy the communal orders of 
civil society.483 The centrality of life politics, revolving around the idea of 
4 8 1 Giddens, A. "Brave new world: the new context of politics", 21-25, in Miliband, D. (ed.) Reinventing the 
Left, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp.21-5. For lengthier discussions see Giddens, A. The Consequences 
of Modernity, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990) 
4 8 2 Giddens, "Brave New World" , p.27 
4 8 3 Giddens, A. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics , (Cambridge, polity Press, 1994), 
pp. 124-6 
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emancipation, feminism etc., in formal and less orthodox spheres of the political 
order should be recognized. Within this context ecological questions should be 
linked to broader problems of identity and life-style choice. The notion of 
generative politics, a politics supporting a positive action on behalf of individuals 
and groups, in order to make things happen themselves rather than accepting a 
passive stance waiting for things to be done for them. Another is dialogic 
democracy, i.e. the creation of a public arena for the discussion and resolution of 
contentious issues through dialogue. Thus democracy wil l be democratized. In 
relation to the world of nation states in particular, to the degree that they are still 
relevant, this should mean the filling in of the empty or anarchic areas connecting 
states. The whole idea of the welfare state should be revised thoroughly in the 
light of the changing nature of risk from external to manufactured. Unlike external 
risks, e.g. misfortunes etc., the manufactured risk is a result of human intervention 
into the conditions of social life and nature, e.g. global warming. It is a risk that 
cannot be coped with by traditional insurance methods. Whereas the idea behind 
welfare has been a passive one, to protect against misfortunes that happen to 
people, a new positive concept is required emphasizing the mobilizing of life-
political measures and thus linking responsibilities and autonomy. Globalization 
undermines the welfare state's economic basis and the commitment of its citizens 
to the correlation of individual and national wealth. And as the state is unable to 
control economic life effectively and centrally, the national sovereign capabilities 
are crippled by the combination of globalization and social reflexivity. Moreover, 
the welfare state failed to address the issues of world poverty and wealth 
redistribution, and became a instrument in the hands of the expanding middle 
class.484 Finally, the role of violence in human affairs, from family to inter-state 
4 8 4 Giddens. Bevond Left and Right, pp. 140-9 
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war, should be confronted, something that is missing from both liberalism and 
socialism.4 8 5 
Giddens expanded his argument to ful l length in his Beyond Left and Right. He 
argued for a new radical politics as the age old distinctions between left and right 
become obsolete. Modern conservatism has managed to respond to the effects of 
globalisation, and the corresponding manufactured uncertainties, by means of 
stressing the need for market deregulation. Markets, in this context, are seen as 
creating the fundamental conditions of individual freedom and are more crucial to 
democracy than the constitution of the state itself. Meanwhile, as reflexive 
modernization and globalization change the social and economic environment, the 
cybernetic model, implicit in all forms of socialism, that was reasonably effective 
in the past cannot deliver the goods anymore. A modern economy can endure and 
expand under a great degree of central planning, only i f it is a national one where 
social life is segmentalized, and the degree of social reflexivity is low. Otherwise 
both, command and Keynesian economies stagnate. 
Whereas conservatism embraced radicalism, socialism retreated from it. 
Radicalism can be rescued by the ecological movement which, for Giddens, has 
neither obvious affinity with leftist thinking, nor a privileged connection with 
conservatism and the right. 4 8 8 The ecological crisis is vital to political renewal 
because it is 
Giddens, "Brave New World", pp.28-37 
Giddens, Bevond Left and Right, pp.3 5-43 
Giddens, Bevond Left and Right ,pp.66-7 
Giddens, Bevond Left and Right, pp.200-2 
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a material expression of the limits of modernity; repairing the damaged 
environment can no more be understood as an end in itself than the redress 
r 489 ' ' 
oj poverty. 
For Giddens, although some of the socialist principles retain their value, 
productivism must be seen in a context different from the traditional socialist 
understanding of the issue. Compulsiveness should be overcome in the light of 
expanding human happiness. The critique of productivism, following 
philosophical conservatism, argues for a recovering of suppressed moral concerns 
and assumes the creation of a variety of social pacts, the most notable being the 
one between the sexes.490 
Two major flaws in the direction of conclusions can be identified. The major one 
is that it sees socialism as a single entity. To do this is to ignore the richness and 
variety of the socialist tradition. And although it is true that the dominant currents 
came to reject all radicalism there is still plenty of radicalism waiting to be 
rediscovered in the lesser known socialist currents. Another shortcoming of his 
analysis of state and deregulation is that he overlooks the possibility of 
incorporating some initiatives and approaches at the European level. 
Along similar lines, Blackwell and Seabrook advocated what they call a 
conserving radicalism, a form of conservatism leading to the search of all the 
valuable resources, the people that have been neglected in the process of ardent 
industrialization.491 
4 8 9 Giddens, Bevond Left and Right, p.227 
4 9 0 Giddens, Bevond Left and Right, pp.247-8 
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is nonsense, a mistake, just another ball and chain shackled to socialist 
parties by Marxist fetish.340 
Rosselli saw socialism as the realization of liberalism which in turn he attempted 
to dissociate from free market. Unlike most socialists of his generation he did not 
regard revisionism as a heresy. Revisionists openly declared that they wanted to 
transcend Marxism. Their theory was to be culminated in liberal socialism. And 
the essence of this modern, non-Marxist, socialism ought to be the civil society.541 
Among Marxism's serious faults is its failure to appreciate the so-called irrational 
factors such as nationalism. Moreover, it has mistaken the prologue for the entire 
course of development, and has given transitory phenomena long temporal 
duration. 5 4 2 Unlike Marx, for Rosselli 
Socialism is not socialization; it is not the proletariat in power; it is not 
even material equality. Socialism, grasped in its essential aspect, is the 
progressive actualization of the idea of liberty and justice among men: an 
innate idea that lies more or less buried under the sediment of centuries in 
the marrow of every human being. It is the progressive effort to ensure an 
equal chance of living the only life worthy of the name of all humans, setting 
them free from the enslavement to the material world and material needs 
that today still dominate the greater number, allowing them the possibility 
freely to develop their personalities in a continuous struggle for perfection 
against their primitive and bestial instincts and against the corruptions of a 
civilization too much the prey of the demons of success and money.543 
It follows then, that in Marx's terms Rosselli is an idealist rather than an 
materialist. But what should be stressed once more, is the similarities between 
5 4 0 Rosselli, C. Liberal Socialism , ed. by N.Urbinati, trans, by W.McGuaig .(Princeton, N.J., Princeton 
University Press), pp. 122-3 
5 4 1 Rosselli, Libral Socialism , introduction. 
5 4 2 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 63-5 
5 4 3 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, p.78. Theses similar to Rosselli's were advanced by the "Revisionists". Since 
they are better known I will not discuss them here. See Bernstein, E. The Preconditions of Socialism, ed. and 
trans, by H.Tudor, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).Tudor, H. & Tudor, J.M. (ed.) Marxism 
and Social Democracy: the Revisionist Debate 1896-1898 , (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1988).Tudor, H. Bernstein's Preconditions of Socialism: the first Crisis of Marxism , (Durham, Durham 
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Rosselli's ideas and those of Spinelli as he attempted to reform the working of the 
European Communities as expressed both in the European Adventure and the 
draft European Union Treaty. 
Keane argued for a pluralist idea of equality that would work towards the abolition 
of large and permanent monopolies of privilege through the development of a less 
hierarchical but more elaborate relationship between citizens. Such a relationship 
would be mediated by the goods they produce and distribute among themselves 
according to criteria such as friendship, voluntary association, market exchanges, 
legislative decisions, etc. Thus, 
the democratic idea of complex equality recognizes that the gap between 
ythe haves' and ythe have nots' can be closed only by developing institutional 
mechanisms which distribute different goods to different people in different 
ways, andfor different reasons544 
He also called fdr the abandonment of undifferentiated concepts of liberty. The 
secret of the latter, the maximization of which requires the maximization of 
complex equality among citizens, is the segmentation of decision making powers 
into a number of institutions between the state and civil society, and within the 
latter. The maximization of citizen's liberty requires the increase of their choices. 
The road to socialism therefore, is democratization and it means the maintenance 
and redefinition of the boundaries separating the state from the civil society by 
means of expanding social equality and liberty, and reconstructing and 
democratizing the institutions of the state.545 Sovereign state power is a vital 
requirement for the democratization of civil society. Since pluralism tends to 
Research Papers in Politics No. 1, 1993). MacMullen, A.L. Belfort Bax: the Intellectual Formation of a 
Socialist Theoritician , (Durham, Durham Research Papers in Politics No.2, 1993) 
5 4 4 Keane, J. "The limits of state action", in Keane, J. Democracy and Civil Society, (London, Verso, 1988), 
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generate anarchy, central planning is necessary, and as competing claims and 
conflicts of interest can only be settled by universal laws, a legislature, a judiciary, 
and a police force are necessary. A democratic civil society requires state power to 
defend its independence in the global system. Within this context, European 
socialism, for Keane, must break with its defensive and statist character, and to 
fight for the activation of civil society and the democratic reform of state power. 5 4 6 
Citizenship therefore is a vital component of the civil society. Citizenship can be 
taken to mean the recognition on the behalf of a legally instituted authority of 
somebody as a ful l member of a community, which in turn confers certain rights 
on the citizen. In this direction one can see the establishment by Article no. 8 of the 
Maastricht Treaty of the concept of "citizenship of the European Union". Such a 
move, despite several shortcomings, such as the fact that the determination of 
Union citizenship rests with the Member States, is a major step in the right 
direction. 5 4 7 
Hirst has formed another alternative model which he calls Associative Democracy. 
He started from the premise that both Socialist and Liberal systems share a few 
common characteristics that generated a bureaucratic mass society. Representative 
democracy, instead of checking upon the centralized and bureaucratic government 
has become a means for its legitimization.5 4 8 The alternative is associationalism 
which, instead of big government that has grown at the expense of individual 
rights and freedoms, combines citizen choice with public welfare. At a time when 
the nation state is being exhausted and an elaborate multifocal politics is 
5 4 5 Keane, "Limits of State", pp. 13-5 
5 4 6 Keane, "Limits of State", pp.21-5. On the need for a strong state for the transition to socialism see 
Bienefeld, M. "Capitalism and the nation state in the doc days of the twentieth century", and Panitch, L. 
"Globalisation and the state", both in Miliband and Panitch, Socialist Register. 
5 4 7 Newman, Democracy. Sovereignty and the European Union , pp. 153-6 
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unfolding, associationalism re-emphasizes the notion of a single effectively self-
governing political community. And it 
makes accountable representative democracy possible again by limiting the 
scope of state administration, without diminishing social provision. It 
enables market-based societies to deliver the substantive goals desired by 
citizens, by embedding the market system in a social network of coordinative 
and regulatory institutions. It is a political idea that is big enough to offer 
the hope of radical reform, and to mobilize political energies in doing so, 
but it is specific enough to be developed within and added to our existing 
institutions. It requires neither a revolution nor the building of a new 
society, merely the extensive but gradual reform of the old at a pace 
directed by the realities ofpolitics and the choices of citizens.549 
By advocating new types of institutions, a constituency wider than the traditional 
left can be approached. Moreover, without these new institutions and a state more 
agreeable to the creation of new communities the much talked about new 
movements wil l be restrained and ineffectual. 5 5 0 
The intellectual sources of associationalism can be traced back to Owen and 
Proudhon, Maitland and Figgis, Laski, Cole and his Guild socialism. And 
although it never formed a single coherent ideology, nor exercised power, it 
argued for a decentralized economy based on mutuality and cooperation, and it 
condemned the centralized sovereign state, offering radical federalism and 
political pluralism as an alternative. Its modern version does not endeavor to 
replace liberalism, but rather strives to extend and develop it. It attempts to 
amalgamate liberalist individual choice with collectivist public provision, without 
at the same time being a substitute form of the later. For associationalism, 
individual liberty and human welfare can be best served when more social affairs 
5 4 8 Hirst, P. Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance , (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1994), pp. 1-3. 
5 4 9 Hirst. Associative Democracy , pp. 12-3 
5 5 0 Hirst, Associative Democracy , pp. 13-4 
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are managed by voluntary self-governing associations. It works towards the 
harmonization of individual freedom and effective government, but renounces 
individualism because a purely competitive market society will deprive many 
people of the means to achieve their objectives, and consequently wi l l result in 
bad government. Associations should be legally protected and, i f necessary, 
publicly financed through taxation.5 5 1 
For Hirst the institutional changes that Associative democracy proposes are 
governed by three basic laws. Gradually, voluntary self-governing associations 
take over the democratic governance of economic and social matters. This 
becomes even more urgent as it is very difficult to restore liberal democracy in the 
modern states that cannot function as the exclusive spots of economic and social 
regulation. Power should be widely distributed to various authority areas 
according to functional or territorial criteria, and administration within these areas 
should be devolved to the lowest possible level. Thus associationalism challenges 
the state's claim to sovereignty and its centralization. Finally, there should be a 
continuous stream of information between the rulers and the ruled to facilitate the 
• • ceo 
processes of consultation in a decentralized system. 
Unlike collectivism, associationalism gives individuals some purpose that they 
could not have otherwise unless they work together. And through this process they 
develop themselves as they are further individuated by associating with others. 
Associations are communities of choice, the right of exit is a basic one, and the 
primary general regulation of all associations is legal. Associationalism provides 
1 Hirst, Associative Democracy, pp. 15-20 
2 Hirst, Associative Democrcav, pp.20-39 
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for the self-interested and the resourceful, and takes on some of the competitive 
disciplines of the markets.553 
Associative democracy has two fundamental distinctive features: that it 
bridges and transforms the division between state and civil society, 
^pluralizing' the former and publicizing' the latter; second that it promotes 
the democratic governance of corporate bodies in both public and private 
spheres, aiming to restrict the scope of hierarchical management and 
offering a new model of organizational efficiency.554 
Associationalism is more democratic than the other schools of economic 
governance as it attempts to include as many actors as possible, not as the objects 
of decision making, but as ful l participants in economic governance. Its goals are 
as follows. The adequate production of wealth to ensure, not the strict equality of 
income, but wide prosperity. Wealth though, is not the sole aim but in its 
production employment should be relatively secured. As many economic actors as 
possible have the highest level of control of the assets necessary to their 
livelihood. The interests of local communities, of consumers and of savers are 
represented in the decision making bodies.555 For Hirst, the closest existing 
example we can get to this model can be found in the major Japanese enterprises, 
and to a lesser extent in Italy and in the German institutions of national and 
regional coordination. Nevertheless, as he himself admits, they are difficult to 
copy and, i f a common EC monetary system is developed, they would be difficult 
to maintain. 5 5 6 The problem with the Japanese model is that it includes several 
characteristics such as the worshipping of the company etc. that make it 
unattractive to a number of people. Moreover, they do not seem to assist in the 
development of individuality which is a key component of associationalism. 
5 5 3 Hirst, Associative Democracy , pp.50-66 
5 5 4 Hirst, Associative Democracy , p.74 
5 5 5 Hirst, Associative Democracy , pp.97-8 
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Furthermore, they do not sound particularly socialist or left-wing since they 
glorify work for its own sake and therefore do not aim to the liberation of time. So 
characteristics like these would be more at home in the Thatcherite world. 
Since, as we have said earlier, the capacities of the nation-state are limited and 
globalization and interdependence are irrevocable, then, Hirst believes, 
associationalism can meet the new demands more easily than the traditional state-
centered doctrines. This is because of its commitment to federalism and self-
government of the units of the federated authority. And 
then we should also conclude that a trade bloc like the European 
Community is one effective way of managing the most internationalized of 
the dimensions of economic policy, such as trade and monetary policy. 
The Community's jurisdiction should include: monetary policy, eventually leading 
to a common currency; the common framework of general regulatory rules; and 
competition and technology and skills policies. It should also include some inter-
regional re-distribution to meet common social and infrastructure requirements. 
And finally, it should include the provision of infrastructure common to the whole 
continent, such as air traffic control. Moreover, the old liberal objection to 
regulation, that it tends to multiply and become more complex wil l be met. This 
will be achieved by means of the federal mechanisms and organs which wil l 
restrain such tendencies. Again, one must notice the similarities between Hirst's 
federalism and Spinelli's federalism as discussed in chapter four. 
Discussing welfare and its provision, Hirst called for the creation of conditions 
under which the consumers of welfare wil l have a great input in its provision. 
Hirst, Associative Democracy, pp. 125-8 
Hisrt, Associative Democracy , p. 139 
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Associationalism offers extended government without big government, and at the 
same time offers thick welfare, but thin collectivism. Its means towards social 
justice, instead of the deceptive hope of equality of ends, is greater empowerment. 
And since the centrality of the nation state is more illusory than real, as it has lost 
many of its activities as regulator in the social and economic spheres, the only 
long run answer to this crisis is a federalist one. The recent crisis of the Italian 
state, and the electoral success of the Northern Leagues, is only another 
manifestation of the failure of national redistribution. In such a case the European 
Community in collaboration with national and regional governments wi l l take 
over partial but definite welfare duties.5 5 9 
Assessing the record of the Community's social policy, Newman has noticed that 
despite a number of failures and shortcomings it has made progress in some areas: 
it has facilitated networking and campaigns on particular issues; the ESF and the 
ERDF have funded some useful projects; and has maintained equal opportunities 
as a high priority. 5 6 0 It follows then, that despite the above mentioned failures, the 
Community offers a tool that can be utilised in the struggle for social provision. 
Moreover, as Meehan has argued, the European Union can be regarded as an arena 
for the realization of democratic citizenship. It already offers the opportunity to act 
on the fact that people have more identities than their nationality. Its framework 
allows for the recognition of people who share such identities but who belong to 
different national groups. It also means that people can understand that their 
interests are best expressed by a combination of vertical channels through 
governments and of horizontal roots through common institutions. In addition, the 
Hirst, Associative Democracy, pp. 140-1 
Hirst. Associative Democracy. pp. 168-71 
Newman, Democracy. Sovereignty and the European Union , p.96 
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European Union provides for the assertion, or reassertion, of local and regional 
identities. And this pluralism is a vital prerequisite for a modern radical politics. 5 6 1 
So we can turn now to what became known as Market Socialism. 
Meehan, E . Citizenship and the European Community, (London, SAGE, 1993), pp. 155-6 
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3.B. Market Socialism 
The above mentioned radical departures from the established left discourses, such 
as political economy and history, to the more recent ones such as the culture of 
identity can be explained by the reformulation of the left's relation to capitalism. 
Instead of challenging and opposing capitalism, the left is trying to make some 
space in it. Capitalism is here to stay. This is the certainty, with which Wood 
disagrees, underlying all these theories.562 It is clear it follows, that capitalism's 
cornerstone, the market as an institution has come a long way towards being 
accepted by a number of thinkers in the left as something not only tolerable, but 
sometimes vital, for the completion of their project. 
Devine identified three interrelated areas of reassessment. One is the relationship 
between legal ownership, actual control, and exploitation. The orthodox socialist 
ground rules that exploitation would be abolished along with private ownership, 
an act which in turn would give direct producers control over the production 
process, have been rendered void by the Eastern Communist and Western Social 
democratic statist experiences. The second is the relationship between planning 
and the market. It has come to be accepted that, whereas centralized planning 
could be effective for a short time, the creation of some kind of market economy is 
necessary. The decentralized decision-making which is necessary for efficient 
resource allocation in a complex modern economy can only be coordinated 
through the market mechanism. Only it, in the form of market-determined prices, 
can communicate sufficiently detailed information to individual production units. 
Furthermore, only through the market can a system of incentives be operated to 
allow the production units to respond to the information available by producing 
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what society desires. And three, the question has arisen whether it is possible or 
not to devise a planning system which is not based on hierarchy and personal 
dependence. Moreover, in the light of the previously mentioned historical 
experience, the notion of economic independence in the sense of absence of 
economic dependence on the state has become more convincing.5 6 3 
The discourse of Market Socialism is characterized by references to the now 
familiar themes of autonomy, choice, etc. that we have discussed before. In market 
socialism they can find their expression, their applicability in economic life. 
Consumer sovereignty is related to citizen sovereignty. Democracy in the political 
life is expressed by a variety of alternatives, a number of parties, and such a 
variety must be available in economic life. The ideological foundations of Market 
Socialism can be traced back to Duhring's idea of economic communes of 1876 
and Hertzka's socialist Utopia of a few years later, through to Oppenheimer's 
notion of the settlement-cooperative (1890) which formed the basis of the Jewish 
kibbutz. In the twenties both E.Heimann and Polanyi developed market socialist 
models, and in the thirties the English liberal socialist H.D.Dickinson worked 
towards the same end, while at the same time A.P.Lerner made a distinct 
contribution to welfare economics.564 At the same time, another model was 
devised by Breit and, especially, Lange in their joint publication of 1934 in the 
program of the young left-wing socialists associated with the group Plomienie. 
Two years later, in 1936, Lange produced a newer version of this model. 5 6 5 
5 6 2 Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism , p.2 
5 6 3 Devine, P. "Self-Governing Socialism", in Tabb, Future of Socialism , pp. 187-90 
5 6 4 Blackburn, R. "Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash", in Blackburn, After the Fal l , p.204 
5 6 5 Chilosi, A. The Right to Employment Principle and Self-Managed Market Socialism: A Historical 
Account and an Analytical Appraisal of some Old Ideas, EU1 Working Paper no.86/214 , (Florence, 
European University Institute, 1986), pp. 1-4. In this paper Chilosi compares the Breit and Lange 1934 model 
with Lange's 1936 one, and in turn he compares the first with Hertzka's original model of the late 19th 
century. 
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More recently, in the early eighties, Nove worked on the economics of what he 
called feasible socialism in a multiparty democracy with periodic parliamentary 
elections. By this, as he himself put it, he meant, 
a state of affairs which could exist in some major part of the developed 
world within the lifetime of a child already conceived, without our having to 
make or accept implausible or far-fetched assumptions about society, 
human beings and the economy.566 
The assumptions of political democracy feature prominently in Nove's work. 
Associated with this is the need for variety. I f variety in political life requires 
pluralism, multiple identities and a vibrant civil society, correspondingly variety in 
production requires opportunities for individual and group initiative. I f central 
government needs to be tamed and citizen rights to be reasserted, consumer 
preferences and user needs should correspondingly determine, to a great extent, 
what and how is produced. Instead of one type of producing unit, several are 
desirable. Citizens must be able to choose and then change their minds i f they so 
wish. The variety in political terms which allows for the existence, at the same 
time, of states, communities, localities, unions of states etc. should be reciprocated 
in the economy. So, centralized state enterprises should be allowed to exist along 
state owned autonomous enterprises, co-operatives, small-scale private concerns, 
individuals, and even very large corporations. The dividing line between the state-
centralized and the autonomous categories could be the line dividing the range of 
decisions that can be made at the production level and the corporation 
headquarters. It is clear that corporate giants such as Shell or IBM cannot be self-
managed by the workforce. In turn the major differences between socialized and 
co-operative enterprises in a competitive environment would stem from the 
5 6 6 Nove, A. The Economics of Feasible Socialism , (London, Unwin Hyman, 1983), p.197 
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difference in property relations, with means of production belonging to the 
workers in the latter who can freely dispose of its property. Finally, private 
property of the productive apparatus should be allowed, but with a limit on the 
number of employees, or on the value of capital assets of the concern.567 In Nove's 
model planning has still a number of functions to perform. It wil l be responsible 
for significant investments and for the monitoring of decentralized ones in order to 
avoid duplication and waste on unsound projects. The center wi l l also be 
administering productive activities such as electricity, oil, and railways. Moreover, 
it will have to set the basic rules for the autonomous and free sectors with the right 
to intervene. Foreign trade wil l also be the responsibility of the center along with 
working practices and living standards. The same wil l be the case when 
externalities are likely to be considerable, like environmental protection, regional 
development, etc. It will have also to define the share of total GNP to be devoted 
to investment, and to balance the perspective plans by means of adequate savings 
and controlled inflation. Finally, the planners must make sure that a balance 
between present and future is kept. But the boundary between the market sector 
and the free provision of goods and services must be decided by a democratic 
vote. 5 6 8 But to what degree is the above mentioned model a socialist one? For 
Nove, a society based on his principles would be characterized by the following. 
The absence of any large-scale private ownership of the means of production. The 
conscious planning of major investments by an authority responsible to an elected 
assembly. Central decision making will apply only in the cases that demand such 
an approach, i.e. economies of scale and major externalities. A preference for 
small scale to create a sense of belonging. With the exceptions of centralized or 
Nove, Feasible Socialism , pp. 197-207 
Nove, Feasible Socialism , pp.207-8 
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monopolized sectors and the narrow domain of private enterprise, the managers 
should be responsible to the workers. Although production and distribution of 
goods and services must be determined by negotiations, the importance of 
competition for choice must be recognized. Workers must have freedom of choice 
between various types of employment and specializations. Market principles wil l 
not apply to sectors such as health and education, and the state wil l determine 
income policies , levy taxes, restrain monopoly power etc. Inequalities wi l l be 
consciously limited, but some degree of inequality is unavoidable. Finally, barriers 
to abuse of power must be built and maximum democratic consultation must be 
promoted, although the distinction between governors and governed cannot be 
eliminated completely. 5 6 9 
In Britain, following Labour's disastrous performance at the 1983 general election 
the lack of an ideological foundation was blamed for the predominance of the so-
called new right. It had to be acknowledged that often there was a rational 
substance to its critique, revealing some real substantive problems that were not 
created but only addressed by Thatcherism. The left had to address them as well, 
and in the process of doing so it has to answer some very difficult questions. A 
major one is the problem of the fiscal crisis of the welfare state.570 
While the accepted socialist forms of economic organization were perceived, East 
and West, as failures and the old socialist values, such as collectivism, were under 
severe attack by the emerging individualist principles, the Labour party had to 
offer only a statist defense of the status quo and a return to the tested (and found 
lacking) wisdoms. This led to a reexamination of socialist economics, resulting in 
a new version of market socialism. The traditional view that economic growth and 
5 6 9 Nove, Feasible Socialism , pp.227-8 
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a fairer society would be achieved by means of state control of the economy came 
to be questioned in the light of the British post-war economic and political record, 
and the analysis of the communist economies.571 An attempt has been made to 
combine markets and socialism and to reorientate socialist thinking by 
understanding that the market is the most effective way of coordinating 
decentralized economic decision-making.572 Market socialism sets itself against 
both nationalization and privatization, while markets are seen as providing a 
society wide sense of overall community. According to Forbes, 
instead of the iron fist of the state, the velvet glove of participatory 
democracy envelops the invisible hand of the free market.573 
Although more than one market socialism models are available, for the purposes 
of the present thesis I wi l l concentrate on what I would term the Fabian model, 
which is based on Nove's above mentioned ideas.574 The basic assumptions behind 
this notion are the admissions that the market is not a single entity, that it is not 
diametrically opposed to planning, and that it is legitimate. Markets are an 
efficient way of producing and distributing a variety of common items, they give 
their participants a certain kind of freedom, and they tend to disperse personal 
power. 5 7 5 Although the borderline between market and non market provision is a 
fluid one, it is important to remember that labour and capital markets differ from 
5 7 0 Hall, Hard Road , p.276 
5 7 1 Nolan, P. & Paine, S. (ed.) Rethinking Socialist Economics: A New Agenda for Britain , (Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1986), Preface, p.2 
5 7 2 Le Grand, J. &Estrin, S. (ed.) Market Socialism, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 1 
5 7 3 Forbes, I. (ed.) Market Socialism: Whose Choice? , Fabian Tract 516, (London, Fabian Society, 1986), 
intro. p.2 
5 7 4 Another model which allows for a greater degree of central planning than the Fabians do, by means of a 
central bank, is the one advocated by Ignacio Ortuno Ortin, J.E.Roemer and J.Silvestre, in their "Market 
Socialism", Working Paper no.355, Department of Economics, University of California at Davis. For a more 
recent expoosition see Roemer, J.E. A Future for Socialism, (London, Verso, 1994). It is a model based on 
Lange's mechanism of subsidizing investment through preferential interest rates. This model is more suited to 
the North American conditions and because of this I am not discussing it here. 
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markets in most products. Investment decisions, on the one hand, require a high 
degree of expertise and have substantial social consequences. Workers, on the 
other hand, cannot divide their labour among various options and hand over to the 
employer a big part of their lives. Market socialism therefore, advocates a free 
market in products but a well regulated market, at most, in these two domains. 
The idea of capital-labour partnership may be a way of combining the benefits of 
self-management with those of the traditional capital f i r m . 5 7 6 Market socialism 
does not advocate the complete rolling back of the state, but the use of its power 
efficiently in order to successfully perform the duties no one else can. Its socialist 
advantages lie in the fact that it involves ordinary people in the running of their 
enterprises, distributes income in a more egalitarian way, and brings capital, a 
major source of power, under popular control. It allows for the combination of 
market and non-market elements in a way to facilitate the expression of individual 
desires and communal loyalties.5 7 7 The major works that I am considering here are 
those of Plant, Forbes, Le Grand and Estrin, and above all Miller (1990). 
The first exposition of this model was provided by a group of academics who got 
together under the auspices of the Fabian Society in 1983. Their initial treatment 
of the subject was published as a book in 1989. Estrin and Le Grand noted that 
socialists have failed to distinguish between ends and means and that there is 
nothing inherent in planning that implies equality and nothing inherent in markets 
that prevents it. Markets are an excellent way of processing information, 
encouraging innovation, and dispersing economic power. As Miller observed, 
nineteenth-century socialism was a morally inspired vision of society which 
5 7 5 Miller, D. and Estrin, S., "Market socialism: a policy for socialists", in Forbes, Market Socialism , pp. 3-4 
5 7 6 The limitations of co-operatives are discussed later in this chapter. 
5 7 7 Miller and Estrin, "Market socialism: a policy for socialists" 
5 7 8 Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism , pp.2-3 
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rejected the offensive characteristics of capitalism, partly drawing on the 
preindustrial communities which capitalism had destroyed.579 Plant argued that 
market socialism denies the link between socialism and outcomes and accepts the 
liberal idea that people should be allowed to decide for themselves what good is. 
Market socialism argues for equality at the beginning and not equality at the end, 
i.e. equality of opportunity. It needs a theory of distributive justice, equality, and 
community to distinguish it from neo-liberalism. It also calls for a central role for 
the state as market socialism can not solve the problems of government. And as 
market socialist views about the market have sought to empower individuals and 
groups in the market, so in relation to the state they must empower the individual 
by means of extended democracy and accountability in political structures and 
bureaucracies.580 For socialists equality is the tool for the extension of individual 
freedom and the safeguarding of fraternity. Here it should be noted that the 
socialist notion of equality differs from that of equality of opportunity. Equality of 
opportunity takes the established structure of inequality for granted and is only 
bothered about recruitment to it. The socialist notion of equality is concerned 
about outcome in terms of income, wealth and welfare. Nevertheless, at this point, 
it can be said that it is not clear how real this difference is in practical terms. The 
task of market socialism therefore is the development of a theory of legitimate 
inequality.581 The failure of the traditional statist-socialist model is that it, in its 
welfare state form, strove to tackle the symptoms instead of the causes of 
inequality.5 8 2 For Abell equality, freedom, and efficiency should be incorporated 
into the socialist doctrine, as they are missing from the traditional socialist 
5 7 9 Miller, D. "Why Markets?", in Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism , p.27 
S 8 ° Plant, R. "Socialism, Markets, and End States", in Le Grand and Estrin , Market Socialism 
5 8 1 Plant, "Socialism, Markets, and End States", pp.24-6 
5 8 2 Plant, "Socialism, Markets, and End States" , p. 27 
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principle from each according to ability to each according to ability, and 
subsequently need. 
The failures of central planning as an argument for market socialism have been 
used by Estrin and Winter who observed that in a command economy the 
economy functions only because of the emergence of black and gray markets. For 
them the use of markets as the main economic mechanism does not exclude the 
use of planning where necessary. France, and Japan especially, offer the prime 
example of an exercise in systematic state intervention to achieve particular 
targets in a few sectors of the economy, without regard to the consequences for the 
allocation of resources as a whole. Markets are not an end in themselves but 
means by which certain economic activities are carried out. There can be no 
objection to their use provided their operation is consistent with a society which 
combines freedom, efficiency and fairness. Market socialism entails the rolling 
back of non-market provision to allow competitive forces to increase efficiency 
and choice and to do away with monopolistic abuse. State intervention is required 
in the case of natural monopolies, to introduce market relations whenever non-
market provision has emerged in pursuance of monopoly power, in the case of 
goods with spillover effects, in the capital market, to dampen price fluctuations 
and the associated effects on incomes while directly stimulating quantitative 
changes in sectors where supply adjustments to demands are relatively slow. A 
planning agency is needed to produce acceptable results. Central planning suffers 
from infeasibility, tautness, and the incoherence and inefficiency that follows, but 
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also suppress and damage the market mechanism. Indicative planning, on the 
contrary, 
offers a decentralized and potentially democratic version of planning which 
can improve the functioning of markets, without threatening to displace 
them as the principal allocation mechanism. Its primary contribution is 
intended to be improving economic efficiency, rather than directing 
economic activity. It operates through the provision of information, and its 
effectiveness in large part depends on the sophistication and usefulness of 
the data made available. The contribution of indicative planning to 
economic welfare may appear small to traditional socialists, who compare 
it with the directive organs of central planning. Viewed from the perspective 
of a market economy, the contribution of indicative planning is much 
larger.584 
Winter sees exploitation in modern capitalism as arising from the differential 
ownership of productive assets, and form the fact that people bring different skills 
to the labour market. Socialism is mainly concerned with the first kind of 
inequality. Nationalization, traditionally seen as the principle means of tackling 
this problem almost always involves a separation of ownership from control and 
fails to satisfy either the workers or the customers. Changing the legal framework 
that supports the capitalist society is the only way of reforming it. A socialist 
economy must renounce the private ownership of the means of production as the 
primary form of ownership in the economy. Rigorous inheritance taxes, 
curtailment of privately owned companies' size, and the use of market to allocate 
labour skills are necessary. After the implementation of these changes the need of 
a large government bureaucracy wi l l disappear. 
5 8 3 Estrin, S. & Winter, D. "Planning in a market socialist economy", in LeGrand and Estrin, Market 
Socialism . pp. 100-138 
5 8 4 Estrin and Winter, "Planning in a market socialist economy" , p. 119 
5 8 5 Winter, D. "Market socialism and the reform of the capitalist economy", in Le Grand and Estrin , Market 
Socialism 
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Le Grand examined the relationship between market socialism and welfare. After 
dismissing full-scale privatization, he proposed a serious experiment with a 
discriminatory voucher scheme to determine whether they were dangerous right-
wing nonsense or a potentially appropriate tool for achieving socialist ends. 
Moreover, he advocated a user tax, a charge for services incorporated into the tax 
system to that could promote the socialist objectives of efficiency and fairness. He 
also championed the idea of introducing a lifetime capital receipts tax. A so called 
poll grant, a capital grant to everyone on reaching the age of majority, wil l be 
financed by the revenues of the above mentioned tax. 
• The combination of a developed system of wealth taxation with a poll grant 
would go a long way towards the redistribution of resources that is an 
essential requirement for the kind of egalitarian market socialist economy 
discussed in this book. 
Probably the most important book on Market Socialism is Market, State and 
Community by Miller. In it he provides market socialism with a theoretical 
justification. In the book's first part Miller shows that the libertarian ideas of 
freedom, justice, and efficiency cannot justify laissez-faire capitalism. But at the 
same time he proves that the pro-market arguments are convincing enough. In the 
second part he defends the market from socialist attacks. When consumer 
sovereignty is concerned he proves that there is no known alternative to it. 
Although exploitation is still possible, market socialism evades the systematic 
exploitation of capitalism. And i f agencies of government can be constructed to 
express the general wi l l , economic relations can acquire an instrumental, 
competitive, and spontaneous character, without at the same time losing their 
Le Grand, j . "Markets, welfare, and equality", in Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism , p.211 
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human co-operative and planned character. Thus alienation, the market's great 
disadvantage for Marx, can be countered. 
Miller offers a detailed theoretical justification of Market Socialism. For him 
social-democratic strategy suffers from a number of limitations. It is no longer 
clear that Keynesianism can be used in the desired manner to secure ful l 
employment, the effect of fiscal measures on the overall income and wealth 
distribution has so far been limited, and finally, the welfare state has not been a 
very successful vehicle for general equality. The aims of market socialism can be 
summarized as follows: obtaining the efficiency advantages of the markets in 
goods' and services' production, confining the state's economic role in order to 
make democratic government feasible, protecting the workers' autonomy both as 
individuals and as members of self-managed enterprises, and bringing about a 
more equal distribution of primary income.5 8 7 
The discussion of the politics of democratic socialism requires a reexamination of 
the socialist notions of community and citizenship. Individuality has been seen as 
an essential part of socialism by Marx, Morris and Kropotkin, and they sought to 
accommodate, rather than extinguish, individual self-development and communal 
solidarity. This requires a looser form of community in which direct communal 
ties are not the only human relations, but allow for others forms such as market 
ones. I f all members of the community are to participate in shaping the world in 
which they live to f i t common ideas and aspirations, communal identification 
must occur at national level where most major decisions affecting the shape of the 
society are taken. Smaller scale communities, although valuable, wil l be 
inadequate. Justice can only be guaranteed by a national distributive mechanism. 
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Since the collective identities that people currently possess are overwhelmingly 
national ones, the nation is where the promise of overall community wi l l be 
fulfilled. But as socialism has traditionally rejected this identity source, nationality 
must be reexamined i f this aim is to be achieved. The very conjunction of nation 
and state allows national communities to come close to self-determination and 
distributive justice since only a politically organized community can hope to 
determine its fate and to distribute justice to all its members according to their 
needs.588 
All particularist loyalties create at least the potential for objectionable 
behaviour towards outsiders, but to conclude that we should never pledge 
ourselves to anything less than humanity as a whole is to overlook 
everything that is valuable in these special commitments.589 
Nations are the only possible form in which overall community can be realized, 
and it is here that the right kind of political organization is needed for the 
achievement of socialism. This remark contradicts the Marxist idea that it is only 
the class that matters and that the workers have no homeland. I f community needs 
a common vocabulary, a collective memory and a set of values, these are to be 
provided by the nation. And this is a statement that sounds nationalistic, since it 
resembles the idea of nation as we saw it in the first chapter of the present thesis. 
But then again we have to remember that the idea of the "actor" is common to 
both ideologies, socialism and nationalism. They both need the actor, it is the class 
for the first, and it is the nation for the second. So, this is for Miller where 
nationality meets citizenship. The first furnishes the common identity necessary 
for people to think of defining their world together, and the second provides them 
5 8 7 Miller, D. Market State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism , (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.8-10 
5 8 8 Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.227-240 
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with the tools to do so. 5 9 0 Normally, the independence of action that people enjoy 
in market environments is compatible with citizenship's requirement of some 
political involvement and taste differences. Citizenship symbolizes an equality of 
status, thus meeting the radical idea of egalitarian community, while providing a 
moral foundation for distribution according to needs, as well as the practical 
means for fulfilling this ideal on a society-wide basis.591 I believe that his 
treatment of the nation-state is Miller's major contribution to current socialist 
thinking. He introduces in socialism something that was hitherto missing with 
disastrous consequences as we have seen. The problem is that in times of 
globalisation the nation-state is losing its importance. But that does not mean that 
we have to throw the baby with the bathwater. I f old nation-states, traditionally 
understood, are not capable any more new forms might emerge. Instead of the old 
nation-states, new ones wil l be created, based in the case under consideration, on 
the emergence of a new European nation (it is doubtful though whether Miller 
would accept the EU as a nation-state equivalent). A new nation that wi l l be the 
result not of wars of conquest, and domination, but of mutual understanding and 
consent, and that will provide for the proliferation of a number of multiple 
identities. The process of European integration and the building of a European 
identity in the future will provide us with a new platform. This concept can be 
traced back to the federalist aspirations of Spinelli. So, once more, we can see the 
relevance of Spinelli to today's discussions about the future of the left and its 
relation with the process of European integration. 
Where politics is seen as the aggregation of interests the political system remains a 
piece of external machinery. Decision legitimation is based on the procedure 
Miller, Market. State, and Community , p.241 
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followed rather than the outcome itself and as such faces several difficulties. A l l 
interests must be pressed with equal force, the interest's strength, rather than its 
quality is what counts, and it is widely assumed that it is not possible to find an 
acceptable aggregation procedure. The alternative model is politics as dialogue, 
and the socialist idea of citizenship 
exerts powerful pressures towards the form of legitimation that politics as 
dialogue promises to provide. Where dialogue succeeds, the citizen's 
rational capacities are respected, and he is able to align himself with the 
decisions that are reached.592 
Questions about everyday consumption and questions of personal belief and 
morality are excluded from dialogue. But the dialogue could proceed to identify 
interests, and means of realizing them, common to all members of the collectivity 
in question, and to award competing claims to resources in terms of agreed justice 
standards. This type of dialogue takes place among the citizens of a nation-state 
which are bound together by a common public culture. And despite the fact that 
ethical traditions are heterogenous, and capable of being interpreted in opposing 
ways, the interpretations offered stem from something common among all 
members of the community. This community must be big and loose enough to 
allow for the separation of political and personal relationships as required by an 
impersonal type of dialogue, thus justifying the representative model. 5 9 3 
Discussing toleration, Miller noted that the question of how to respond to cultural 
diversity presents a major difficulty. Ethnic divisions offer a narrower focus of 
loyalty and nourish a factionalized form of politics. The solution is an overarching 
Miller, Market. State, and Community, p.245 
Miller. Market State, and Community , pp.245-251 
Miller, Market. State, and Community , p.260 
Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.252-275 
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socialist sense of identity which is more vital to all communities than their 
individual subcultures.594 Toleration, nevertheless, ought to be valued when 
freedom of speech and the realm of private culture (religious beliefs, sexual 
relationships, etc.), when not generating demands on the state for special forms of 
support, are concerned.595 In developing the sense of citizenship a crucial role is 
going to be played by the institutions of politics and by the educational system. A 
citizen must understand the history of the collectivity to which he belongs i f he is 
to perceive his fate as connected with that of the rest of his fellow citizens and 
therefore to develop a sense of common citizenship.596 
In this outlined socialist model the state wil l have five functions. A protective 
function, safeguarding people and the assets and benefits they have accumulated. 
A distributive function, allocating and reallocating resources according to the 
principles of distributive justice in both economic justice and personal welfare. 
Economic management, the regulation of economy in order to work efficiently. 
The provision of public goods. And finally, self-reproduction, supporting present, 
and preparing future citizens for their role. 5 9 7 Such a state should be an "apparatus 
whereby the popular wi l l is translated into effective policy". 5 9 8 Such a state though 
must solve the problems of bureaucracy and scale. Each one of us needs a 
protected sphere free from state intervention. When local issues are at stake it is 
difficult to apply Macpherson's 'pyramidal system'599. Some decisions involve 
specialist knowledge. Some cases involve conflicts of interest. In some cases 
5 9 4 Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.279-284 
5 9 5 Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.284-287 
5 9 6 Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.287-293 
5 9 7 Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.295-298 
5 9 8 Miller, Market. State, and Community , p.298 
5 9 9 This system, as outlined by Macpherson, C.B. in The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy , (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1977) is one based on local assemblies electing delegates to communicate their 
opinions to regional and national assemblies. Thus, higher level decisions are a sum total of primary direct 
decision making. 
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single majority decisions when added up together could result to a poor policy 
overall. For all these reasons decisions should not be made by simple 
majoritarianism. And since there is no sovereign in Hobbes' sense and decision 
making is divided, the need for a constitution determining the competence of the 
various state constituting political and administrative bodies, as well as a 
constitutional court arises. The socialist state should embody the rule of law, assist 
the assertion of human individuality, and protect human rights by means of a bill 
of rights. On the economic domain the main task is to find the institutional 
framework that can reconcile political monitoring with market freedom. Banks, 
free from undesirable political control, should be given the task of creating 
enterprises, investment should be sensitive to local needs while individual 
enterprises should be protected from the lending agencies. The state's success in 
performing such a function depends on the prevailing public and political culture. 
Discussing the state's role in welfare provision Miller argued that a public system 
comes closer than any other to distributing the goods in question according to 
relative need, although this should not substitute a wider commitment to equality. 
Medicine and education require a public system allowing for consumer choice, 
whereas in housing for example public authorities should play a complementary 
role to the markets.600 
Market socialism is a pluralistic system based on the market economy and the 
state, the first producing most goods and service within a state established and 
enforced framework. Citizenship provides the means by which people determine 
their future in a new participatory form of political system. The socialist state 
shares the liberal features of its liberal counterpart, but it employs a more 
Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.298-319 
286 
democratic way of formulating basic policies.6 0 1 Feminist, environmentalist, and 
other concerns cannot substitute for socialism as the world of work remains of key 
importance to the vast majority of the population.6 0 2 
Critics have pointed out that a problem with Market Socialism is that the idea of 
having a market to allocate produced goods and services, while removing the 
financial rewards and sanctions which normally determine quality and quantity, is 
bizarre. I f a hard working successful individual can only draw the same rewards as 
a less motivated one, motivation and ambition will disappear thus reducing the 
society's wealth as a whole. It is Utopian to believe that self-interest can be 
eliminated entirely. Moreover, starting gate equality requires an extensive welfare 
state with large police and confiscatory powers, thus rendering itself incapable of 
substituting for end state equality. Here it can be said that these critics have 
somehow missed the point. Market socialism does not advocate the complete 
elimination of unequal rewards. They still do exist, but not as great as in laisser-
faire system. 
From a left wing point of view, Beuret and Coole saw the pursuit of markets as 
antithetical to genuine socialism. First, although temporary balances may be 
struck, markets display certain structural imperatives which are likely to remain 
more powerful than any rational socialist control system bent on constraining or 
co-ordinating them. I f we are to move beyond possessive individualism and a 
semi-Hobbesian view of human nature, a more radical program is required. 
Secondly, market socialism suffers from tendency to economic reductionism 
which relegates questions about other aspects of life to a secondary position. 
w ' Miller. Market. State, and Community. pp.321-323 
6 0 2 Miller, Market. State, and Community, pp.324-325 
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Thirdly, the market is equipped more to profit maximization than meeting needs. 
As a result, research and development are oriented not in socially useful 
directions. Furthermore, production decisions, even in the democratic workers' co-
operatives, wil l not into account the concerns and needs of those outside the 
organization. Fourthly, members of workers' co-operatives are bound together by 
self-serving interests rather than solidarity. The reduction of socialism to market-
socialism represents a failure of courage and imagination. Socialism must not be 
reduced to a radical version of J.S.MilPs liberalism.6 0 4 
Mandel offered a more traditional orthodox left-wing criticism of market 
socialism. He argued that efficient market regulation is absurd. It is impossible to 
have an extensive market economy without bankruptcies and mass unemployment. 
And as total resources are always limited, any use of them by the public sector or 
for non-market purposes of direct need satisfaction automatically reduces their 
availability for market-oriented production. The history of capitalist free enterprise 
is the history of more and more people deprived of the necessary means of 
producing their livelihood on their own account. For Mandel market relations 
could be eliminated for all goods whose elasticity of demand is falling towards 
zero or has even become negative. And although market socialism is born out of 
opposition to bureaucracy it will lead to a repressive and detached state. The 
debate is not about the greatest possible economic efficiency but about the greatest 
possible freedom for individuals. They themselves, rather than markets or experts, 
should have the right to make these decisions freely. 
6 0 3 De Jasay, A. Market Socialism: a Scrutiny 'This Square Circle', Occasional Paper 84 , (London, The 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990) 
6 0 4 Beuret, K. and Coole, D. "Rethinking the present", in Forbes, Market Socialism , pp. 18-21. 
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That is what human freedom is about. That is what socialist planning is 
about605 
Generally speaking, market socialism as outlined fails to address the problem of 
how an incoming socialist government committed to reform is going to overcome 
the substantial obstacles that its opponents are going to put up. As R.Miliband 
noticed, this points to a general failure on the part of many socialist thinkers to 
appreciate the existence of a substantial power structure in capitalist democratic 
regimes, and the degree to which people are prepared to fight for its 
preservation.606 Other criticisms can be directed against market socialism. It is not 
clear why co-operatives for instance pursuing their narrow self-interest within a 
regulated socialist market amount to a different system than the one in which 
private enterprises follow their narrow self-interest within a regulated capitalist 
market. And even i f it can be argued that such a system would be more just, it 
does not follow that it wil l be more stable and more subject to social control. 
Market socialism is based on nondiscriminatory regulation by the center. But this 
fails to address the problem of local self-interest, which wil l do its best to avoid 
regulation bargaining and the regulator game. Moreover, even the outcome of 
nondiscriminatory regulation wil l appear arbitrary to some who would not accept 
its outcome. And although the regulators might reflect democratically agreed 
national preferences, the compulsion of the market reinforces and reproduces 
alienation since the narrow self-interested consciousness is sustained by material 
incentives.607 But despite its failures, market socialism is a first step in the right 
direction since socialism seems to be coming into terms with its own mistakes and 
attempts to correct them. There is still a lot of work to be done but we are on the 
right track. Again, it must be made clear that, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
6 0 5 Mandel, E, "The Myth of Market Socialism", New Left Review , no.169 (May/June 1988), pp.108-120 
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there is an echo of market Socialism in Spinelli's thought. And Market socialism 
can be seen as bringing together all the recent ideas about socialism with the 
notions of choice, democracy etc. figuring prominently in it, alongside the market. 
It can be said that Market Socialism brings together the diverse European models 
such as the pluralism of national and regional communities that operate under the 
European framework. At the European level, Market Socialism commits to certain 
values such as democracy, the rule of law and social solidarity, and a degree of 
commitment to redistribution. Moreover, it promotes a policy of ecologically 
sustainable growth and of alternative action in areas like science and technology 
where there are economies of scale, as well as presence in the international arena. 
Finally, it can be said that for socialists that want to operate at a European level, 
Market Socialism provides the link and the justification for such an action. From 
the Treaty of Rome onwards, the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
European Communities (EC), and the European Union (EU), all have been 
characterised by a strong commitment to Markets. The Single European Act 
(SEA) has underlined this process. Without market Socialism the accommodation 
of European integration, and Europe, into the socialist project would have been 
impossible. 
Miliband, R. Socialism for a Sceptical Age , p. 163 
Devine, "Self-Governing Socialism" , pp. 196-7 
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CONCLUSION 
The present thesis has demonstrated that the relationship between nationalism and 
socialism has been a troubled one. This can be explained by the fact that the founding 
fathers of scientific socialism had relegated nations and nationalism to the 
superstructure. So, the lack of a coherent legacy left the followers of Marx-Engels 
without a solid base upon which to construct a proper theory of nationalism. Even 
attempts by Gramsci and Bauer were incapable of breaking completely free of this 
straitjacket. It can be said that the reason for this failure is to be found in their 
preoccupation with economic factors and with the state and political structures. This 
preoccupation can explain the failures of the Internationals in the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth centuries. The working class became attached to the nation-
state and in times of crisis it felt that there was something worth defending in it. 
After the end of the Second World War, the process of integration in the western half 
of the European continent gathered pace. This was a new phenomenon that in many 
ways affected the power and the role of the nation-states. The examination of the 
German SPD and the French PS/SFIO has shown that both dealt with this 
development in accordance with perceived interests emanating from the two nation-
states rather for specifically socialist reasons. They produced a confused policy as 
they were caught between the need to appeal to a domestic electorate, the 
responsibilities of running the state whenever they happened to be in power, the 
realities of the international environment, and the internal party balance of power. 
291 
Needless to say that this confusion was best manifested in the vocabulary and the 
rhetoric used. 
It would have been expected that socialist thinkers would have managed to avoid 
these pitfalls. But unfortunately this was not the case with the three types of socialist 
theoreticians, and their approach towards the process of European integration, that 
have been examined. Even Galtung and Mandel, freed from the responsibilities and 
the constraints of practical politics, failed to provide a satisfactory analysis of the 
phenomenon of nationalism and the way integration in Western Europe was 
developing. And, although to a lesser degree, this was also the case with the French 
Rocardiens. They all ignored nationalism and remained preoccupied with statism. 
The notable exception to this failure was Altiero Spinelli. Spinelli was in the unique 
position of being both a thinker and a practicioner. But above everything else, he was 
a convinced Europeanist. And, throughout his long career spanning almost five 
decades, he had the opportunity to have an inside view of the way the major 
Community institutions work. The underlying current of his thought has remained 
federalism which he encountered through L.Einaudi. At the same time, he was a a 
non-doctrinaire socialist who distinguished between Marxism and socialism, and who 
managed to appreciate the importance of nationalist feelings. To a degree his career 
and thinking were determined by the fact that he was an Italian and Italy was the 
country of Eurocommunism and coalition politics. 
Spinelli, spent his last years in the European Parliament working towards the draft 
European Union Treaty, and died in 1986. Soon afterwards the so called "existing 
socialism" came to an abrupt end in the eastern half of the continent. Meanwhile, the 
post war Social-Democratic project was undergoing a major crisis on the countries of 
western Europe with the economic crisis and the advances of the new right. The left 
project was in a desperate need of redefinition. A major debate is going on about the 
future of socialism in a comprehensive way. This debate evolves around the central 
themes of the unit of socialist change, the agent of socialist transformation, and the 
socialist theory and practice. 
With regards to the unit of socialist change the topics of discussion include the ideas 
of national sovereignty and the state. This discussion touches upon both the process of 
European integration and socialism. Sovereignty is central upon any discussion of 
integration in Europe. At the same time sovereignty, seen as the location of power in 
the state has been essential to socialism. Nowadays, the idea of national sovereignty is 
being challenged in a number of ways, both internally and externally as a result of the 
growing interdependence and globalization. It follows then that the state is not an 
effective tool for any government that find its hands tight in its attempts to pursue its 
policies. For socialist parties, which have traditionally attempted to utilize the state 
mechanisms in order to put into practice their policies, this has been an unpleasant 
surprise. Meanwhile, though the nation-state remains the focal point of popular 
imagination. 
At the same time the working class can not be seen as the agent of socialist 
transformation. The old paramount conflict between proletarians and capitalists that 
had shaped the traditional socialist project has been replaced by a number of other 
conflicts and, correspondingly, new multiple identities have replaced the single 
working class one. People are now defined by their sex, their colour, etc. These has 
led to a proliferation of new movements such as regional and environmental to 
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mention but a few, that have led to the emergence of new forms of political 
radicalism. 
A l l these demand a new synthesis of socialist values i f the left is to regain popular 
support and escape from the corner that the so-called new right had put it in the last 
two decades since the usage of the state mechanisms in both east and west had failed 
to produce the desired results. Such a synthesis is constructed around the notion of 
democracy and includes the issues of choice, rights and autonomy, and citizenhip. 
Directly connected to these is the new theory of Market Socialism which can be seen 
as the application in economic terms of the democratic notions of choice, autonomy 
etc. 
In a way market socialism is the epitome of the whole discussion as it brings together 
the connects of the nation-state impotence, of multiple identities and democracy, and 
of European integration. We have to remember here that i f socialists are to utilize the 
opportunities offered by a united Europe, they must first accommodate the market 
since from the Treaty of Rome onwards European integration has primarily been an 
exercise in free market. 
It is here therefore that Spinelli's ideas become very topical. Most notions dominating 
the above mentioned discussions are to be found in Spinelli's thought. He broke free 
from marxist economism, and he advocated ideas of market socialism long time ago. 
He campaigned for more power for the representative bodies, for more power to the 
regions and he was concerned about the environment and the provision of welfare. 
Moreover, he emphasised popular participation, accountability, constitutionalism and 
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citizenship. And all these, since he was a federalist, at the European rather than the 
national-state level. 
For over a hundred years the socialist movement all over the world has faced a 
dangerous dilemma. The working class has been organized in movements based on 
the idea of the people. This has been the result of the division of the world system in 
states. The nation-state has been glorified by both, socialists and nationalists. As 
Habermas put it, its great historical success can to a great degree be explained by the 
fact that the modern state has turned out to be the most effective vehicle for the 
/ A n 
accelerating modernization of society. The great achievement of the West European 
nation-state was the linking of accountability, loyalty and legitimacy with power and 
authority, to tie political community to state power. But as we have seen in the course 
of the last quarter of the century this link is now loosening. The nation as a social and 
political community is gradually becoming distant from the state as security and 
welfare provider. 6 0 9 And as the nation-state is being challenged by the multicultural 
differentiation and the trends towards globalization the European Union is the only, 
at present, available substitute for the traditional nation-state. 
It cannot be said that the European Union is panacea. Nor that it wi l l be successful. 
What I am saying is that in a number of fronts such as the environment, equality, 
citizenship etc. the European Union can be utilised to further the socialist cause. 
There are several shortcomings and failures. But some possibilities can be exploited. 
Habermas, J. "The European Nation-State - Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future 
of Sovereignty and Citizenship" in Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) Mapping the Nation , (London, Verso, 1996) 
p.282 
6 0 9 Wallace, W. "The Nation-State - Resque or Retreat?" in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. (ed.) The 
Question of Europe , (London, Verso, 1997) p.45 
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Of course there is still work to be done in this direction. Although member-state 
citizens are greatly affected by Union decisions and are subject to its legal norms, the 
European Parliament for instance has very little say in issues like this. This 
democratic deficit has to be corrected. One here must remember Spinelli's great 
contribution to this effort. His ideas should be the guideline for any attempt to redress 
this imbalance. But some important positive steps should not be ignored. For example 
the European Parliament has actively been involved in fighting racism in the 
Community for a long period. And although the Union's member states are 
responsible for the determination of Union citizenship, the very fact that such a 
concept has been introduced is remarkable and it opens a window of opportunities for 
the left. 
But as we have seen national identity is still an important issue. People become 
attached to their nationality and make sacrifices for it. It follows then that i f the 
European Union is to become the focus of popular support, the need for the 
elaboration of a European national identity is pressing. As Miller has observed, it is 
valuable from a universal point of view for people to have the moral power to bind 
with each other into special relationships with ethical contents. The nation provides 
the communal ties that are necessary for the effective operation of the market. 
Moreover, a European welfare arrangement must be based on communities the 
members of which recognize obligations of justice to one another. To have a national 
identity one does not have to be a nationalist in the doctrinaire sense, and there should 
be no friction between someone's nationality and their identity as for example a 
woman. 6 1 0 Nationalism can stimulate the move from private subject to citizen. 
6 1 0 Miller, D. On Nationality 
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The construction of a European identity presents us with a challenge. How it can be 
done? This is not an answer that can be given within the limits of the present thesis. 
But we can agree with A.D.Smith when he says that the official formula of "unity in 
diversity" is not the right one. Instead what is needed is a new formula of a "family of 
cultures" resembling Wittgenstein's concepts of "family resemblances" and of the 
"language game", which features a variety of elements, not all of which feature in 
every example of the game.611 
The socialist failure can be explained by the fact that nationalism is not a concrete 
unified doctrine. Nationalism is a Janus faced doctrine. It has two faces. One, the 
exclusive, and another, the inclusive. The first, is based on the element of race or 
other factors that nationalists claim to be objective. It defines the nation as an 
aggregation of people that share some common biological characteristics. National 
identity in this case is a hereditary characteristic, something you are born with and 
you can not escape or acquire. One is born Greek or German. No one else can join 
such a national community. The second, is what I call inclusive nationalism. Here 
national identity is a characteristic one can acquire in the process, one that does not 
exclude the other, one that is based on tolerance, equality and respect. In this case one 
is not born Greek or German but i f they so wish, they can become Greeks or 
Germans. In the ancient Greek way, Greek is whoever has the Greek paideia, the 
Greek education. The ancient Greek formula allowed for people to share multiple 
identities as one could be Athenian and Greek, or Spartan and Greek at the same time. 
One could say that the modern example of such a nationalism is the American one. 
The big melting pot has produced a nation that has managed to incorporate a variety 
6 1 1 Smith, A.D. "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", International Affairs , Vol.68, no.l, 
(1992), pp 70-1. 
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of cultures and origins. A nation that most of the times has been at ease with its past 
and a nation that despite several drawbacks has managed to achieve, and maintain, a 
dominant position in world affairs. 
So, the socialist failure is to great extent to be explained by the inability to understand 
this duality in the nature of nationalism. Not all nationalisms are deplorable and 
dangerous. What is even more important is the fact that some of the aspects of this so-
called inclusive nationalism are of vital importance to any socialist attempt to correct 
the ills of society. The nationalist idea of community and belonging can be the main 
allies of any socialist effort for redistribution in society. And at a time when socialism 
feels the need to exploit the possibilities of common action with the new movements 
ideas like these can provide the platform for a mass mobilisation and rallying behind 
these new values. 
The construction of this new European identity within the process of building a new 
Europe is a difficult one. But it is the only route available to us. 
The European Community, with all its warts, is thus a step in the right direction, not 
least because it seems bound to enshrine, at some new level, the principle of 
multiculturalism - not as a congeries of irritable narcissisms, but as a rational 
integration of local cultural solidarities within, but sharply distinct from, the supra-
ethnocultural "republican" state-idea that was born from the Enlightment. This 
stance permits Habermas to speak about the possibility, emerging from the kinds of 
international meetings held recently on global issues in Geneva, Rio de Janeiro, 
Cairo and Beijing, of what he calls "world domestic politics " 6 I 2 
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